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

SPECIAL ISSUE: THE ANCHOR BREWERY: PARK STREET, SOUTHWARK

PETER MATHIAS

Brewery History (2012) **145**, 2

INTRODUCTION

KEN THOMAS

The academic discipline of business history was a child of the 1950s. As a branch of economic history it went beyond merely recounting the history of leading companies, and sought to explain a company's place in its wider industry, and that industry's importance to the even wider economy. There are many examples of this pioneering work, amongst them Charles Wilson's *History of Unilever* (1954), Theo Barker's *Pilkington Brothers and the Glass Industry* (1960), and Peter Mathias' *The Brewing Industry in England, 1700-1830* (1959). By the time this book was published, Peter Mathias was in his early thirties and a fellow of Queens' College, Cambridge. However his interest in business history had started many years before and he spent the summer of 1953 researching the extensive archives of Barclay Perkins & Co of the Anchor Brewery, Park Street, Southwark. A short essay or article, 'The Anchor Brewery', was then written. It was not specifically intended to be published and, for nearly 50 years, a single copy of it remained in the Barclay Perkins' archives. When Peter Mathias retired as the Master of Downing College, Cambridge in 1995, his original typewritten manuscript was presented back to him - but still there was no thought of it being published. Only now, nearly 60 years after it was first written, has it finally been made available to a wider readership through the Brewery History Society's journal.

Although 'The Anchor Brewery' is important as it opens a window on the early stages of the study of business history, it is also much more than that. It tells the story of the rise of one of England's largest breweries against the backdrop of the industrial revolution. It examines the changes of ownership of the brewery, from the Thrale family through to the establishment of a partnership between David and Robert Barclay, John Perkins and Sylvanus Bevan in the 1780s. By 1826 the firm of Barclay Perkins brewed an astonishing 380,000 barrels per annum, and in 1896 when the firm became a limited liability company, Barclay Perkins & Co Ltd was valued at a little over one million pounds. In 1921 they built a new lager brewery on their Southwark site, thus anticipating a trend in the market before many of their rivals, along with an extensive export market covering both the British Empire and beyond. However, after the Second World War Barclay Perkins & Co started to lose their way and, by 1958, they had merged with their near neighbours Courage & Co, and brewing had ceased on the Park Street site.

But this is a postscript. Professor Mathias' essay deals with a more energetic period of the brewery's history when Britain was becoming enveloped in industrial innovation and free trade philosophy. Britain's economy was expanding rapidly and her influence was soon to wash out over the entire globe. British firms like Barclay Perkins were part and parcel of these historical movements.

[The following manuscript has been reproduced unchanged apart from some minor spellng corrections. Editor]

THE ANCHOR BREWERY

Park Street,

Southwark.

-o-

An account of the growth and development of a London business from the Seventeenth to the Nineteenth Century.

P. Mathias,
Jesus College,
Cambridge.
1 9 5 3.

BREWERY
HISTORY

Brewery History (2012) **145**, 4-74

THE ANCHOR BREWERY: PARK STREET, SOUTHWARK

PETER MATHIAS

The Text has been written with the Tables of the Rests, which I have already prepared, very much in view. A copy of these tables is already at the brewery (I believe in Mr. B.W. Cockes' care), so that the assertions of the text can be checked against it. I could not see any way to include these typewritten tables in the Appendix because of their size - I think they would have to be reduced photographically or printed in small type to be included.

The long table of Capital accounts (in many ways the most interesting of all the accounts) is left incomplete. I need to return to the Rests for a few days, in order to note the total investments of other investors to bring the accounts into line with the totals for everybody.

A little more information about Thrale's finances may emerge from a close study of all the accounts preserved in the Thrale Collection held at the John Hyland's Library, Manchester. This I hope to be able to make on my return to England.

The general background of the economic development in the brewing industry during the 18th. Century will be discussed in an article in the 'Explorations in Entrepreneurial History' for May, 1953, published in Cambridge, Massachusetts.

INTRODUCTION

The personal details of the ownership of the Anchor Brewery from the Child family to the Halsey, the Thrale and the Barclay and Perkins families are well known. I have spent little time working on these specifically biographical stories, taking much of the family information from the published manuscript and notes of Mr. B.W. Cockes. I have studied the surviving records of the business and of its owners as businessmen, so that this study will try to deal with the actual growth of the brewery; with the more prosaic but more fundamental details of economic problems faced and commercial opportunities grasped. In the 18th. Century, above all, biography and history cannot be separated, but I shall limit my interests to the people in their rôles as businessmen and in their situations as affecting the fortunes of the brewery. In addition to this convergence of families to the firm, the fortunes of the firm itself must be seen in relation to the changing situation of the brewing industry and trade conditions in the country generally, The history of a business concern makes the most historical and economic sense only when placed as far as possible in its total relevant environment. It is important to know absolutely that the Anchor Brewery expanded its production rapidly after 1795; but it is stimulating - and suggestive of further problems - to realise that this happened while its rivals were suffering from a decline in production. The grin on the face of the Cheshire Cat is most remarkable only in relation to the absence of its body. I hope therefore, that the history of the particular firm and the cause of economic history will prosper best by making the basis of a study as wide as possible.

RECORDS

By the middle of the 18th. Century there were well-known and recognised techniques in the management of a large brewery - or a 'Capital Brewhouse' as it was called. These essentially did not change in the course of the century so that a brewer of 1700 would still have been at home running the business, or doing the actual brewing, in 1800, though doubtless amazed at the scale of the work, the lay-out of the plant and the mechanical aids for pumping, milling and mashing. There was also the saccharometer for him to master. This well-established routine of manufacture and marketing is reflected in the equally well-established bookkeeping system. I have found this common to all the breweries whose records I have seen. To a certain degree it is different from the accounting systems in other industries and had evidently evolved in response to the particular needs of the brewery, and was as much a body of professional 'know-how' as any other branch of the management. It is essential, at this point, to give some idea of the nature of this accounting system, in order to show what information about the development of the firm can be gained from such parts of the records as have survived. This may appear tedious, but only with this commentary do the tables of the Rest Accounts become alive for the person untrained as an accountant.

The most important records remaining at the brewery are the Rest Books. They were made yearly and exist from 1748, with gaps only for 1751, 1760 - 1766, 1768 - 1779. (This last decade is the most important lapse.) From 1780 onwards they are complete. This is itself significant. It is natural that the Rest Books should have been the most carefully preserved - it is above all the Rests which have survived in the records of the other breweries where anything at all is left - because they contained the information most valuable to the owners of the business. Yet they by no means give the complete picture of the firm to the historian, and, strange: they lack the most obvious information - production and sales. In fact, they are nothing more than complete balance sheets of the firm taken usually at the end of May or the beginning of June each year, when the summer heat had put an end to brewing in a normal season. When the partnerships begin it was common to find that the Articles contain a clause detailing the Rest at a day of the week closest to June 1st. All the partners would then assemble for the valuation and stocktaking, and customarily enjoy a Rest Dinner afterwards. Normally this amounted to an inspection of the Rest Book of which a fair copy had already been made, and there was no disagreement. There might be a copy of the Rest Book for each partner where there were only two, but when the numbers were greater it was customary for the Books to be kept at the brewery in the care of the Managing Partner. In this case they would be open to inspection at any time by any of the partners. This may explain the presence of the Rest Books after 1780 - when the brewery was controlled by partnerships working under this system; and even indicate the chance for gaps before 1780, because then the firm was owned by a single man who could take the Rest Books home at his pleasure. Indeed, at the end of Henry Thrale's life the family spent much of their time at Brighton, with Mrs. Thrale doing most of the communication with Park Street, so that it was natural for some of the Rests to be away from the brewery. And this is even truer when Thrale was dead and the five executors were trying to work out what price they should try and get for the business. This latter point may explain the absence of the ten years of Rest Books from 1768 - 1779, which would be the crucial decade for analysing the fortunes of the firm.

Essentially the Rest Book showed the value of the nett. assets of the concern, and this may have given the Rest its name - that which was left after liabilities had been deducted from assets. When this total was compared with the total at the Rest of the previous year, and that amount which had been taken out of the business brought into the calculation, the gain of the year's trade could be assessed. This position clear, the partners could agree, or the owner could decide, how much they would take of the year's profit and how much should be left in the business. Then, in the case of the partners it would be divided according to their shares. Essentially this is the genesis of the dividend paid to ordinary share holders (when partnership has been transformed into Limited Company), which existed or failed to exist following the success of the trading year. Similarly, the preference share capital of today had its beginning in the Surplus Capital Account of the 18th. Century partnerships, where those people who lent money received a regular 5% on their investment. It became customary for the partners to invest in this Surplus Account, and written into the Rests there were often specific agreements whereby the partners limited the amount of capital they could withdraw in any one year, with the proviso that a certain proportion of that taken from the nett. asset; would be placed to their accounts in the Surplus Capital - thus ploughing back a proportion of the profits. All this merely made explicit what had been customary when the firm was owned by the single man; that it was not to be robbed of capital or starved of the chance of expansion by the absence of ploughed-back profits.

The Rest Book therefore contains this important record of the growth of the nett. capital stock, and the chance of estimating the profitability where the amount withdrawn from the business is known. But a caution is necessary. This 'rate of profit' cannot be accurately compared with the modern concept of what the firm means by it. Under a single owner, there was no valuation made of his own services in a salary which would come under the costs of management. He merely owned the increase of the year. Similarly, during the 18th. Century the accounting did not employ a regular depreciation policy. This could mean an artificially high rate of profit for several years which concealed the running down of assets until an artificially low profit in a particular year would mean heavy expenditure in replacing the item - boiler, copper, mill, etc. Valuations tended to become customary also.

The Rest Book had another specific importance to the partners implied in this function of valuation. If one died, then his share of the nett. capital stock would be assessed on the valuation of the preceding Rest; or if an old partner wished to retire without handing on his share to his son, then his part would be calculated similarly on the valuation of the Rest. Hence it was crucial that the figures be uncontested and without distortion. To ensure this each partner would testify his agreement with the valuations by signing the book - and until the document bore the signatures of all the partners it was not valid. After the signing the valuations could not be contested - and there could be no complaint that the premises or stocks had been undervalued in order to make the total artificially low in the year a partner was going to retire (hence limiting the value of his share to be withdrawn, so that the whole might be revalued upwards again in the next year after his departure.)

This being the purpose and scope of the Rests their value limitations for the historian becomes apparent. Especially is this true where the other books have been destroyed. They are analogous to the surviving skeleton of a man, for a person trying to reconstruct his life. The bones will tell how large was his physical structure, but will scarcely reveal the shape which the flesh and muscle gave to the whole man. Nor, within certain limits, will the skeleton show how strong or active he was, nor how much work he used to do. With this in mind it is worth while analysing the information which can be obtained from the Rests, and the position of the other accounting books in relation to them.

Taking the assets first, or the first folios in the Book, there comes the debts owed to the brewery. These comprise the outstanding accounts of the London publicans, the country trade and export customers respectively. Being a balance sheet only the Rest gives the state of the accounts in a cross-section taken at a certain moment in time. So, for each of the headings in the Rest Book there will be a Ledger in which all sales and transactions are recorded as they occur. The Rest will give the state of this ledger at the moment when the balance is struck. Receipts from the London publicans came in every month (the initial delivery of beer was paid for when the next was delivered and so forth, the deliveries being each month) Consequently there was a monthly or less than monthly debt outstanding from the publican to the brewer whenever the Rest was taken. At the end of the 18th. Century this total for the London trade will include also money on loan to the publican - and it is important that this should be distinguished from the actual debts owing for beer delivered, where the accounts allow this to be done. Payment by the country and export customers was normally by bill of exchange (later by cheque) at three or six months credit. As the turn-over of capital in the country trade was three times or more less than in the London trade each year, the resulting calculation must be made when comparing the debts outstanding from both in the Rests. For instance, £1,000 owing to the brewery from the London trade will represent, at a minimum, a sale, of £1,000 worth of beer for a month. £1,000 owing from the country trade can mean, also at a minimum, a sale worth £1,000 during three or six months. [This depends obviously on the assumption that there are no long-term debts outstanding.] In practice the country trade receipts were longer in coming in, and the turn-over was slower than the official credit terms of the brewery implied.

On the debit side - of the indebtedness of the brewery - the same things hold true. The Rest gives only the state of indebtedness at the moment, which is taken from separate account books in which all the transactions are recorded as they appear. It is from these books alone that the total of expenditure for the year on particular heads of accounts - malt factors, hop merchants, coal merchants, coppersmiths, coopers and carpenters, with the like, - may be assessed. These expenditures will also appear in the Cash Books and Journals as they occur. From this side of the accounting system only the Hop Book from 1786 - 1893 and the Cash Books from 1776 - 1809 remain, without any of the Great Ledgers of the London trade (sometimes so big that they are difficult to lift, and certainly too bulky to store with ease) or the Country Trade. It was customary for the malt factors to allow the brewery six months' credit, and probably this holds true for the rest of the payments to established traders, while the small men and debts would be paid in cash on the spot. Where the malt and hop purchasers are listed separately then it becomes possible to gain some knowledge of the structure of the two branches of the industry - especially where there is fuller information in the stocks' valuation headings in the Rests. On the credit side of the Rests, and directly laying off some of the expenses of the hop and malt payments, are the sales of grains to the cow-keepers of London, and the sale of the boiled hops for manure. The brewers had certain of these sales as perquisites but other credits for them appear in the Rests and in some of the running accounts of the expenses of brewing for the year, which are included in some of the Rest Books of the early 19th. Century.

When the limitations of the Rest figures have been explained they can still give some intimation of an expensive year in building and in buying, and, less sure, of a rewarding year in sales, by comparing the figures of liability of and indebtedness to the brewery for that year with the neighbouring years. And in the years when, from outside sources, sales figures are known from production figures, possibly a co-efficient can be found between their level in the years and the level of debts owing in trade which can be applied to the debt figures of other years to get some idea of the sales figures. This is treacherous ground for there are so many variables which exist between this relationship of debts outstanding and yearly sales, and the figures are too frail to bear the weight of any correlation upon them. Some idea of the dangers may be gained from the malt and hop debts. Unfortunately most of the accounts are entered in the books only under the surname of the merchants involved, which makes identification impossible in the case of the commoner names. But it is certain that there was very commonly a transference of a trade debt by the brewery to a permanent investment credit for the hop merchant or malt factor in the Surplus Capital Account. When this debt in trade is transmuted into investment it bears the usual 5% interest. The relationship between the brewery and its raw-material suppliers becomes therefore more than purely a market-connection. Very often there were personal, even family ties, between them but a permanent investment which might run on for many years consolidates the bond, and must have been advantageous to the brewery in a bad year or bad times, when the merchants felt themselves to have a direct interest in the concern. But the switching of the debts in the Rests makes calculations based on the extent of trade debts difficult where it is impossible to be certain how many of them have been transferred to another heading. In the case of the more important merchants only is it easily found.

Just as the number of malt merchants dealt with can give an idea of the structure of the malting industry, so the numbers of the London publicans served, and the numbers of country and export customers, show the extent of the market, if not the volume of sales It is using the Rest Books in this kind of way that the maximum of information can be squeezed out of them.

Next on the credit side of the Rests, debts in trade to the brewery in the books, come the valuations. First are the stocks of beer. All the Rest figures have to be calculated in money but the price and quantities are generally given in the folios which enables more exact information about stocks to be gained. So the kind of beer made, and the relative importance of the mild beer (porter) against other kinds may be assessed. This is the more certain as all the beer made went into store for a time to be matured so that the stock valuations can give a fairly good idea of the proportions between the various kinds brewed. But, again, this series of valuations cannot be taken as absolute over a long time series. Firstly the valuation rates changed with the times - and more precisely with the successive jumps in the excise taxation - and then the maturing time for the beer decreased. The amount of stock depended on this maturing time in vat as well as cask, and after 1800 several factors were at work shortening it. It was in the interest of the brewery to cut down as much as possible the time taken to turn over the capital, and hence to limit this time in vat. Techniques for quickening the process with stale beer combined with a change in the public taste, which may or may not have been purely autonomous, to prefer the milder beer, so that the rate of turn-over of the beer in stock became much faster. This must be borne in mind when looking at the series of beer valuations. In fact, the rise in value shown there means a more than proportionate rise in production.

Malt and hops tell a similar precise story of prices and quantity - and from them something can be discoverer about stock carrying policy in hops. The art was to buy heavily in certain years in order to avoid the high prices which resulted in that particular year when the hop blight struck the gardens. For malt too, the kind of malt and its place of origin are usually mentioned. Both are important, for the different proportions of brown and pale which were used in the making of porter can be broadly gauged from these accounts. The early 19th. Century saw an important change here. Porter used to be made primarily from brown malt, but increasingly pale was used to give the strength and the colour and flavour imparted by a small quantity of roasted malt - an economising measure as much as the quickening in the rate of turn over of beer in stock. Similarly the valuation of casks gives quantity and price, which can indicate where country trade expands, but which give little knowledge of the amount of cooperage done at the brewery or the merchants who supplied the staves. The astonishingly high value of the casks does, none the less, show how large the production was, and the implications of this in equipment.

The valuations of the plant and equipment contain disappointingly little of exact description or precise information. Where one wants to know how many vats and boilers there were in the parcel which Johnson said was really the potentiality of growing rich, beyond the dreams of avarice, there will be the brief statements of 'Coppersmith's Appraisal £5,000', 'Backmaker's Appraisal £2,000'. For horses there will be a similar round figure named as the farrier's valuation; and so forth through the list of fixed assets. It is seldom that even the buildings are listed separately so that a new tun room will appear as an additional £1,000 on a total figure. Little items, some of them more picturesque than important will be singled out - the brewery clock (like the stables at all the country houses in the 18th. Century the breweries had their clock over the yard.), the fire engine, the weapons issued during the Napoleonic Wars for the defence of the brewery by its servants from invasion up the Thames. The steam engine appears separately in 1787, and from the Cash Books details of its cost, erection expenses, and the yearly premium paid to Boulton and Watt are listed. From the Rests the resulting drop in the valuations of the horses as the mill horses gave way to the engine are noted in the following years. It is with the steam engine (and the clock) that regular depreciation in the yearly valuations begins. These were the first pieces of equipment inviting a regular drop in value as time passed - a vat or a building might last an indefinite time. But even here the depreciation payments of £50 each year or two years proved very pessimistic, for the engines ran so slowly, and so noiselessly as all remarked, as not to wear out for many years. A century in the case of the one at Whitbreads. In most cases, as in the instance of the one at the Anchor Brewery they were removed to make way for a larger model, and were sold still working. The other machines introduced also appear in their turn in the Rests; mashing machines and 'rousers', and the refrigerator in 1817 (a water cooler more than an ice-making machine.)

In a sense, the most valuable and precise evidence given by the Rests is that of the investments with the firm. As these did not change as rapidly as the debts in trade, but were from their nature more long-term in effect, the Rest Books give a convenient summary of the changing fortunes of these deposits, and a complete analysis of their sources. This is true also for the brewery 'investments' also in leases of public houses in London and in loans to the publicans. So from the Rests the purely financial side of the firm is clearly described. When this is backed up from the Finance Ledgers (or the Private Ledgers as they were called, probably because they were kept by the managing partner and not the clerks) a complete survey becomes possible.

This nearly completes the balance sheet. Balances of cash held at the bank, other investments of the brewery, apart from the trade, and smaller items complete each side of the book. When all assets have been added, and all the debts, the difference between them is the nett. capital stock of the business, and owned by the one person or between the partners.

One of the unfortunate consequences of the Rest Books being limited to this particular function is the absence of all reference to the expenses of management, the salaries and wages of all those employed. Presumably as these were paid out of the cash in hand they never appear as outstanding in the Rest Books. Payments to the Clerks, the Brewer, the head Cooper of the firm would be in the Gratuity Book and the labourers' wages in the Wages Book, with details of their perquisites, but these books do not survive.

It is with these observations in mind that the tables of the Rest accounts can be interpreted to elicit both the information which they express and the information which they conceal. Much of the account of the growth and development of the Anchor Brewery will be drawn from these sources.

Part I: The Early Business.
Until 1781.

"This year (1765) was distinguished by his being introduced into the family of Mr. Thrale, one of the eminent brewers in England, and Member of Parliament for the borough of Southwark. Foreigners are not a little amazed when they hear of brewers, distillers, and men in similar departments of trade, held forth as persons of considerable consequence. In this great commercial country it is natural that a situation which produces much wealth should be considered as very respectable …"

Boswell: 'Life of Johnson', OUP (i), 327

The Seventeenth Century

The earliest surviving books of the firm on which to base its history date only from 1748. Some extracts from a single previous volume, the Cash Book of Edmund Halsey kept from 1692 - 1703,*1 alone give points from the position at the end of the 17th. Century, but without the valuations or the complete accounts to say for certain how large was the brewery or how extensive its production. From secondary evidence the production was at least great enough to produce affluence for its owners. And this had been true for most of the century, assuming that the various owners gained their wealth mainly from receipts of trade by this business. The elder James Monger who developed the trade almost or quite from the establishment of the brewhouse on its present site in 1615 or 1616 was able to leave £1,000 to his grandchild Bridget and small legacies to his godson and St. Thomas's Hospital before passing the main inheritance to his son Henry. This son did not continue in the brewery but the younger James Monger held it from this date, 1757, until 1770. In 1633 James Monger had the tenure of the brewery from a Hillarie Mempris, who in that year passed the lease to John Partridge for £400. The indenture survives, and describes the property as being formed from eight tenements, doubtless very small, with their 'yards, backsides, gardens, garden plotts, chambers, rooms, casements, sheds …' and so forth according to the legal formula. A small part of the property was leased by Sir John Bodley (probably a ground rent) to a Francis Carter for £6 p.a.; and the bulk of it to Monger for £21½ p.a. So the position here is probably that the ground rent was £21½ and the value of the buildings £400. Although not at all large in comparison with what it was later to become this document proves one important thing conclusively - which the fortunes of the owners of the brewery show indirectly. The brewery was large enough to be manufacturing for sale to retailers in London, and too large merely to be a brewhouse attached to an inn. The economic function of the business did not therefore change from this time onwards, although the scale of the operations grew with the scale of the market exploited. The point needs emphasis in relation to the organisation of the brewing industry in 1700 and before.

Throughout the length and breadth of rural England - including the market towns which were an economic part of that system - brewing was organised locally without much specialisation of function. The brewer was akin to the baker; he made the product and sold what he made over his own counter to customers who came to take away or who stayed to drink at his own bar. As maltster he would buy grain from the local corn market, itself locally grown barley, or possibly buy directly from the local farmers (but most generally the former). He would malt the barley he bought himself and sell malt to the home brewers of the district to make their own beer. It was customary, even for the farmer who brewed, to buy his malt from the maltster-brewer, despite the fact that it might be from his own barley. This was true for the hospitals, country houses and colleges who had their own brewhouses but seldom any maltings. On small beer the children grew up and servants and patients survived, while strong was the staple drink of men. On one of the most extensive local markets in the country innumerable maltsters and brewers prospered. As 'brewing-victualler' he would malt also for himself, for the heart of his trade was for his own inn. Special beer might be sent out in cask for local customers, but more would be fetched from the inn or consumed there. He would purchase hops from the travelling hop merchants unless he lived amongst the gardens in Shropshire or the South-Eastern counties of Hampshire and Kent.

The important point is that there was no differentiation of function between maltster and brewer, between maker and retail seller. And in these circumstances, serving a small market, operations were bound to be on a small scale. This was not the case in the large towns such as Bristol, Norwich, Sheffield, and above all London, where the state of the market invited specialisation. Burton was also beginning to expand on Baltic exports. Broadly speaking the changes in the structure of the brewing industry during the 18th. Century were that malting and brewing became separate trades, the innkeeper in the towns became only the seller of beer, and the making of beer itself was industrialised. In other words, the brewing industry passed through its own form of industrial revolution. What happened in the towns during the 18th. Century, moreover, was carried over to the country districts in the 19th. and the 20th. Centuries as the railway and the lorry extended the marketing area for beer brewed in large breweries. The Anchor Brewery exemplifies the story of the dominance of the London market by the few great brewers during the 18th. Century, successively taking over the trade of the brewing victuallers and their smaller rival breweries. It was only in an 'intensive' urban market where beer could be delivered to a great many sellers in a small area by dray that these large scale units of production could develop in the 18th. Century. The increase in production becomes rapid after 1740, but in London the trades of brewer and maltster had been distinct for a long time, and certainly there were wealthy Common Brewers (as these brewers who sold to publicans were called in law) on Thames-side as far back as the mid-16th. Century, reported by Stow. In the country as a whole in the decade 1710 - 1719 only 35% of the malt made was made into beer for retail sale (the bulk of the rest being made into beer privately); by 1800 - 1809 decade this proportion had risen to 52%, and the 19th. Century virtually saw the end of the home brewer. London was almost a century ahead in development. By 1830 the Common Brewers made 95% of all the beer brewed in the metropolitan area, and of this the first twelve porter houses brewed almost 85%. In 1750 the first twelve houses brewed 43% of all the beer sold. This was a total of 979,500 barrels out of which 437,000 came from the twelve. In 1830, 3,441,500 barrels were brewed in London altogether; 1,200,000 of them by the twelve breweries alone.*2 Throughout the period the two rôles of Common Brewer and Brewing Victualler were legally distinct, and the former was not allowed to brew for retail sale except at the tap house of the brewery. In return he got a 'wastage' allowance of almost 10% free of duty from the Excise Commissioners, deliberately invoked to encourage the large breweries at the expense of the victualler. The purpose of the device was fiscal; it being easier to collect duty from a few large establishments where an officer could be on duty the whole time than from a myriad small inns where it was easy to deceive the visiting officers. So at the outset, a Common Brewer in the 17th. Century had a fiscal advantage when the duty was put on beer, and the chance of exploiting an evergrowing market if he was in London. This is exactly the position in which the owners of the Anchor Brewery found themselves. This figure of £400, together with the proved wealth of succeeding owners, make it certain that the brewery was one of those selling to publicans; it was already specialised in function, and had that specifically capitalistic nature which realised itself in the expansion of the 18th. Century.

The typical success story of that century - which comes true more often than we imagine - is of the industrious apprentice who succeeds in marrying his master's daughter and inheriting the business. In truth this is more the tragedy of the master who had no son to whom he could pass on the inheritance. For a business, when personally owned, was personal property as much as a landed estate or silver plate - and the inheritance of the eldest son. But whereas a girl might maintain property under stewardship, or wealth in lands or plate, until marriage, the inheritance of a business was a far different thing; demanding active management, technical control and all the 'know-how' of markets and the command of men. This could only be gained by living in a world of markets and men. It virtually meant that if there was no son to take it over, a firm passed into new ownership. When the daughter married the manager it was a '*pis aller*' for the father. It was the irony of the Anchor Brewery to come into the possession of the man who made it great through a failure of male heirs, and to pass from his own son for the same reason. Johnson knew exactly the position of the firm in these circumstances. In 1776 he remarked, when Mrs. Thrale was known to be going to have another child and wished for it to be a boy,

"... I should wish her not to be disappointed. The desire of male heirs is not appendant only to feudal tenures. A son is almost necessary to the continuance of Thrale's fortune; for what can misses do with a brewhouse ? Lands are fitter for daughters than trades."*3

This happened several times in the history of the Anchor Brewery until the partnerships began in 1781 and brought flexibility, with continuity into the ownership. James Child, it appears, bought the brewery from James Monger in 1670. He was free of the Grocer's Company before entering the Brewers' Company in 1671, and, became master in 1693. He had no son to take over the business and Edmund Halsey, the son of a miller, who was keeping the cash books in 1692, and therefore evidently in charge of production, had the good fortune to marry Edmund's daughter, Anne. On his marriage in 1693 (when payments to the Childs in the Cash Books for the first time are noted as to 'Fa. Child and Moe. Child' instead of to Mr. and Mrs. Child) he became a co-partner with his father-in-law (the expenses of making the Articles are entered in November, 1693) and inherited the whole through his wife when James Child died. But, in their turn, both the sons and heirs of Halsey died young, and his daughter married Lord Cobham ("It was not fit that a peer should continue the business."*4) so the same problem of continuity arose. This time it was his poor nephew, Ralph Thrale, a clerk in the brewery, who was able to buy it from his rich cousin and pay the £30,000 in eleven years out of the profits. This whole problem of continuity was forgotten after 1781 with the successive partnerships and, later, recruitments to the Board of Directors. But until that time, just as the daily success of the business depended primarily on the ability and drive of the single man - owner and manager, capitalist and entrepreneur together - so the continuity of the business, which again could make or break it, rested on the family situation of this same person. Business history and biography cannot be divorced.

The Eighteenth Century

At the turn of the 17th. Century a more detailed analysis of the firm becomes possible. Indications of wealth there had been in the three generations before, but none so direct as the marriage of Ann Child to Lord Cobham in an age when marriage was a contract reflecting very much mutual scales of social position and wealth. The lost cash book gives a more precise but partial view of the actual business.

In 1697 as managing partner after James Child's death, Edmund Halsey was taking a salary of £52 p.a. - apart from the profits of the year which, as partner, he would share. There is an indication that he shared £800 with Child for the year in 1695, when that sum was withdrawn, and in 1696 there is the entry of £18 withdrawn 'Moe. and Self for 2 weeks', another instalment of a regular salary-payment more than a partnership profit. Halsey died a rich man, for the brewery was already operating on a fairly large scale. Before 1700 there are entries for 'Rideing Horses at the Liveries Stable, man's livery, wine, wine for hunt, wigs', which suggest a social position of some importance. And this he must have held, moving in the small commercial and political group in the City - as a Member of Parliament related to the Cobhams, Lord of the Manor of Stoke Poges, Master of the Brewers' Company (1715) and Governor of St. Thomas's Hospital in 1719. At his death he could leave £500 to his daughter, £100 to his wife's sister, £100 to his clerk, Lewis Laundy, £300 to Saml. Wise and £10 each to every clerk, workman and servant - all to provide mourning only. This in addition to his estate. The brewery was producing wealth enough for a gentleman of the 18th. Century to live 'Handsomely but without ostentation' - as Horace Walpole later interpreted this station.

Supporting this, the Cash Book shows that the brewery had already bought in at least one brewhouse-cum-alehouse, the Green Dragon for £275 - presumably for selling the Anchor Brewery beer, as it was kept in repair. This itself is significant. Insurance payments on the brewhouse came to £21 8s. (unfortunately it is impossible to calculate from this what the valuation is, because of the doubt about the scope of the insurance). Capital invested in the firm at 1700 was at least £1,700 (Halsey had lent £200, E. Williams £1,200 and Malyn £300 - all at 6%). In addition £1,000 was invested by Halsey in the firm's books in Government Stocks ('lent to the King') and there were two small loans to Excise Officers. This probably means that the brewery was large enough to have these officers permanently on the premises, as was already the practice at the larger breweries.*5 And Halsey spent £16 petitioning Parliament, which would only have been done by one of the small group of the greatest brewers at the head of the trade, and meeting at Brewers' Hall. The expansion or repairs to the brewhouse in the year 1699 - 1700 also show how large it was. £254 was paid for carpentry, a total of £3,546 to a Mr. J. Clark, brewer, (but evidently a builder of some sort) and £408 to the coppersmith - which means probably a new building with a very large set of utensils in it. There is mention also of a small export consignment to the Barbadoes (15 Tuns of XX Beer worth £24) - which would be a special brew of strong beer to withstand a long, rough, sea passage and a hot climate. The export of beer to countries beyond the North Sea and Baltic shores was beginning at this time - following Englishmen wherever they settled in trading stations and plantations in both West and East Indies, Spain, Portugal and beyond.

These entries indicate what the complete book or the Rests would tell in detail - that at the turn of the century the Anchor Brewery was already a large establishment, one of the few big breweries in London, with valuable premises, large utensils, the mills and pumps worked by horses (there is payment for a blind horse which would only have been used in a mill), with the management already used to dealing in large sums. The organisation of management also appears to have assumed much the same pattern as it was to keep for the next century and more. One person would be in control - the Halsey, the young Thrale or the John Perkins of the time - as the owner became older and more committed socially and in Parliament. Later this was to be the managing partner. Under him were the two senior clerks (in 1729 Lewin Laundy and Samuel Wise) representing the heads of departments in a modern business. Probably one of them was in charge of the routine and accounting for raw-material buying; the other for business about sales and management. (Since the 18th. Century the currency of the term has depreciated in value. Then the word clerk might denote someone of great importance in a firm - at the end of the Century a senior clerk might be receiving nearly £1,000 p.a., a very considerable salary at contemporary values. The old meaning survives in such terms as Clerk of the Peace, Clerk of the Court, and in the Civil Service ranking as 'Principal', which is the shortened form of 'Principal Clerk'. Very extensive responsibilities and decision-making belonged to the senior clerks of an 18th. Century firm) The head of the brewery would take the decisions in the actual brewing, possibly with another brewer under him, and attend the markets for selecting hops and malt.

Having looked at the position of the brewery at the end of the seventeenth century in as close detail as the documents permit, it will be useful, before proceeding with the description of its growth under the Thrales, to try and assess its economic position in relation to economic conditions generally.

Firstly, the site was excellent being on the Thames where the wharfs were good. Malt was bulky and cheap in relation to its bulk so that the only effective medium for transport over long distances was water. This was absolutely true for the malt which came down the Thames from the West Country markets as far up as Newbury*6 (West Country Pale or Brown - or WCP, WCB as it was noted in the stock valuations in the Rests), or round the coast from Kent and Norfolk (the Ship Malt). It was relatively true for the malt coming from Hertfordshire, although some carts did supply the breweries on the North bank of the Thames and in North London with malt from Hertfordshire. Land carriage from Ware ceased after the improvement of the Lee Navigation in 1766. Even before then the water carriage was 1s. per quarter from Ware and the land carriage 3s. 9d. or 4s. per quarter from Bedfordshire.*7 A brewery on the Thames would have an advantage in the costs of its raw materials over its competitors situated away from the river in Chiswell Street, where Whitbread had set up his large brewery in 1750; in Brick Lane at Truman's, and elsewhere. The expense came not so much in the actual cost of carriage but in handling the malt when a cargo had to be 'broken down' into carts at the waterside and taken to the brewery. When most of the malt was purchased from the market at Bear Key this was not so important - as the cost of shipping it across the Thames in barge was not much less than taking it to the breweries by cart. But as the century progressed more and more of the malt was bought on direct contract from the malt-factor in the malting areas of Hertfordshire and Norfolk, the economy of being able to bring it right 'home' became more valuable in the cost patterns of the Anchor Brewery. Also, but less important, the same held true for the beer sent away from London by water, whether up the Thames, around the coasts of England or beyond the seas. This trade beyond the boundaries of London never became vital for any of the big brewers, who depended on sales within the metropolis, but insofar as the country trade of the Anchor Brewery expanded greatly at the end of the 18th. Century the site on the waterside became important for beer as well as malt.

The intensive urban market on which they did depend - that within the 3 or 5 mile radius which could be exploited by the dray - suffered only temporary checks to expansion when building came to a near-stop during some of the wars when credit was expensive. Apart from this the population grew in leaps, and the houses marched out into the fields beyond Westminster and Limehouse, and formed into the Bloomsbury Squares and terraces like an army. The boroughs outside London, even before they became joined to the main body of the capital, like Hampstead, Highgate, Finsbury, were still within the metropolital marketing area of the brewers. Such opportunities which the new century revealed as time passed could be seized by the brewers more than almost any other industry. Above all, the market was there, and the technique of manufacture did not need to wait for steam power or the railway before this market could be exploited. Cotton had to wait for the steam-engine to bring the factories back to centres of population, iron had begun to be made on a large scale but Cort's 'puddling' process in 1784 brought the industry free from charcoal completely and back to the towns. Steel had to wait for the Bessemer process in the 19th. Century to become 'industrialised' on a large scale. Baking could not go the way of brewing until the invention of the steam-oven. While none of these inventions was purely autonomous, but proceeded in a degree from force of circumstance spurring the inventor; the lack of a need for any new process for brewing to become 'industrialised' meant that there was no technological time-lag in this industrial development in brewing. In essence the problem and the solution were simple. To take advantage of the larger market the brewer had to make his utensils bigger and bigger. This itself gave economies of scale, for the costs of construction and the number of workers did not increase proportionately to the capacity of vat, copper and back. Because the handling of a liquid in manufacture was more simple than processing a solid - say iron - planning the brewery itself led to major economies. When one utensil was placed under another, or the mashing vat put just under the malt mill, only one man was needed at the cock to transfer the contents of the largest of these to the one below, and one pump could get the wort from one side of the brewery to the other. Not until the beer needed to be racked into barrels was there need for many labourers. All these things merely emphasise that brewing was technologically more suitable for being organised in units of large scale, industrial production than almost any other industry in the 18th. Century. The crux of the matter was the existence of a suitable market to be exploited by a large brewery. When this did exist, the breweries taking advantage of it grew to be some of the largest units of production in the country. This is the economic background of many of the picturesque details known from contemporaries. It helps to explain the rivalry amongst the brewers for having the largest vat in London, of the breweries themselves being one of the sights of the capital shown to visiting kings and princes, and the remarks of many of the visitors - that while the yard was full of bustle and noise, inside the brewery the actual brewing was done in deserted and silent surroundings. All this was true of the years before the introduction of steam power in an efficient form in 1785. Steam was taken at once by most of the great breweries (Watt named the London brewers and distillers as two of his chief customers) to help greatly in economising and speeding production, but it was an aid to that process and not the innovator of it. Steam did not cause the same transformation in the structure or the location of the brewing industry as it did in other industries, because, in London, this transformation had occurred beforehand and was not dependant upon steam-power. In these respects, the techniques of manufacture supported the commercial advantages existing for an established brewery in London at the opening of the new century.

Such development as this depended also upon the presence of much capital for expansion, and here again the brewery was fortunate. The site could be expanded without difficulty, and the business was already large. This meant that the initial sums for 'overhead' expenses in setting up a large establishment were avoided - growth could come gradually and easily by utilising the profits which were already considerable from the large production in 1700. Coming by stages, erecting a new tun room one year, installing a new copper or a new horse mill the next, there would not be the heavy drag of interest payments for large loans needed to build up a large brewery from the beginning. In a bad year when raw material prices were high, or when a certain innovation was needed in plant, there would be a search for funds. In these circumstances of availability of temporary loans, Thrale was fortunate, and, after 1781, even more the Quaker families. The sources for loans in the 18th. Century depended more upon the family connections and friends than upon the banks (very often if a loan did come from a bank it would be truer to describe it as a loan from a friend or relative who happened to be a banker) and the people to whom the owners of the brewery turn when in need, shows very clearly the strength which a well-established social grouping gave to a business. Here also the history of the 18th. Century, as in its politics, cannot be understood without social analysis. While economic forces impinged upon the business, and moulded its development, creating needs and influencing policy, they acted onto a structure conditioned by a certain social composition, itself creating and being created by economic circumstances. Insofar an analogy does not distort this unity, the observer must analyse the structure of the ship when in dry dock, observe the forces of wind and tide at sea, and then understand the behaviour of that particular vessel encountering these pressures.

<u>Thrale</u>

The great era of the brewery began with the Thrales. Their friendship with Dr. Johnson and the literary world of London brought fame to the business, and secured it a place in the history of that world. From the writings of Boswell and Mrs. Thrale for the first time a richness of personal detail and character appears in the history - a little of the flesh and muscle which the bones of the account books do not possess. Johnson quoted with approval the reward for honest labour which Ralph Thrale received after working for more than twenty years at only six shillings a week, in the brewery which he afterwards owned. When it was decided that he should have the opportunity of buying it, security was taken on all the buildings, and he was enabled to pay off the debt of £30,000 out of the profits each year. So with frugality and industry he came into full possession, with the debts cleared off, in 1740. He did not join the Brewers' Company until 1732, and although he went up through the hierarchy of offices in the following years there is every reason to think that this was merely to avoid the difficulties of not playing a part in their activities. When elected Master of the Company in 1748 he did not appear to take up the office and had to be warned twice thereafter to attend the meetings of the Court of Assistants more regularly. This attitude was maintained by Henry Thrale after his own admission to the Company in 1755. On his election to Renter Warden in 1770 he was admitted to fine for the office "... on account of the multiplicity and other business in which he is engaged," and again in 1773 he fined for the Mastership "being totally unable to give the necessary attendance." This refusal to take the rôle of the Brewers' Company seriously was common at the time amongst most of the important brewers who had a full job on their hands in being in sole charge of their expanding concerns, apart from other duties in Parliament. It reflects the fact that, at this period, the Company played an important part only in the social and charitable side of its activities, apart from providing the meeting point where unofficial co-operation might result. It did not assume an important position as a Company until the end of the century, when it was the organisation through which considerable regulation of trade resulted (especially through the Committee of Porter Brewers meeting at Brewers' Hall). Its economic position was then reflected in the regular attendance of the great brewers.*8

Ralph Thrale became M.P. for the Borough in 1741, and gained a fortune from the business, bringing up his son with all the advantages which wealth and connection could bestow. He lived with the best men in Oxford, following that first instalment of the 18th. Century gentleman's education with the next - a grand tour of Europe in the company of Lord Westcote and £3,000, his yearly allowance from his father. This scale of living, paying off the £30,000 for the firm until 1740, and the expenses of Parliament and Henry Thrale after then, account for the lack of growth in the nett. capital stock of the brewery from 1748 to 1767. Little of the wealth being produced was evidently allowed to remain in the business for the total assets in 1750 were £77,000, the nett. assets £72,000, and in 1767 £90,000 and £40,000 respectively. The nett. assets here are unexpectedly low because of heavy liabilities, but they did not reach the figure of £70,000 at all during the years for which the Rests survive, (1752 - 1759) after 1750 and before 1780. The real expansion of the firm comes between the years 1767 and 1780 - when the assets more than double, but it is just for this period that the Rests are missing. Ralph Thrale was perhaps conscious of the absence of growth of the firm through failure to plough back the profits, for Boswell reports him as saying about his son, "If this young dog does not find so much after I am gone as he expects, let him remember that he has had a great deal in my own time."

In 1748 there were evidently two brewhouses in production, although one of them was quite small in comparison to the Anchor Brewhouse, and as the accounts of the 'second House' do not appear again after 1748 it is probable that brewing was confined to the original plant. The subsidiary may have been the Vine Brewhouse, situated between the Thames and the Anchor Brewery which Ralph Thrale bought in 1731. In 1727 this had been sold for £200 so that it was more inn than brewery, but possibly production had been developed there until 1748. Then the nett. assets of the two houses were £58,000 and £13,000 respectively. With these figures in mind the scattered production figures become more meaningful. Full reference will be made to these in a table, as with the Rests, while the significance of the trends alone will be brought into the text. The barrelage brewed in 1748 was 35,580, and this rose rapidly in the next two years to 40,670 in 1749 and 46,100 in 1750. Until 1760 there is no more information about production, so that these three years do not allow any interpretation to be placed upon them about expanding capacity. In 1760, moreover, barrelage had dropped to 30,740. When the complete series begin in 1776 the same result is given as in the Rests. In that year production was above 75,000 barrels, and it was only to drop below that figure in three more years; so that this again establishes the years from 1760 to 1776 as a great period of growth when compared with the years from 1750 to 1760.

The remainder of the Rest accounts show what might be expected and the various accounts bear roughly the same ratio to each other in all the years until 1780. Debts in trade do not rise significantly and the loan total to London publicans fluctuates but does not become important. This is true also of the leases held by the brewery, most of them in public houses, but together they establish the fact that from the beginning the maintenance of the custom of a publican through a credit bond, or a fixed lease-tie was common. True, the race to tie the London trade did not begin until the end of the century, but when that struggle started, the way had been long prepared and the course taken was in no ways an innovation, save in scale. Similarly the monies invested in the brewery are insignificant when compared with the great sums which were to be deposited after 1781. The amount varies between £1,000 and £5,000, composed of the Club Accounts and the Private Accounts. It is probable that the Clubs attached to various public houses were the first - and spontaneous - social security groups, whose members put a little money into a common fund each week, and withdrew the interest at the end of the year, or whenever funds were needed for sickness or burial. It was a standard practice for the publican to be the keeper of the Club's account and he would place the money at interest with his brewer. Here, as in so many other ways, the public house was the centre for local organisation around a social purpose. The Clubs would be advantageous to both parties. At a time when banking facilities were not widespread for the small investor, Clubs and individuals could be sure of a higher yield for their money than was obtainable in government stock - and the large breweries were some of the most secure industrial enterprises in the country in which to invest. On the other hand, the brewer was able to draw in working capital from his activities as a private banker, which he could put to work with great advantage in his business. And the Clubs were useful to him in maintaining regular custom at the public houses in his trade. In the case of Thrale, however, the numbers of the Club accounts were never large, fluctuating between eight and fifteen, and the amounts deposited by a Club would seldom be above £100. Similarly, the Private Account is made up of a large number of small, irregular deposits, and in no ways has the importance or the composition of the Quaker family capital which moved into the business after the sale in 1781. Few, if any, of these depositors are friends or relatives of Thrale, and the only familiar names appear to be those of the brewery clerks, who are named as such in the Cash Books.

At this time, the brewery was a personal firm, depending for its financial backing in the bad years, as for its direction, upon the one person. This being so, there is always the danger that the books of the firm will not reflect the financial position of owner and business accurately. If Thrale borrowed money privately the record may not be entered in the books, and as such, impossible to discover without a complete analysis of the family papers.*9 And in the one case where Mrs. Thrale describes the collecting of all available cash in her family to meet the emergencies of 1772, the Rest Books are missing so that it is impossible to check both family and firm accounts together. With this possible limitation in mind - which is also operative in the case of the elder Thrale's remark about his inheritance to his son, quoted above - the growth of the brewery out of profits can be seen.

The entry of Henry Thrale to the control of the firm in 1758, on his father's death in the early spring of that year, was the sign for a great expansion in plant; probably the basis for the expansion in production which occurred after 1767. This can be seen most clearly from the various utensil valuations which appear only under a total in the Rest accounts:

Coppersmith's Appraisement.

1757		£746
1758		£106
(Credit from sale of old copper	£618)	
" " lead	£99)	£763
" " brass	£46)	
1759		£1,209
1767		£1,170

Backmaker's Appraisement.

1757	£630
1759	£956
1767	£1,853

Millwright's Appraisement.

1757	£95
1758	£68
1759	£1,423

(This last figure drops regularly in valuation through depreciation until 1767 when it is £132)

Total Valuation of Plant and Utensils.

1757	£4,676
1758	£3,569
1759	£7,111
1767	£7,675

Stocks of casks tended to vary greatly depending on the state of deliveries to the London publicans at the time of the Rests. In 1748 there were only 2,880 butts in stock; the following year the very high total of 18,870, and only 11,880 in 1767. The total grew gradually from that date onwards. Until 1780 the only large numbers of casks were butts - used for the London trade, and the other smaller casks were quite insignificant in number. After 1780 an increasing number of barrels appears in successive years, which is probably a sign of an increasing amount of country trade and export consignments. Barrels were far easier to handle at sea than unwieldy casks of 108 gallon capacity, and as the beer was stronger than the London porter it is doubtful if much of the country trade beer was sold in bulk over the counters of inns. While this movement comes only after the change in ownership, its beginning in 1767 is worth mentioning. In that year in the cask account 'Butts in the Country Trade' and 'Sea Barrels' are listed for the first time - 163 Butts and 20 barrels only.

Turning to the Beer valuation there is an innovation in 1767 which is scarcely coincidental, coming with the new non-London trade casks of the same year. (Both may have come in the gap for the years 1760 - 1766 when the Rests are missing). Until then the main beer in stock was only Mild Beer - or London porter. A small quantity of amber was evidently brewed but this would be for a quality market, and more expensive. Beer in stock was valued at 22s. the barrel for mild in 1748, 28s. for amber. These rose after the increase in the excise taxation in 1761 to 27s. and 30s. respectively. Several other kinds are listed, although the quantities are infinitesimal, and most of them are probably used in the processing of the mild beer, except the small beers. These are stale beer, cloudy beer, eager beer, stale amber. The new beer first mentioned in 1767 is the Pale Stout (to our ears a misnomer) and it is this kind which increases in quantity with the increase in barrels in the cask account. On the export of this expensive beer away from London, the brewery was able to outstrip its London rivals. For technical and economic reasons it was the expensive beers which were sent to the provinces and beyond the seas. First a rough sea voyage and a hot climate needed a strong beer to survive without depreciation, and therefore an expensive beer. Economically too, a beer which was more valuable in relation to its bulk could travel to a wider market than the ordinary porter. Beyond the small area within which delivery by dray was possible, water was the only carrier until the railways came. And even here the costs of transport were so high that it was not profitable to serve scattered customers outside London with anything but the most expensive beers. The ratio of the costs of transport to the total value per barrel in the case of the Stout was only half that of the porter, and this widened the efficient marketing area accordingly. In view of the development of the Irish market by the London brewers the point is important. Until the exigencies of the Napoleonic Wars, when high prices for grain, heavy freight and insurance charges made the shipping of beer to Ireland unprofitable the London, Liverpool and Bristol brewers had virtually owned the Irish market. In the few years of war, when the beer excise was removed from the Irish brewers, and the malt tag lighter than England, the Irish brewers seized their opportunity and captured the market completely and irrevocably. Since that time the traffic in beer has come the other way. The interesting point of this development, in relation to the present discussion is of the kind of beer. The Irish market had become accustomed to Stout - for the reasons given before. When their own brewers took over the market (notably Guinness) it was on stout, and not on London type porter. It was the export of this stout to Ireland in the 18th. Century which set the pattern for the Irish Brewery in the 19th.

The importance of the Irish market for the Anchor Brewery is shown by the travels of John Perkins. It was of sufficient importance for him, the superintendent of the brewery after 1770 under Henry Thrale, to go himself to organise the sales to Cork and Dublin merchants. Equally, the Cork authorities thought Perkins worthy to be made a Freeman of the city in 1773, so that the trade he brought to the City was probably considerable. Unfortunately, it is masked by the Rests only giving debts in trade for all country exports together, and no excise accounts survive which would show the rebate on the duty for beer sent abroad. It is, in fact, a coincidence of Mrs. Thrale owning estates in Wales which draws attention to Perkins' journeys. When he was working for Henry Thrale, and when he was a partner in his own right, he regularly collected the rents for her, or saw that they were collected, on his way back from Ireland. It became one of the personal services on which Mrs. Thrale came to depend, for though she became exasperated with John Perkins on occasion at heart both knew how much they relied on one another. Their friendship was shown in Mrs. Thrale becoming the godmother of his eldest son John, and in looking after the boy's schooling - all Perkins' family had a similar affection shown them. From the beginning all the circumstances of the management of the brewery made for this alliance. It is true that Mrs. Thrale opposed Perkins' efforts to obtain a share in the ownership of the business before the death of Henry Thrale. This was at a time when Perkins was virtually in sole charge of the brewery and naturally wanted his rewards to be more commensurate with his responsibilities. He was still manager with a fixed salary (probably more than the £500 p.a. he was getting in 1770 when Boswell met him for the first time, dining with the Thrales) and so did not receive any of the year's profits. In 1780, when Thrale was ill and away from Southwark, Perkins tried to establish his position. Mrs. Thrale opposed him: "... 500 a year I am willing to give the man but he has set his heart upon Power ... Duce take him!" "Perkins takes every step to worm himself into this proposed partnership ... *non mi piace tropo*." The rôles were suddenly reversed after Thrale's death, when the true position became plain to all. The executors could not run a brewery; Perkins could. A purchaser had to be found; it was Perkins who found them. Even here, it was the generosity of Mrs. Thrale lending him her own money which enabled him to become a partner, as opposed to being the manager for the new owners. It was a just recompense for him. Increasingly from 1772 onwards he had been in charge of the firm, with Mrs. Thrale associating herself more and more in the absence of her husband. But she could never have been successful in this had it not been for Perkins. Then in 1780 he had virtually saved the brewery from the rioters - and it was Mrs. Thrale alone who responded with two hundred guineas and the silver cup engraved with the apposite inscription, '*Mollis responsio, iram avertit*'. After 1781 Perkins continued to look after her financial affairs, and continued to collect her rents in Wales. In view of this Mrs. Thrale's opposition in 1779 - 1780 is seen to be occasioned by the temporary circumstances which Henry Thrale's death abruptly reversed.*10

It will be more appropriate to discuss the raw material buying and the sources of malt and hops in the next section of this study, for they become significant in relation to the changes in the traditional pattern which occurred after 1781. However, there remains the important question of the profits of the brewery under the Thrales, a feature which is excluded from the Rests. It was to share these profits, in whose creation he had been the most instrumental person, that Perkins wished to change his status from manager to partner. Henry Thrale once told Boswell that he would not quit the trade for an annuity of ten thousand a year; "'Not (said he) that I get ten thousand a year by it, but it is an estate to a family'". This was probably soon after he had taken over from his father, for Mrs. Thrale knew that it was producing full ten thousand a year by 1778. The passage is worth quoting in full for it gives a very good insight into the attitudes of rivalry which attended the expansion of production amongst the London brewers, as well as showing the profitability of a large brewery. The winter she speaks of is 1777 - 8.

"Mr. Thrale overbrewed himself last winter and caused artificial scarcity of money in the Family which has extremely lowered his spirits. Mr. Johnson endeavoured last night and so did I, to make him promise that he would never brew a larger quantity of beer in one winter than eighty thousand barrels (Note: '... if he got but 2s. 6d. by each barrel, 80,000 half crowns are 10,000 pounds - and what more would mortal Man desire than an income of £10,000 a year - 5 to spend and 5 to lay up' Mrs. Thrale) ... but my master - mad with the noble ambition of emulating Whitbread and Calvert - two fellows he despises - could scarcely be prevailed on to promise even this, that he will not brew more than fourscore Thousand barrels a year for five years to come ..., and so the wings of speculation are clipped a little ...”

She defines ‘speculation’ (for her a kind of ogre whose presence is enough to explain any misfortune descending upon a business) as ‘brewing more beer than is necessary merely because malt is cheap, or buying up loads of hops in full years, thereby expending one's ready money in hopes of wonderful Returns the ensuing season.’

A more sober estimate of the profits of his business was left in the 1780 Rest, written by Henry Thrale himself. On a piece of paper he calculates the Total gain for the year 1767 - 8 to have been £9,397, for 1768 - 9 £19,577 (of which only £5,966 was withdrawn from the trade) and the average for ten years to be £15,033. It is not certain from which ten years he has taken this average, but from comparison with the size and profitability of other breweries it is probably for the decade 1769 - 1779. Certainly, in this decade more capital was allowed to remain in the firm than ever before (this would be calculated in the profits which are increments in nett. capital plus withdrawals by the owner); the net stock rising from £42,171 in 1767 to £149,206 in 1780.

It is with the consideration of one of the commercial crises weathered by the brewery in 1772 that the full force of Mrs. Thrale’s remark about ‘causing a scarcity of money in the family’ can be appreciated. Bad harvest conditions causing high malt prices, a drop in demand through more wages being spent on food and a decline in employment meaning less purchasing power in existence, all combined to hit the brewers who were not allowed, traditionally, to raise their retail prices to the publican as a result of one bad harvest. The theory was that they stood the loss in a year of dearth and gained the benefit of artificially low malt prices in a year of glut. In the case of Thrale, 1772 was a bad year through him being indirectly involved in the money market crisis in the City. So, taken together, the year 1772 is a good instance for watching the effect of a liquidity crisis on a large 18th. Century firm having a familial structure in ownership as did the Anchor Brewery. Financially Thrale was connected with his brother-in-law Arthur Nesbitt; so intimately that at Nesbitt’s bankruptcy and suicide in 1779 the bond between them was rumoured to be as high as £200,000. In 1772 Nesbitt was touched by the bankruptcy of Fordyce, and, in turn, Thrale was involved through Nesbitt. Just at that time too, a mad venture with Humphrey Jackson had ended in disaster. Apart from rash experimentation with brewing, Jackson had persuaded Thrale to invest a great deal of money in a venture to prevent ships’ timbers from rotting. This entailed great expense in erecting large vats in order to boil the timbers in a chemical solution. Mrs. Thrale affirmed that the metal in these alone had cost £2,000, a minor part of the total expenses of the site, the construction of the vats and the chemicals. And just in this year of crisis the whole project had been written off as a failure and the site in East Smithfield abandoned by Jackson and Thrale. Moreover, the run on the money market in general implied a run on Thrale’s house in particular, where he was acting as a banker to the extent of a few thousand pounds on deposit in the brewery, from Clubs, clerks, friends and customers. And as a final blow, the clerks, long insulted by their master being completely in the confidence of Jackson and refusing their own advice, decided to leave, - ‘ye greatest distress of all’ wrote Mrs. Thrale.

It was at this time that Mrs. Thrale first mentions her own intervention in the business which was to owe so much to her in the years that followed. Thrale was periodically ill and began to spend more and more time at Bath and Brighton, leaving Perkins to carry on at Southwark and Mrs. Thrale to run the messages or do the things Perkins found it impossible to do. Above all in the last year of his life, and in the year after his death, Mrs. Thrale had the control of the firm. Now, in 1772, it was she who ‘held the clerks in’ and set about collecting enough cash to save the brewery, which was now desperate even for money to buy starting beer.

“… first we made free with our mother’s money, her little savings ! about 3,000£ ‘twas all she had.; and big as I was with child, I drove down to Brighthelmstone to beg of Mr. Scrase 6,000£ more … Dear Mr. Scrase was an old gouty solicitor, retired from business, friend and contemporary of my husband's father. Mr. Rush lent us 6,000£, Lady Lade (i.e. Thrale's sister) 5,000£. Our debts including those of Humphrey Jackson, were 130,000£ besides borrowed money. Yet in nine years was every shilling paid, one, if not two elections well contested, and we might, at Mr. Thrale's death have had money, had he been willing to listen to advice ..."

In addition to the debts she lists here, money was borrowed from a Count Viry and a Mr. Hankin which probably completes the number of direct loans. Apart from these., most of the indebtedness appears to be in arrears of payment by the brewery to malt-factors and hop merchants. During the following year, Perkins told Mrs. Thrale that payments to 'Hopmen' stood £18,000 behindhand, and that the brewery could not get as advantageous terms from them as its rivals because such long credit was required. Being caught so seriously short of cash in a year of dearth and financial stringency was probably mainly the consequence of Thrale's 'noble ambition' for expansion. Apart from withdrawals from the trade for personal and family spending he used all available money for buying raw materials in order to increase production, and, in doing so, overextended the financial commitments of the firm - Mrs. Thrale's 'speculation'. This consequently left the brewery without adequate cash reserves or easily realisable securities, causing a liquidity crisis when any serious fluctuation came in the prices of raw materials (as in the nature of the grain and hop markets, where a small variation in quantity caused a great variation in price, it was bound to over a period of years). It was general, moreover, for a bad harvest (causing the high malt prices) to be accompanied by changes in demand and, sometimes, shortages in the money market, both of which would also affect the brewery adversely. In Johnson's own words, when he was trying to keep Thrale from speculating in 1778, "If you thus persist in pouring the Profits of Trade back upon the Trade, that Trade will swell indeed like a Bubble, but like a Bubble it will be sure to burst". Despite the serious shock of 1772, Thrale was already experimenting again in 1773, and another, milder crisis in the spring of 1778 found the brewery still short of cash and Scrase had to be approached again for a loan. This was short-lived, with Mrs. Thrale being able to write to Johnson on 19th. October, "All goes well at the Brewhouse I hear & the Money that was borrowed when the Leaves were coming out will be paid - or may be - before they are fallen".

The results of the 1772 crisis were clear: Thrale had to be made to see how dangerous were his own rash policies of expansion (although from the 1778 affair it seems he had not been convinced). Mrs. Thrale became more and more closely involved in running the brewery with Perkins, interviewing clients and attending regularly at the 'Compting House'. Dr. Johnson was very often at Park Street or Streatham, advising on business affairs, and, from this date onwards, his correspondence with Mrs. Thrale often refers to commercial problems affecting the brewery. In a sense, this situation implies an alliance between Mrs. Thrale and Perkins - temporarily weakened by her resentment at his efforts to become a partner but revealed immediately anything serious occurred. One such occasion came in the summer of 1778, when Thrale was trying to assert his control, and 'horrified' his wife by proposing to dismiss Perkins "who sets his faults before him somewhat too strongly". The letters of Johnson and Mrs. Thrale reflect this growing alliance between the three of them, with, it appears, the acquiescence of Henry Thrale after his temporary collapse in 1779. In recognition of this position in the brewery, Johnson advised her not to take a house in the more fashionable part of London, which would have kept her farther - and more often - away from Park Street. She, in turn, acknowledged the situation, and her responsibilities to 'the Golden Millstone' (as she called the brewery), by moving into residence to Park Street, which she disliked, from Streatham, in the spring of 1780. And, as a woman, she paid the penalty of taking her business duties seriously through two miscarriages brought on directly by this enforced activity, once when rushing to Brighton to borrow money in 1772, and again in 1779 when called to settle a dispute amongst the workmen.

In 1781, on April 4th., with the management of the brewery well in hand, the capital stock built up to £150,000 from £42,000 in 1767, and Mrs. Thrale herself complaining of the production declining from 96,000 barrels in 1778, to 76,000 in 1779, and now to 65,000 "... so horribly is the consumption lessened by the war", Henry Thrale died. His death meant that, once again, there was a break in the ownership and history of the brewery as it was proved to Mrs. Thrale that the business could not be run by a widow and a committee. The old system had died with her husband; with the new ownership a different economic environment came into the trade.

Part II: Barclay Perkins.
After 1781.

The Sale, 1781

The reality of running a family business without the head of the family was soon brought home to the Executors of Henry Thrale when they faced the task of deputising for the absent entrepreneur. It was Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark, and could not succeed despite Mrs. Thrale's endeavours to perform full time the duties she had been forced by Thrale's illness to do part time. The Executors, as a committee, were divided amongst themselves and had equal voice in business decisions, while all the practical knowledge of brewing was with Perkins (Mrs. Thrale keeping to the counting house). Power and responsibility were thus divided - and at loggerheads for Perkins knew this was his opportunity to gain a share of the trade as partner, and he disliked all the Executors save Mrs. Thrale. Where capitalist was not entrepreneur, and actual management in the hands of professional 'career men' (as in a later century) such an impasse would not have been forced to an issue, but as it stood in the conditions of the business environment in the 18th. Century the situation is significant. The solution, equally, revealed the pressures existing on both parties, caused partly by the positions of the actors, and in part implicit in the organisation of ownership.

With one of the largest manufacturing businesses in London (moreover, one demanding the skill of a lifetime of experience, for so much of the choosing of malts and the processes of brewing were to be learnt only empirically) it was not easy to find purchasers with sufficient skill and capital to risk the loss of failure in taking the chance for riches beyond the dreams of avarice. The difficulty was increased by the executors not allowing loans to the purchaser on the security of the estate, and hence not letting the purchaser pay for the business out of the subsequent profits as Ralph Thrale had done. All this is evident in Mrs. Thrale's account, where she describes the need for almost bribing Perkins into bringing forward his wife's relatives as buyers, and lending him £1,650 herself and getting Crutchley to lend him £1,000, so that he could take up a quarter share of the partnership capital himself. As the situation suggests, it was a buyer's market, with the sale eventually concluded at a buyer's price. Mrs. Thrale had hoped to get £150,000 for the business - not a high price considering the £15,000 clear profit produced in a good trading year, or the nett. valuations of almost £150,000 in 1780. But with one buyer in the market the price was depressed to £135,000, which she was thankful enough to receive at the time, but in recollection many years later knew to have been 'a prodigious bargain'.*11

The one person who was really outside the world of business, brought in unexpectedly by being an executor, did not appreciate these economic realities, and being innocent of the risks and liabilities, did not wish to sell out. Johnson's reactions, with the other issues - which at the point of sale reflect very much the human situation of the parties concerned - are brought out clearly in two accounts of the sale written by Mrs. Thrale, the first in *Thraliana* and the other in her *Autobiography*. While the first gives her contemporary feelings, being written at the time, the autobiography was her reflections written just after Perkin's death in 1812. Read side by side they give the best account of the transaction.*12

Thraliana, 1781, 3 June

"Well! here have I with the grace of God, and the assistance of Good Friends completed - I really think very happily - the greatest Event of my life - I have sold my Brewhouse to Barclay the rich Quaker for 135,000£ to be in four year's time Pd. I have by this bargain purchased peace and a stable fortune,

Autobiography, 1812

"On Mr. Thrale's death I kept the counting house from 9 oclock every morning till 5 oclock every evening till June, when God Almighty sent us a knot of rich Quakers who bought the whole, and saved me and my coadjutors from brewing ourselves into another bankruptcy, which could hardly I think, have been avoided

Restoration to my original Rank in Life and a Situation undisturbed by Commercial Jargon, undisgraced by Commercial Connection. They who succeed me in the House have purchased the power of being rich beyond the wish of rapacity & I have secured the Improbability of being made poor by the Flights of the Fairy Specualation."

7 July 1781. "We had another storming Day last Tuesday, 3 July about this everlasting brewhouse, but 'tis over. Perkins wanted more indulgence than we, as Executors could give him ... so I lent him the money I had saved and put in the Stocks 2,000£ it was, & sold out for 1,600£ and odd. He is, or ought to be much obliged ..."

3 June, l781. "... Dear Mr. Johnson (was) something unwilling ... but not much at last - to give up a trade by which in some years 15 or 16,000£ had undoubtedly been got, but by which in some years its Possessor had suffered agonies of Terror and tottered twice upon the verge of Bankruptcy. (note) Johnson was the hardest to gain over to my intention of quitting, but the small quantity of Cash, the immensity of the Capital, the Consciousness that the Risques we ran were were ours, the Profits - if Profits - were not be ours - frighted and convinced him ..."

being, as we were, five in number, Cator, Crutchley, Johnson, myself and Mr. Smith, all with equal power, yet incapable of using it without help from Mr. Perkins, who wished to force himself into partnership, though hating the whole lot of us save only <u>me</u>. Upon my promise, however, that if he would find us a purchaser, I would present his wife with my dwelling house at the borough, and all its furniture, he soon brought forward these Quaker Barclays .... her own relations I have heard - and they obtained the brew-house a prodigious bargain, but Miss Thrale was of my mind to part with it for £150,000 and I am sure I never did repent it ... although the place has now doubled its value ..."

"Will it surprise you now to hear that, among all my fellow executors none but Johnson opposed selling the concern? Cator, a rich timber merchant, was afraid of implicating his own credit as a commercial man, Crutchley hated Perkins ... Smith cursed the whole business and wondered what his relation Mr Thrale, could mean by leaving him 200£ he said, and such a burden on his back to bear for it. All were well pleased to find themselves secured and the brewhouse <u>decently</u> though not <u>very</u> advantageously disposed of, except dear Dr. Johnson, who found some odd delight in signing drafts for hundreds and for thousands, to him a new, and as it appeared delightful, occupation. When all was nearly over, however I cured his honest heart of its incipient passion for trade, by letting him into <u>some</u> and <u>only</u> some of its mysteries. The plant as it is called, was sold, and I gave God thanks upon Whit Sunday, 1781, for sparing me farther perplexity, though at the cost of a good house, etc."

The sale closed with Johnson (who had been diverting Boswell by talking 'in a pompous manner of his new office, and particularly of the concerns of the brewery') 'bustling about, with an ink-horn and pen in his button-hole, like an excise-man'. He, the friend of Thrale, is, at last, the figure presiding when the Anchor Brewery passes over to a new business world, with Perkins, now a partner, the link between the new world and the old.

<u>The New Firm</u>*13

When the partners entered into possession they accepted all obligations and received all profits (except for the sums removed in cash by Mrs. Thrale) from the time of the 1780 Rest. Payment of the £135,000 to the Executors was by stages: £35,000 by July, 1781, and the balance by yearly instalments of £25,000 with 4%

interest. This did allow profits from trade to be used, but with initial outlays for stocks of raw materials, heavy reliance had to be made from the beginning on borrowed money. Thrale's Devisees received a bond underwritten by 'Messrs. Barclay and Perkins, John Barclay and John Gurney' and the partners, including Silvanus Bevan and David Barclay gave a Counter-Bond to John Barclay and Mr. Bevan (at the Bank). In these Bonds was symbolised the new world. The Quaker bankers, bringing with them the resources of a. great kinship group, were written into the constitution of the firm.

The partnerships were as follows. John Perkins had a quarter share (for which he had to borrow £5,000 from the other three partners as well as his £1,650 from Mrs. Thrale) and Robert Barclay held in his name the other three quarter-shares, although this was the joint account for himself, David Barclay and Silvanus Bevan (Articles of November, 1781). When payments to the Executors were completed these three shares were to be held individually (Clause in Indentures of April, 1782) and were so divided in the Rest of 1787 despite the fact that the Executors maintained £24,000 in the new firm as investors. The usual partnership provisions appear in the original agreement between Perkins and Robert Barclay, repeated in the second agreement signed when Silvanus Bevan and David Barclay came formally into the partnership. Each partner is to share profit and loss in proportion to his share of the capital stock. There must be written mutual responsibility for any Bond given in the name of the firm for any debt incurred. Provisions for the withdrawal of a partner, for the introduction of the son or the nominee of a partner into his share of the trade; procedures for arbitration in any dispute between the partners, were all made explicit to protect the firm from any administrative disorders and from the arbitration of the Law of the Realm, in an age when it meant commercial disaster for a firm or an heir to fall into the clutches of the Court of Chancery. Silvanus Bevan and Robert Barclay agreed to aid John Barclay in his Cheapside business up to a maximum figure (left blank in the copy of the Article written into the Deed Book) if necessary - evidently some return for his putting up capital for the brewery.

In the initial articles between Perkins and Robert Barclay in 1781, both agreed to draw only £4,000 from the trade annually (£1,000 for each person involved), with £200 for Perkins' expenses in entertaining clients, so that the rest of the profits might be charged to the reduction of the debt to the Executors. When this had been discharged there was to be new agreement, as it proved an annual agreement at the time of the Rest, on the amount to be withdrawn from the trade, with the only provisions that it be in proportion to their shares and 'not Exceeding the Profits of the said trade'. In addition there were the various perquisites of ownership, which complicate any exact calculations of profits for an 18th. Century business as much as the perquisites of employment complicate the value of wages. Perkins had the dwelling house from Mrs. Thrale; Robert Barclay the rooms above the counting house (both with expenses from the trade). Both partners had the traditional allowances for partners living at their business, of Coals, Candles, Beer and the keep of horses. Above this, Robert Barclay received £1,200 to build himself a house in front of the brewery.

One other set of articles exists in the Deed Book, which date from the inception of the partnerships. George Lester, who had been a clerk in the firm for many years, was taken in as a nominal partner "in consideration of (his) skill and experience". He was to be in charge of the storehouse and of all management except counting house business and the duties of the working brewer - in fact superintendent and manager as Perkins had been for Thrale, and at Perkins' old salary of £500 p.a. It was in this position that Perkins had been so restless at being excluded from a share in the profits and the partnership, so that this scheme is evidently designed to avoid similar friction without giving away any control of the trade. Besides his salary, Lester was to receive annually that reward which £4,000 of the partnership capital would have given him, thus sharing the profits without owning any of the capital.

Capital

On both sides of the partnership, the same social 'world' put its resources into the firm. In 1774 John Perkins married Amelia Bevan, whose first husband had been Timothy Paul Bevan, the son of Timothy Bevan, banker of Lombard Street. Timothy Paul's mother was the former Hannah Gurney, daughter of Joseph Gurney and widow of Nathaniel Springall. Joseph Gurney's first wife had been a daughter of David Barclay of Cheapside whose son John was banker with Bevan in Lombard Street, and whose nephew was Robert Barclay, partner in the brewery. David Barclay, the partner in the brewery,was another son of David Barclay of Cheapside (Richard Gurney who became a partner in 1802 with Hudson Gurney was the son-in-law of this David Barclay Jr.). Finally the fourth partner in the brewery, Silvanus Bevan, was the brother of Timothy Paul Bevan; therefore brother-in-law of Amelia Bevan, consequently indirectly related to John Perkins. David Barclay of Cheapside was one of the greatest merchants in London, connected through his second wife (Priscilla Freame, the daughter of John Freame, banker of Lombard Street) and through the marriages of his fourteen children with the Quaker merchant and banking families of Barclay, Willett, Gurney, Freame, Lloyd and Bevan. This whole Quaker kinship group was rapidly consolidating itself in banking circles in London, Norwich and the Midlands. A glance at their genealogical tables will show at once the financial strength held within the families and, from this, a comparison with the table of invested capital will reveal the reliance of the brewery upon it.*14.

It would be intricate and tedious to trace the connection of each person appearing on the investment lists with the firm, but in most cases the important investments are conditioned by the family link. Being in an 18th. Century. business environment, more particularly this 18th. Century social 'milieu', it is not surprising. The Quakers were excluded from participation in certain forms of public life; more important, their own ways of life, thought and faith instinctively brought them into community, so that it would be rare for any one of them to marry out of that charmed circle. All forces beyond the economic worked to the advantage of the economic. In the great debate upon the impact of religious ideas in daily life, the individual religious consciousness of the Puritan and the Quaker has been seen as the spur to endeavour and profit, personal integrity and success in the business of the world, with the twin ghosts of idleness and extravagance presiding upon both eternal damnation and commercial bankruptcy. While spirit and application (as the 18th. Century would say) were certainly stressed by the new creeds - and proved abundantly present amongst the 'non-conformists'- it exaggerates the direct impact of ideas upon events by ignoring the opportunities and strength given by the social communities of the faithful. It is upon this less abstract level, in the less rarefied atmosphere of these familial groupings, that the successes of these energetic individuals need to be explored. Being consciously a community the obligations of cohesion, with its opportunities, were equally self-conscious. At the humblest level, this meant that no Quaker ever had need to accept public charity or poor relief outside his Meeting or his faith; in more fortunate circumstances, it implied that businesses owned within the kinship group were the most natural resting places for capital held by members of the group. The particular world of the religious-cum-family group provided an environment of mutual trust and confidence within which the Invisible Hand could accommodate the advantages of each member with the benefit of all.

Within this particular Quaker community, the brewery began to play the rôle which the Government Funds did for the general London social world, that of being a repository for rentier capital, where people relying on income from a regular investment might enjoy a steady five per cent return. Moreover, this gave the sort of mutual benefit which would remain undisturbed when panic hit the money markets, and strengthen the bonds of community. As Mrs. Thrale - a person outside the kin but within the group - remarked to Perkins when he had collected some of her Welsh rents:

"I had rather it lay at your House than in the Stocks,
for I may then have it when I please without difficulty,
and I have no Spirit of saving about me - very little.
You will give me better Interest and it may be
convenient to both you and myself".*15

A regular investment of £6,000 stood in her name until 1796. Similar deposits of a few thousand pounds which run on regularly through the years come from within the family: Priscilla Bevan and her sister Elizabeth (later Elizabeth Pim) keep £4,000 each invested until 1818 and 1821. Dr. Benjamin Moseley, Amelia Perkins' brother, invests regularly until 1826; Ambrose Benning, partner in the bank ('Barclay, Bevan, Barclay and Benning') keeps £3,000 in until 1819. Rosa Perkins and the Trustees of Mrs. Perkins begin to invest in 1825 and 1827. Other regular investors, outside the family include George Lester, the manager, with his Trustees after him, until 1819, and the Westons, father and son, until 1814.*16

Some of the family investors appear only for a few years - evidently to oblige the firm in times when they were in need of cash. David Springall is probably the brother of Nathaniel Springall who was to be brought into the Cheapside firm as a nominal partner in 1781, being also in the family through his marriage to Richenda Barclay (another daughter of David Barclay of Cheapside). More hypothetically the Capt. J.H. Watson of Dawlish, who invests in the brewery may be a relation of the Sir W. Watson who married Christiana Gurney. These Quaker names come and go as the years pass, providing a float of capital which was never very extensive, and declined in the 19th. Century. But for the early years the individual investors were important, perhaps vital, and remained a potential source of aid. Nor were they confined to England. Robert Barclay, the partner, had been in Philadelphia, where his father had settled, so that there was always a connection with the friends in America, and often American Quakers using the brewery for holding their assets in England. Elizabeth Fox, Benjamin Chew, Fox and Reynell, Phineas Bond, Jasper Yeates, and probably one of the Cadwallader family, all have Philadelphia addresses given. With most of them their connection with the brewery is a passive one - in the sense that they will leave money invested for a few years and then withdraw it, but with Phineas Bond and R. Rundle there was a more active transaction on both sides. Bond was the Consul General in Philadelphia, and used to pay many of his English accounts through the balance he kept with the brewery (using them purely as a private bank), while they, on the other hand, bought American Stocks through him when there was cash available for temporary investments by the firm. One such account for £8,500 (24,000 dollars' worth of Bonds) ran from 1806 until 1812, and £984 was paid to Rundle for American stocks in 1801.

The Quaker bankers had far higher commitments with the brewery than those whose interest was of the rentier aspect, and with the same *raison d'etre*. In the days before commercial liability was limited; when personal ownership of firms kept board meetings round private dinner tables, and a man's credit rating was known to his friends and rumoured beyond them, the business world lived very much in a personal way, almost as a vast, straggling club; some of its members always in the heart of things (as the informal club which exists inside most clubs), most on the fringes of the group which 'knew'. Given this 18th. Century commercial environment, to be a member of a wide family group within the business world, with a personal chain of friendship, news and the ear of business centres from Norwich to Birmingham, Philadelphia to London, meant a great deal. It was to be a member of the club within the club, and when finance and trade were so notably represented within the group it is to be expected that members should do business where possible with other members, and that great resilience should result from the connection - as it had with similarly placed groups within several economies from the Fuggers of the 16th. Century to the commercial colonies of Sephardim in Spain, Holland and London since then.

The change in the bankers of the brewery from Boldero, Barnston, Carter and Snaith to Barclay, Bevan, Barclay and Benning in 1781*17 inaugurated a time of great business between the banks and the brewery. The Quaker bankers knew that the business was sound and honestly run, that when money was sought it was for a crisis in liquidity only, not the symptom of a more deep-seated weakness. Both belonged to the same sophisticated financial background, and knew that expansion of industry on borrowed money could be greatly advantageous to both industrialist and investor. In addition there was the feeling that both brewery and banks were within the same family community, with all that feeling implied for all other industrial enterprises within the same group. In 1785 a £20,000 long-term loan was negotiated with Gurney and Bland, to finance expansion, and repayable over 1789 - 91. Here, as in the case of so many of the short-term loans, the balance ran over the stipulated time; in this case until 1803. From the point of view of the bankers the brewery was useful. There were times when they wished to put surplus money out to earn, so naturally looked with favour upon a profitable, secure firm able to take a round five-figure sum and pay a customary five per cent. They lent to the brewery upon the security of short-term notes from the firm (which were guaranteed by all the partners - so that John Gurney could end a letter to Robert Barclay settling a loan to the firm by Notes, 'These Notes I shall accept of thee as payment without holding thee individually responsible for them') which proved to be an efficient way of financing for both parties. The legal means of investment was the note which ran for three, six or nine months, and could be called in at the expiration of that time if the bank was in need of cash, thus safeguarding them from tying capital permanently when it might be needed. In normal times when the note was coming to an end the brewery would apply for a renewal, (of the note) which would be customarily granted to make these short-term loans in fact more permanent investments. When the bank did call in its loans there was always time for the brewery to write round to the other bankers asking for someone to take it up, and as they were intimate with the Gurney bankers in Norwich, it was seldom that a local run on the London money markets caused a crisis in the brewery. Having these connections in the provinces (Gurneys, Ketts, Lloyds) who were often outside the area affected by stricture in Lombard Street, was a great source of strength to the firm. In its turn, the brewery could lend to the bankers - as in the Norwich crisis of 1783. The brewery had borrowed £5,000 from Gurney and Bland in December, 1782, repaid in March, 1783. During the crisis they lent £11,000 to the bank in August, being repaid in December.

The bankers did much discounting of trade bills for the firm, again, with this link between London and East Anglia. This traffic in bills exists from the inception of the partnership and is one of the significant early movements in coupling the London and provincial money markets. Thomas Hichardson, who began his career with the Quaker bankers in Norwich, later made a fortune by specialising in this transfer of bills of exchange for discount between Lancashire,*18 London and East Anglia, whereby industry could receive the benefits of agricultural wealth. With the brewery the connection is even more intimate than the financial link alone suggests. Rising prices of barley was making regular cultivation of the sandy soils of East Anglia profitable for the first time, on a rotation of wheat, turnips and barley, with the turnips allowing winter feed for sheep. The wealth that was now entering the Norwich banks, to be partly used in discounting trade bills outside of East Anglia (amongst which were trade bills from the Anchor Brewery) had been in part made on the profits of the sale of barley to the London brewers. The circle, in grain and money, is complete: moreover it was completed within the same kinship group.

As the brewery was acting as a banker for some of the investors, both English and American, on its own account similar services were being given by the Norwich banks. R. Bartlett and John Gurney in particular act as agents for paying trade customers in the Norwich area by cheque. The malt bills of John Lindoe (probably the J. Lindoe who married Caroline Barclay, daughter of David Barclay of Cheapside) are being settled in this way, apart from other financial business with the firm on his part, and other discounting business on the part of the bankers. Silvanus Bevan is using the brewery as a bank for his own account. He begins this by borrowing £5,000 in September, 1783 and when this has been repaid and he is in credit with the firm, still there will be extensive transactions in and out of the account, with the balance usually kept up to a few thousand pounds.*19

The capital accounts of the partners deserve special analysis, being those which were soon to dominate.

Their rapidly accumulating balances show that the ploughing back of capital was one of the most important features of the life of the new firm. Until expansion came, until the purchase price could be paid off and extra capital sought for investing in real estate and loans to publicans, then reliance had to be made primarily upon capital (beyond the resources of the partnership capital) coming from others. But when the firm has expanded to this optimum size the profits were quickly turned to liquidating the loans which had made it possible. Many of the small investors still remain in this new period, but they no longer have a significant percentage of capital in their hands. By 1810 three-quarters of the surplus capital is in the partners' accounts, as the table will indicate. From 1797 onwards the nett. capital stock was fixed at a certain figure in the Rests (£160,000 until 1804 and £200,000 thereafter) and the surplus from the year's trade placed into the capital account, except for that sum which the partners agreed to withdraw from the trade. It is therefore only from 1797 that the deliberate build-up in the partners' share of the capital account comes; previously the profits were being turned back into the partnership capital which rose from £82,000 in 1782 (depressed from £156,000 in 1781 by the debt incurred in purchasing) to £169,000 in 1797 when the new book-keeping practice begins. After that date the ploughing back of capital becomes obligatory. In the Rest Book of 1802 the partners agree to keep at least £25,000 in the capital account for each of the four shares of the partnership, and this was raised to a minimum figure of £30,000 per share in 1803 and £80,000 per share in 1813.

It would be tempting to see in this book-keeping switch from joint partnership capital to surplus capital account (a practice which occurs in other breweries about the same time), a device to limit the *de facto* liability of the partners while not changing the form of ownership of the firm. Insofar as they put capital into the surplus capital account they become investors in the firm, consequently with claims on the firm, and therefore beneficiaries in the case of bankruptcy. But it is difficult to see how this could be achieved. They remained partners of the firm, and as such accepted responsibilities for all debts incurred, in the proportion to which they held the partnership capital. Being 'unlimited' this obligation existed for all the debts irrespective of whether the partnership capital grew or remained constant while the surplus capital account grew. There may have been some other advantages in the new practice, even if this great protection to personal estate given by limited liability was not given. If interest was not paid on the partnership capital (there is no indication either way, but in other cases it was always customary for interest to be paid on it) then there would be the gain of 5% on all funds in the capital account. And the balances held here were individually owned, even if they had to be regarded as a fixed investment. It would be unusual for this to come about under the minor actuarial incentive of book-keeping tidiness, but, at present, I see no other significant motives behind this particular device, albeit coming at a time when the accumulation of so much capital must have made any partner look for some means of protecting it.

The table following this page in the text is a summary of the long capital account given at the end of this study, and shows the movements of the capital accounts graphically. Its initial significance however, does not come from the trends it shows, but from its actual existence, in the fact that a firm had the financial resilience implied in the resources of this kin-ship group. In this lies one of the most important differences between the new firm and the old, and one of the greatest advantages of the new. Thrale had contrived to 'keep out of debt', not to borrow money - almost, it seems, on the principle of the head of a household wanting to keep his family out of debt - and to plough all the profits back, apart from the money he spent; thus keeping the firm without sufficient liquid funds or adequate reserves. It was the Achilles' heel of the family business which tries to expand only out of profits, and the weakness showed at every commercial crisis. The Quakers, on the other hand, having to pay £135,000 within five years and to lay out many thousands in buying stocks of raw materials, were forced from the beginning to borrow on semi-permanent loan. They had experience of the financial world; they had the resources of their extraordinary family group,

[Figures rounded]

Year	Joint capital	Partners surplus	Bankers	Quakers	Rest on P. Acct.	Publicans Clubs etc	TOTAL
1784	95	- / 0.0	5 / 7	8 / 11.2	56 *1 / 79	2 / 2.8	71 / 100
1790	135	16.5 / 9.9	71 / 42.5	22.5 / 13.4	40 / 23.8	17.5 / 10.4	167.5 / 100
1800	160	56 / 40.5	17 / 12.2	34.5 / 24.7	21 / 15.1	10.5 / 7.5	139 / 100
1811	200	309 / 74	20 / 4.8	56 / 13.4	16 / 3.8	16.5 / 4	417.5 / 100
1820	200	456 / 78	5 / 9	10 / 1.7	33 *2 / 5.6	80.5 / 13.8	584.5 / 100
1830	200	556 / 79	- / 0	4.5 / 7	- / 0	142.5 / 20.3	703 / 100

Surplus Capital Account. 1784-1830

Figures in £'000 / %

Note. 1. This £56,000 includes £51,000 owing to Thrale's executors.
2. £32,000 from Tompson & Co. In fact a 'banking' loan.

and therefore felt no qualms about relying on heavy investments. Provided business efficiency was maintained, there was no danger and great advantages. It allowed expansion to come quickly, and without strain. It avoided the recurring liquidity crises, while the investors remained as happy as Mrs. Thrale with their five per cent. Moreover, in attitude, though in but rudimentary form, the situation anticipates the general business pattern of today where firms flourish in a state of permanent indebtedness from the issue of ordinary and debenture share capital.

It is with this financial background in mind that the commercial success of the brewery in relation to its rivals must be seen. From the initial success in coping with the drain of purchase, it withstood the financial strictures of 1797 - 1802 without ill effect, in fact, taking up the trade of less fortunately placed firms, which were forced to cut outputs to conserve funds. When the brewery was itself producing so much money in the years after 1801, the need for investments drop away - except for the year when malt and hop prices are unusually high. On these occasions (as in 1819 or 1825 - 6) the Quaker bankers again came to the aid of the brewery, and some malt or hop merchants would allow a debt to be carried over to the capital account for a year or two. From 1820 there is a sharp rise in the deposits from publicans and other customers of the brewery, probably encouraged, as before, because they would bring regular trade to the firm, and emerging at this time with the growing prosperity of the masses after 1819.

From the nature of the rhythm of outlays and receipts, the one being seasonal and the other regular, the brewery had large sums of cash available for a few months in the year, and it is not surprising that the partners should look for a profitable way of employing them. Being close to the ear of the City they looked for a capital gain as well as for interest. In 1782 comes the first investment of £45,000 Navy Bills, bought in February and sold in March for £73*20 profit. In May and June of the same year £12 profit was made on the purchase and sale of another £2,500 Navy Bills. In the next year £10,000 Continuous 3% were bought at £5,945 in October and sold at £6,010 in December. The amount going into these temporary investments rises in the 19th. Century, but the Private Ledgers are missing after 1814 so that the investments are found only in the Rest accounts which give merely the outstanding amounts at Midsummer, without the transactions over the remainder of the year. From the £42,000 of Exchequer Bills bought in March, 1812 and sold at £43,910 in August, the pattern remains clear, - short term investments with the hope of a capital gain. Exchequer Bills and Consols predominate, with occasional excursions into American Stock, and in some years high figures are outstanding at the Rests. £62,000 Exchequer Bills were on the books in 1817; £80,000 Consols (at 77½) in 1818; in 1830 £110,000 real value of 3½%'s and £16,000 of Exchequer Bills. As would be expected, in the years when the brewery was itself short of cash, borrowing from the bankers as in 1819, 1825 - 6 and the first period 1797 - 1804, no money was available for investment in the Funds. When it did become available, it was used as efficiently as possible.

<u>Raw Materials</u>

The evolution of the London brewing industry towards the point when production became controlled by a few large units such as the Anchor Brewery, meant that manufacturers had the power in the raw-material markets which had previously been held by the independent corn merchant. Then, a myriad brewing victuallers sought their malt and hop supplies from the public markets, and being individually in small a way in trade, they had no individual effect upon their markets. Now that the few porter brewers each offered contracts of up to 50,000 quarters annually, they began to influence matters themselves. Above all they were seeking quality malts, which were the most economical to use as the differences in quality outweighed the difference in price, and were prepared to send agents into Hertfordshire and Norfolk seeking parcels direct from the makers, bye-passing the markets at Bear Key and Mark Lane. In response to the change in the structure of the London brewery, most malt coming from Hertfordshire (and it was upon Hertfordshire brown malt that porter had become famous) was under the control of malt-factors. In this trade there was almost as great a sense of continuity as in brewing, and such names as Taylor, Clough and King come down through many generations of those who have made malt the business of their families. The malt-factors seem to have arisen through the control of shipping malt down the river Lee, which was improved to take regular traffic more conveniently in 1766. They grew up to prosperity and importance only on the contracts of the great porter brewers, never relying on sale to the markets for most of their trade, because they were essentially commission agents - not merchants who owned the malt which passed through their hands. Through the nature of the malting process at this time, the best malt was made by skilled maltster with a plant small enough for him to give the work his own attention. Consequently there were a great number of maltsters resident in the areas around Ware and Hertford, and a great number recorded in the town directories making it difficult for the brewers in London to negotiate contracts for any large amount. It was precisely into this gap between brewer and the many maltsters that the malt-factor came. He would collect malts from the makers, send samples to the brewer and await instructions from London. The porter brewers always picked malts from the samples sent in (never relying on the malt-factor for choice or indication), and would send back their buying directions to the factor. It was then the factor's task to tell the maltsters concerned, get the various parcels down to the Lee at the right time, ship it to London and arrange for payment - conducted through the factor in the same way that the purchase had been negotiated. Throughout this transaction of sending malts to London, and receiving in return the cash or cheques (beginning probably in the decade 1790 - 1800) for distribution to the maltsters, they did not own the malt, being merely the intermediaries taking a commission for the sale and the profits of shipping it in their own barges. In fact, they became the powerful men in the malting trade at the beginning of the 19th. Century, with their control increasing as a rising rate of duty (which had to be paid before the returns from sales came in) through the French Wars, hit maltsters without capital. Increasingly the factor would pay the duty in advance, upon pledge of sale to him, and establish a credit bond over many makers in the same kind of way that the brewer was setting up a credit hold over many publicans. From this point, the factors tended to go into buying on their own account and finally into the actual manufacture of malt. Both brewer and factor became the men with influence, having independence from one another in the sense that both were wealthy and commercially of long standing, yet dependent on one another at this time through the nature of the different structure of the malting and the brewing industries.*21

Despite the fact that the brewery was dependent primarily upon the buying of malt from Hertfordshire through the factors until well on into the 19th. Century, there was never a monopoly of any one method of buying. It is impossible to tell from the books of the firm (especially from the Rests) how much was, in fact, bought through the factors, because all the accounts are in the names of the actual maltsters; and malt bought from the public market would not figure as a trade debt outstanding at the midsummer Rest. The malt book which would answer all the questions directly is unfortunately missing, but outside evidence makes the story clear. Even if the brewers did not buy extensively from the markets, it was their practice to meet there every week to find out general conditions of trade. After 1780 the meeting began to discuss ways of implementing the general conditions of trade, seeking common decisions about applying for an increase in price. From the preliminary discussions held at the market, an official meeting at Brewers' Hall would be summoned and action taken. Apart from this ulterior purpose, it is certain that by 1810 an insignificant proportion of malt used came through the market, and as all merchants connected with the trade affirmed before a Parliamentary committee, market prices of malt were misleading.

Hertfordshire was the oldest of the great malting areas on which the London brewery had always drawn, and as would be expected from this, it shows the most specialised commercial structure. Other areas were not so concerned with the single industry, which in the Hertford area dominated all other agricultural pursuits, and had not this same sophisticated organisation. In 1748, and until the 1770s, the other sources of malt were Huntington and the West Country. More came down the Thames from all the river towns and markets as far up the country as Newbury, than came overland from Huntingdon to the Lee, but there was no rival to Hertfordshire in either quality or quantity. Above all, it was from Hertford that the good brown malts came, the porter malts, with their prices always a little in advance of equivalent malts from other areas. Quality for quality, the brown malts were slightly cheaper than the pale, being less delicate in manufacture; and better brown malt could be made from second quality barley than pale. Beginning in 1781 Norfolk malts (the Ship Malt) begin to replace the West Country malt as the second source to Hertfordshire. This is evidently another feature of the change in ownership, for the Barclays and Gurneys were Norwich men, knowing the recent charges in the agriculture of East Anglia and the rising production of good barley on its sandy soils. It is not unlikely that there was a more specific connection; possibly through their own tenant farmers, or the farmer clients of the Norwich bankers. At all events, the brewery begins to receive supplies from Norfolk in 1781 and in the years afterwards takes active steps to develop the Norfolk market for malt, thus adding incentives for agricultural development.

It was part of a move to bypass the established marketing structure of Hertford - to tap new resources in a newly developed region directly, without intermediaries. The scale of production in the London brewing industry would itself have made the brewers conscious of the need to safeguard their malt supplies, and perhaps broach the possibility of integrating backwards into malting in order to control those supplies themselves. It was the same kind of concern that had led to the growth of the malt-factors and the decline of the public, market sale of malt. A further incentive coming at this time was the rising trend in malt prices, which, with stable retail prices for beer, led the brewers to explore the possibilities of facing the barley markets themselves, to avoid paying the increased costs demanded by the maltsters. This could be done at various levels of commitment, ranging from the temporary commissioning of malting in a single season, through to the renting of malt houses or their freehold purchase. In 1784 come the first payments in the Cash Books to Thomas Adams and John Cobham (both members of famous malting families) for making malt. On December 29th., 1784, John Smith, who became their regular Norfolk agent for buying barley and malting, received payment for barley - £307 - and they continue after this beginning. The next commitments come in 1787 (February 19th.), when the partners first begin renting a malt-house in Norwich, at a rate of £144 per annum. Rent payments continue for what appears to be two separate malt-houses (total outlay remains about £120 p.a.) but in these years the policy was evidently to rent according to the season, so as to take advantage of the depressed prices of malt in the plentiful year when maltsters might have to sell at a loss. During the period until 1830 no maltings appear in the valuations, so it appears that the firm was never fully committed to malting part of its own needs in its own freehold malt-houses.

At no time did the firm obtain more than a small proportion of its malt supplies from these maltings, or from barley which had been malted on commission. The quantities coming 'home' from Norfolk grew, finally displacing the Huntington and West Country supplies, but most remained in manufacture out of the control of the brewery. The amounts made specifically for the firm varied greatly in the different years, for the object of the scheme was primarily to avoid the high profits going to the independent maltsters in the years of some scarcity, From experience the brewers found that the malt market fluctuated more violently than the barley prices, and their own malting can be understood as an attempt take advantage of lower costs - wherever these occurred, either in making malt themselves or in buying from others. In the years of high price it could be expected that the firm's maltings would be working at high pressure, additional houses might be leased and other malt made on commission. Conversely, in the years of glut the brewers could take the best advantage of the malt market and the maltsters.*22.

These movements into malting were never paralleled at this time by a similar entry into the hop markets. Throughout its history the hop had been the most speculative of crops, varying spectacularly in price whenever the blight swept through the gardens. On its cultivation many lives had been ruined, and a few great fortunes made. Throughout this period the greatest people in the hop industry were the hop merchants - or the 'hop men' as they were called at the time - who had the capital to survive the bad years and profit with the good. Over the country as a whole the hops from the Kent and Hampshire gardens were distributed from Stourbridge fair, outside Cambridge, in Defoe's time, and from Weyhill fair by the time Cobbett was writing; but the greatest hop exchange remained throughout at Southwark. It was from the Southwark hop merchants - such names as Bolland, Dawson & Gwen, Golding, Wood, Field & Wood, and Thackrah - that most of the porter brewers bought. Fewer names appear in the hop accounts than in the malt books, and they are all of merchants and not of the hop-farmers. The Thackrah family were connected with the brewery personally through the Perkins family. In 1825 Charles Perkins became a partner in the Birtley Ironworks with George Thackrah and several others, and the fifth son of Frederick Perkins eventually married Eden Thackrah.*23.

Tightly bagged, hops could be kept for several seasons, even if losing a little of their strength in the process. This allowed the brewer to gamble with the hop-blight by anticipating the years of glut for heavy purchases which would allow him to rely on stocks for the expensive year. If he was caught out in the game his error might cost up to £10,000 - a contribution to the great prize of agricultural ambitions, when a farmer had good yields in a year of scarcity prices. For these reasons the Hop Book shows great fluctuations in purchasing through the years, far more so than malt, and for the 1825 - 6 season none at all were bought. The worst year of all was in 1817. From average prices of £6 19s. per cwt. in 1815 and £6 17s. in 1818 the price of new hops in 1817 rose to £25 4s. per cwt. to avoid which, for the first time there were general imports of hops for most of the London breweries. Foreign hops are not mentioned again throughout the period, East and West Kent hops monopolising the book.

(Note: The Hop Book, 1784 - 1893, does not show the amounts bought annually in the summary at the end of the book. The table records only the quantity used each year, with the average prices at which hops were bought during each season. It does not therefore give any indication of the money expended annually on hops, because of the carry-over of stocks. Annual expenditure can be totalled from the individual accounts in the book, and checking the debts outstanding for hops in the annual Rest Books. No information about the hop-merchants is given either in the Rests or the Hop Book, apart from the names of the firms involved. No letter books have survived.)

There remains, still unmentioned, the other important raw-material of brewing - water. In the early days, most of the brewers with plants on the banks of the Thames used river water, while those north of the river relied on the New River Company water, for which they paid an annual rent. Thrale erected a 'waterworks' just by the Bank End Wharf (shown on the plan, page 38), powered by horses, to get water up from the river to his brewhouse. Along with the other brewers, he probably then turned to well water (although this is not mentioned specifically), for 'Thrale's Waterworks' were sold to an incorporated company and known thereafter as the 'Borough Waterworks'. It was here that the famous 'atmospheric' steamengine was installed in 1770 and ran successfully at least until 1812, when Manning and Bray reported it in their *History of Surrey* (Volume III, p.589).

The Brewery and Trade 178l - 1800

After the depression of 1783, with the war over and harvests plentiful, there began a decade when the economic auspices for the new firm were golden. The market was booming, mechanisation (above all steam from 1786) was cutting costs, and although malt prices were on a rising trend, profit margins were expanding and sales were rising, the firm had financial backing to cover expansion in plant, and set about developing a country and export trade to augment the staple London market. The Rests show this expansion of sales clearly, if not directly, with the rising amount of trade debts owed to the firm which were outstanding at each valuation. It is unfortunate that there are no trade ledgers or letter books extant which would fill in the bare outline of sales given by the Rests and the bare figures of production which are known.

Debts outstanding rise from £38,500 for the non-London trade in 1780 to £74,500 in the peak year of 1796; while the London figures rose from £44,200 in 1780 to a peak of £92,800 in 1790 (remembering that the country trade debts were on three months credit at the least six at the most, and the London debts only for a month. London figure: also include permanent loans to publicans which total £17,700 in 1790. New malt lofts and a store house put £3,200 on the fixed assets in 1788; the following year a warehouse was erected at Bank End, with more new malt lofts (£3,000) in 1791. Increased production needed above all, increased storage space, for, while more intensive use of the brewing materials was possible, all the extra malt, hops and beer had to be stored for some time. The parallel to the increase in storage space for the raw materials, was new capacity for beer storage, both in vats at the brewery, and in countless small cellars in the neighbourhood, rented so that casks might be stored in them. Payments for cellar rents came to a total of nearly £200 (61 rents paid) for 1795.

The plant, utensils and fixed goods, had risen concomitantly. Valuations for plant had been fixed when the new firm began at £12,000 rising successively to £15,000 in 1783, £16,000 in 1787 and to £25,000 and beyond after 1798. Over the same period the valuation for utensils rose from £15,600 to £32,000. These increases, with those of storage space of the various kinds, occur mainly after 1786, and are undoubtedly in response partly to the application of steam power to the works in 1786. Besides the actual economy of the engine - enabling the mill horses to be put aside, saving thereby about £40 maintenance each year for each animal, of which there were probably at least twenty - steampower speeded up many of the processes of pumping and milling. Within a few years the engine was used to carry the malt up to the top of the structure, in the place of labourers to mash the malt with the 'liquor', rouse the fermentation tanks and to cleanse the utensils. As the 'capital brew-houses' of London were all large concerns, with great resources behind them, it is no wonder that they took steam-power as soon as it was offered to them in an efficient form. The heavy regular labour of mill-horses turning pumps and malt-mills was exactly suited to Watt's new 'Sun and Planet' Engine of 1784, similarly the labour of men 'mashing' the brew with oars once a brewer's ingenuity had discovered how to harness this onto a rotary motion suited for the engine. Care and keep for the engine was only a bushel of coals for each working hour, a minimum of attention (the early engines worked so slowly that they made little noise - about as much as a spinning wheel was the usual comparison - and consequently did not wear out for many years, sometimes lasting a century) - and the annual subsidy of £63, paid to Boulton and Watt. The engine bought by the firm was a small one of 8 Horse Power, where most other equivalent breweries had ordered 10 Horse Power engines. The cost was proportionately lower, although the annual payment was the same as Whitbread's on a 10 H.P. It is certain that all the payments concerned with the engine are not specifically recorded in the Cash Books, for the total cost would be above £500 and the only entries named for the engine are:

'Dec. 29th., 1786. By steam engine. Pd. Shaw Copper .. £24 18s.
Jan 28th., 1787. By Boulton and Watt .... £209 4s.
Dec. 22nd., 1787. By John Wilkinson .... £116 14s.'

The annual payments begin in 1787, when the engine had evidently begun working, and the valuation enters the Rests "Engine and House, £2,000." Upon a working machine like the engine, there was an understandable need for a depreciation policy, also clear in relation to similar installations like the brewery clock, but not so obvious with other assets such as the vats or the fabric of the actual buildings, which wore out but slowly, even if they were not considered to last indefinitely. It is with the clock and the engine that their valuations in the Rests drop by a regular amount, in the case of the engine £50 each time, each two or three years - the first recognisable depreciation policy, which is applied more or less regularly. In 1832 a new engine of 40 Horse Power was ordered from Boulton and Watt.*24 In this expansion, Barclays were ahead of their rivals, but in the initial installation of steam-power they were neither first nor last. Goodwyns and. Whitbread placed orders with Boulton and Watt in 1784, Felix Calvert in 1785. 'Thrale and Co.' (as the firm was still officially known) in 1786, and the rest follow closely; John Calvert, Gifford in 1787, Stephenson in 1789, Combrune 1792, Cox and King 1793, Clowes 1796, Charringtons 1797, Golden Lane Brewery 1805, Trumans 1807, Meux Reid 1809, Henry Meux 1810, Taylors in 1811 and finally John Elliot of Pimlico in 1819. In all this one point of doubt remains - about the size of the engine. It is clear from Boulton and Watt's order book that the engine ordered was of 8 Horse Power, nor does there appear to have been any change in this until the large engine was ordered in 1832. But in both the main contemporary accounts of the brewery, the engine is described as being much larger than 8 H.P., more so, that is, than could be ascribed to a mistaken view of its power with-



ANCHOR BREWERY, SOUTHWARK

out a noticeable change in its physical size. Manning and Bray ('*History of Surrey*', 1812 - 3, Vol. III, p. 589) name it as being of 24 H.P., installed in 1787, and Louis Simond ('*Journal of a Tour and Residence in Great Britain*', 1810 - 1, 1817, p. 182) thought it of 30 H.P.

Premises

The increase in the physical size of the brewery is apparent from the two plans of the site known, that of 1758 which comprises the original rented plot of land, Noell's Estate, which Halsey paid for at a rate of £40 p.a., and the plan drawn up for the Release signed in 1787. This shows roughly the same area involved in the premises as Horwood's map of London, produced over the years 1792 - 7. Backing up these outline, drawn plans, is a complete insurance valuation for the year 1801, which sets out the shops and offices in detail. If this written list could be 'married' to the plans, a precise delineation of the brewery would be possible, but on the hand the list gives no indication of the placing of the parts, on the other, the plans give only the boundaries of the plant site. But even if the evidence remains unexact, historically, its significance is clear, and little meaning is lost. Between them the plans and the valuation of buildings relate that aspect of the growth of the capital and productive capacity from 1760 to 1790, which faced all London across the Thames, and drew many visitors to wonder at the vast extent of the enterprise.

"The buildings and offices occupy a space of nearly 6 acres ... it has risen by degrees to its present magnitude, being now the largest establishment of the sort in London, or, more properly speaking, in the world." (Manning and Bray, 1812 - 3)

A composite plan is given opposite.

Staff and Labour

The forgotten men of the new industrial England were the labourers, those who dug the canals, made the turnpike roads, worked in the new factories. Their skilled companions - the first engineers who repaired the engines, even if Boulton and Watt made them, the mechanics, smiths, glaziers, rope-makers, carpenters and bricklayers - so many of the skills nurtured in shipbuilding, which was the largest industry in the island and built up pools of skilled labour in the ports - have fared a little better. They at least are recorded through those few of them who rose to eminence, such men as Peter Stubs the filemaker (and inn-keeper) of Warrington, Watt and John Wilkinson, the Darbys, James Naysmyth, Maudsley, Brindley, Rennie and Smeaton. Below these famous names comes the body of industrial craftsmen who remain unknown. Yet in their hands, rather than in those of the élite, lay the maintenance of the slowly rising *general* level of technical skill upon which depended the life of the new industrial enterprises. It was upon this accumulating corpus of technological knowledge - perhaps more upon technical 'know-how' - in the small machine workshops and metalworking shops of Pimlico, Limehouse, Southwark and the other London boroughs, and in the Yorkshire and Lancashire towns that the industrial revolution depended and developed. From these skills, too, came the great boilers, vats and coppers, the miles of good piping, the pumps and mills, the iron machinery which composed the heart of the porter breweries. The new craftsmen appear by name only in the pages of the firms' Rest and Cash Books, and in some of the City directories. But they worked mostly by themselves, or in small firms which kept few written records, seldom crossing the path of public authorities to bring many details of their activities into the Parliamentary Papers or the Public Record Office. While most of their work of its very nature left little evidence, the chances have been against the preservation of what records there were. There has, at least, been continuity of site and ownership in the brewery (the Anchor Brewery exemplifies the tenacity of the familial continuity which has marked the brewing industry (as the banking profession) in Europe, England and America); the volume of written records was already large in the 18th. Century. These two circumstances, with the happy accidents of negligence, until our own day the greatest preserver of business records, have allowed much to survive about the brewery directly. But with the technical skills upon which it so largely depended, there was rarely this continuity of business, and when once the site of a copper-smith's shop changed hands, or was rebuilt for a different trade, most evidence of the older business died with its owners.

The labourers, skilled or not, remain still more forgotten and even less recorded. Their only memorial in the records of the brewery is a paper left in the 1797 Rest Book giving the numbers in the various jobs between the years 1791 and 1797. Most remain constant in these years: there were 4 stokers, 3 moving coopers, 4 coopers, 9 yeastmen, 12 stagemen, 4 millersmen and 18 draymen. The sparemen increased from 14 in 1791 to 30 in 1796; horsekeepers from 7 in 1791 to 12 in 1797 and 7 'drawers off' appear in 1797. The weekly wage bill for the whole group appears to have been £65 for the first year and £83 in the last year - averaging in each year just over 17s. per week per man. In itself this means little. There is no mention of the perquisites which certainly went with the jobs (of which one was known to be free beer), and wages would differ between the trades, coopers getting more than sparemen and so forth. Normally a boy would get 10s. per week or less, and a grown man £1 at least. The total wage figure (again recorded without other details) rose from £3,543 in 1787 to £5,748 in 1796; which again is probably coming almost entirely from an increase in numbers more than a rise in the wage rates. Most of the labourers' jobs explain themselves: the coopers - more skilled men than labourers, but included in these lists - and the abroad coopers, who worked round the public houses in trade with the brewery; the drawers-off, probably working with the stagemen on racking the beer into barrels for storage and delivery, the millersmen with the malt mills at the top of the brewing building. The high number of draymen and horsekeepers emphasises the large labour-costs involved with the horses; the maintenance of mill horses more than the 'feed' being so much more expensive than the maintenance of the engine. The yeastmen collected excess yeast produced in the fermenting tanks, pressed some into barrels, and distributed yeast to bakers and distillers in London.

In addition to the labourers were the clerical staff of the brewery - the superintendent, senior and junior clerks, probably the brewer and the senior cooper, - again unrecorded, as no Gratuity Books have survived. One of the senior clerks appears to have been Field at this time, when George Lester was manager. He took John Perkins' place as the regular visitor to Ireland on the firm's business, and payments out for his expenses occur regularly in the Cash Books.

Part III: The Nineteenth Century: 1800- 1830

"We are the power-loom brewers, if I may so speak ..."
Charles Barclay, giving evidence before the Committee reporting on the Retail Sale of Beer.
(Parliamentary Papers, 1830, Vol.10, Evidence to the Report, p.16)

New Conditions of Trade: Integration

In the decade of great expansion after 1783, when annual production rose from 65,500 barrels to over 130,000, by integrating backwards towards raw material sources - in malt if not in hops - the partners, with their rivals in trade, took action much as economic theory and shrewd business sense suggested. When sales were 'easy', the problem was to obtain raw materials to supply the increasing demand in the most convenient way possible, preventing as far as possible their own increased demand on the raw-material markets from raising prices against them. The conditions of trade were reversed after 1796, when dropping consumer demand brought an opposite problem and the expected reaction of an attempt to protect sales by integrating forward to control retail outlets of trade.

The reasons for a decline in sales, or a slackening in the steady expansion of the previous years, were both general to the consumer-goods industries of the country, and particular to the breweries. The French Wars, which opened in 1793, were just beginning to affect the economy seriously. Heavy taxation was imposed in 1797 to help pay currently for the vastly increased government expenditure, and, more important, heavy government borrowing and an expanding paper currency (freed from a gold 'base' in 1797) were raising prices faster than wages. From Tudor to modern times war-time governments have found an inevitable resource in the easiest tax of all - that of depreciation and inflation - to drain purchasing power into their own hands for war production. The national standard of living did not fully recover until 1820. A small section of the population profited from this, being connected with the financial or industrial preparations for war, either by handling or taking up short-term and funded debt, or accepting war contracts. But the masses of humble people on whom the brewers depended for their sales, had less money in their pockets (in real value terms) than before, while facing higher prices for their purchases.*25

In the crisis, nature had aggravated man-made problems, as the double harvest failure of 1799 - 1800 imposed famine prices for corn and meat on an already strained economy. Consequently, one of the articles whose price had gone up was beer itself, while less money was available to buy it. The old rule of the brewers not changing their prices to the publican for harvest fluctuations (which had stood them in very good stead before as their costs dropped through mechanisation) now could not tolerate such a serious upswing in malt and hop prices, and the way was ready for price changes before war-time increases were imposed on the malt, beer and hop duties. The continuing high prices of malt are shown in the table of stock valuations (Appendix), maintained from the great leap from 46s. - 47s. for pale and brown in 1799 (June) to 87s. - 91s. for pale and 66s. for brown in 1800. Hops rose even more violently, from an average of £4 12s. per cwt. in 1797, to £9 2s. in 1798, £13 3s. in 1799 and £14 15s. in 1800, Rates of duty rose from 5s. to 10s. per barrel, strong beer in 1802, with a drop in the allowance free of duty. The malt tax increased from 1s. 4½d. per bushel to 2s. 5d. in 1802 and again to 4s. 5¾d, in 1804, and hop duty rose from $1\frac{3}{5}$ d. per lb. to 2½ d. per lb. in 1801. The table of duty and price increases will make these movements clear over the whole period, when seen in relation to the average prices of malt and hops, but the startling increases just at this time aggravated the initial problem of dropping demand, in the brewing industry more heavily taxed than most others.

The collapse of the Irish export market came as a particular loss, shared mainly between the London, Bristol and Liverpool brewers, with London taking the greater blow. Difficulties of shipping, higher insurance rates, and above all, lower duties with cheaper raw materials in Ireland, gave the Irish brewers the opportunity to capture their own markets. From this time dates the great rise of Guinness, marking the change in the tide, as porter began to flow back across the Irish sea into Liverpool. Imports of beer into Ireland fell away completely from the peak of 125,000 barrels in 1790 to almost nil after 1803.*26 Among the London brewers it was probably Whitbread who felt this collapse most severely, but Barclay Perkins were regular exporters to Ireland on their own account, as their travellers to Ireland indicate.

These adverse business conditions, which reversed a trend of many years standing, broken only in the occasional years of bad harvests, arrived at a time when the London brewing industry had, as far as one can tell, just completed an important development in organisation. In the porter section of the market (the bulk product for general draught sales, unlike the ales or heavy stouts which were 'quality' markets in some respects, being more expensive, and the ale production in the hands of specialised brewers) the brewing victualler had been finally eliminated by the Common Brewer, and depressed into the role of being only a seller of beer. This is the condensed history of the industry in London during the 18th. Century. More, the percentage of production in the hands of the twelve largest porter brewers had risen from below 50% in 1748 to above 75% by 1815 (and their absolute annual production from well below half a million barrels to well above a million in the same period) so that they were now consciously leading the market.*27

This meant that further expansion could not come from taking up the trade of the less economically efficient brewing victualler) which had occurred in bad times more rapidly than in good. Absorption of the smaller common brewers continued, as they felt the pressures upon them more keenly, and with less resources, than the great, but expansion now depended primarily upon conditions of demand. In years when this demand was either declining, or ceasing to expand, the great brewers were competing amongst themselves for what custom there was, and began, for the first time, to jostle shoulders uncomfortably in the narrowing market.

In these circumstances, where there was every incentive to secure retail outlets for trade, the licensing system provided every opportunity. No other matter for public supervision was more vexatious than this, and in few were the methods so arbitrary or chaotic. The local licensing Justices of the Peace began to limit the number of licenses granted, and to look for opportunities to withdraw licenses from unruly public houses in districts 'overpopulated by publicans', when all licenses came up for review - reissue or withdrawal - every September. For the defense of public morality only a judicious number of licenses were granted to each district, and in a district already built-up, there would seldom be grounds for an increase in the number already granted. This implied a further restriction in the expansion of numbers, for there was a cut in the rate of building new suburbs through the high cost of credit, and cheap housing did not fully recover until after 1820. Only from that time, therefore, did the increase in numbers of retail outlets for sale increase effectively, although more people crowded into the old districts and more beer was sold in previously licensed houses when trade recovered after 1807.

The whole question of public morals and the drink industries is complex. Evils existed, there is no doubt. There is no excuse for ignoring them, neither is there historical justification for considering them out of the context of contemporary standards of which they were a part. For the economic historian, however, considering the development of the industries *qua* industries, the problem of moral judgment does not enter (though it may very well creep in at the back door in shaping the historian's own attitude towards his subject, considering that attitude itself critically and historically) - any more than a study of the iron and steel industry through the centuries need lead to praise or damnation by the writer's views on the wickedness of war.

For the porter brewers, this judicial attitude on the part of the magistrates created firstly an objective situation which made retail outlets of trade worth controlling; secondly, it itself created the conditions to encourage the move on the part of the publicans. Finally, there was undoubtedly some collusion between brewers and magistrates which aided the process, though to what degree it is impossible to analyse.

Initially - and most influential - the brewers now knew that if they could control the trade of a public house, no rival brewer could establish a competing house, tapping the same immediately - local custom. This could be done formally by becoming the publican's landlord, in a manner which had been common, though not extensive, throughout the 18th, Century. Halsey had bought in the Green Dragon 'brew-house' - in all probability an inn where brewing had been done - in 1698, and in Thrale's time there were sometimes twenty leases of public houses held by the brewery. From 1780 the value and number of leases rise gradually until 1802 - when there were 82 entered, worth £13,000 - and then rise abruptly to a peak of 117, valued at £55,000 in 1812. From this point a gradual decline begins in number and value, as the Rest accounts show. The increased desire to tie the trade through buying up the leases of licensed public houses was raising the premiums attached to a transfer of the lease. After 1800 an average payment of £500 down became common, reflected in the valuations rising more rapidly than the numbers involved, and this was true even where the brewery became only an intermediary landlord, paying the rent which they received from the publican to the original owner.

There was little direct profit for the brewer-landlords in the possession of real estate for its own sake. Premiums became higher and higher, calling for larger sums than had been needed in the actual course of industrial expansion; legal expenses were a percentage on each transaction, and a whole breed of real-estate brokers specialising in licensed property appeared, to profit from the new demands of the brewers as prospective landlords. Rents we received, of course, but rents were also paid out, and the landlord became responsible for the upkeep of the fabric of buildings, local taxes and insurance. Then, as in 1950, being a landlord had its disadvantages, and little financial reward came from receiving rents, although there was in no sense the same over-extension of commitments in this tied-house movement as there was in the race of the 1880s and 1890s.

While the firm moved out of lease-holding after 1812, the amount of money lent to London publicans continued to rise. This meant, I think, not that the race had died, but that it was being pressed less fiercely on the part of the brewers, who were themselves under some encouragement from the publicans. A lease was a legal form of control, with written sanctions upon the tenant to accept the beer of his brewing landlord - the purpose for which the brewer had laid out the money on the premium. It might be, in fact, that the provision was not entered into the lease, but there was never any doubt that the tenant accepted his landlord's product. The loan-tie was less formal, being generally without written format apart from the publican's 'note' of receipt for the loan, but the implications for the trade of the public house as long as the loan existed, were equally clear. In other respects it was better for the brewer to lend money to the publicans rather than become their landlord. The loans could be much smaller than the premium for the lease, although they had risen to an average of £350 per loan by 1818, there were no legal expences and less responsibility. All loans carried interest at 5% p.a., a better direct financial bargain than a weekly rent which entailed further payments out, and the tenant looked after his own house.

In another sense too, the loan was a looser form of control than the lease, claimed by the brewers before the Parliamentary Committees enquiring into the State of the Police in London, 1817, The Public Breweries, 1818, and the Retail Sale of Beer, 1830, to be no monopoly of trade at all, for which there was a certain justification. At Brewers' Hall, the Porter Brewers' Committee had agreed on two practices in regard to houses under a loan tie, which modified the permanence of the arrangements. If a publican owing money to his brewer was dissatisfied with the beer delivered, or for any spontaneous reason wished to change his brewer, there would be no objection if he could another prospective brewer who agreed to become his creditor. Unless he was deeply behindhand with his interest payments, so that anyone would be chary of becoming his creditor, the first brewer could not prevent him from taking his debt and his custom to another person. Indeed, the publican had a champion of equivalent power and influence to his old creditor, in the person of his prospective brewer and creditor. Secondly, the members of the committee agreed amongst themselves not to solicit trade among the regular customers of their rivals, nor to foment sedition. When a publican having a debt-obligation to his brewer wished to take his custom elsewhere, the abroad-clerk would come over from the brewery to find out if he was, in fact, dissatisfied, or if he had been persuaded to become so by the officials of a rival house. From this point the issue would be taken up between the two brewers concerned. One would demand 'release' if it was a genuine wish for change; the other would 'refuse to give him up' if he considered it to be an engineered proposal. In this situation, there was room for many different pressures from both sides, but the economic result of the practice was a fluidity of control which did not exist where the brewer was landlord. Although in no sense was this free competition in an open market between manufacturer and customer, it did allow the more efficient producer to exercise his advantages and attract the trade his superiority of product warranted. Only it could not happen directly through differential prices, as there was also agreement on prices per barrel charged to the publican. Competition was in quality, the most efficient manufacturer having the lowest costs, hence the greatest gap between his costs and receipts derived from the fixed price level, and so able to brew a stronger beer for the same price than his rivals could afford to do, while keeping the same profit margins as they. When economic superiority was reflected in 'product differentiation' rather than lower prices: it could still become effective in the sections of the market which were completely free or where the publicans were under a loan-tie only. This was only a brake upon the immediate response to the allurements of economic advantages, and did not prevent reaction as strongly as a tied lease. With the latter the brake was even stronger. A superior product could never be sold at a public house of which the lease was held by another brewer, and could only work its charms indirectly by attracting custom away to another selling point - a slower response by the ultimate customers, than that of a free publican exercising his choice of brewer.*28.

It will be seen from this, that the loan tie was a strong steadying influence upon the allegiance of the publican than an absolute barrier to change, and the 'turn-over' amongst publicans with a loan-tie to their brewer confirms the contention. But while it only slowed down the impact of economic pressures, there were still great advantages. With normal satisfaction on both sides, the brewer was assured of the publican's entire trade in porter, whereas under free trade the publican could divide his custom as a free house does today. Not only was this of great value for sales but it allowed the brewer to make some estimate for production, as the draught of a house could be estimated, more-or-less. Where a product was as temperamental as beer, especially before refrigeration allowed brewing to continue through the summer months, an estimate for some section of the market was a useful thing to have.

Most commonly, a single brewer would put up the loan for a publican, so that he would be 'free' for the sale of ale and spirits (that is until ale brewing became general among the porter brewers in the 1830s). Occasionally a loan (or the money for buying a lease) would be divided between brewer and distiller, tying up the trade completely; but this was always infrequent and Charles Barclay said that the Anchor Brewery had no connection with distillers or spirits dealers.*28

The proportion of the trade secured by lease and loan, and the amount of capital involved in securing this retail trade, were alike remarkable. By 1830 Barclay Perkins had over £350,000 'invested' for this purpose - slightly over £1,5 per barrel. Other brewers of the first rank had about as much absolute capital invested for a smaller production of beer, and Charles Barclay thought £5,000,000 a reasonable estimate for the entire resources of the London industry used for tying the trade.*29 The best explanation of the system comes from the prepared paper which he read to the Committee in 1830. Of the 800 public houses in regular trade with the brewery 52 only were owned, through the lease, and there were 350 - 400 without any loan or lease tie, probably a slightly higher proportion of free trade than the other great brewers possessed. These figures, and the proportion of trade controlled by loans, had been steadily rising throughout the 19th. Century up to this point. It had continued from the bad years at the turn of the century through the period when demand was picking up and trade expanding as comfortably as in the old days before 1797.

The increase in demand, reflected in the increasing sales of beer at public houses, was itself creating the *need* for these loans *from* the publicans, because of the licensing system (while at least one witness hinted that the increase in demand put more money in the brewers' pockets to enable them to support the loans). The point was, that the increased demand, coming from more money in more people's pockets at a time when food prices were dropping, could not be adequately reflected in an increase in the number of public houses, because of the refusal of the licensing justices to issue many new licenses. The natural result was that a large premium became attached to a public house with a license. When such a house was left by a publican, immediately his successor would be faced by the need for capital to pay this premium which competitors, with brewers' loans, were prepared to pay to the outgoing tenant for possession of his house and license. It would be unusual for an incoming tenant - many of them ex-servants of gentlemen - to have large resources of his own, so he would have to ask his anticipated brewer to put up most of the money for him. And although it meant the need for a great deal of capital, financially at 5%, and commercially for a pledge of all porter sales, it was worth the brewer's while to help, rather than see a rival do so. While each brewer could be reasonably certain that some other brewer would take the opportunity of lending money to a prospective tenant, no one of them could afford to refuse. As long as demand exceeded supply, and the same licensing policy existed, the premium on licenses virtually meant that the brewer's loan was 'built into' the marketing structure of the London industry.

While the attitude of the justices in most cases came from genuine fears of public debauchery, it is questionable if sales were limited much by the limitation of licenses - the drop in price in 1830 being sufficient on its own to explain the increase in demand. Increased demand, up to that year, remained bottled up in a restricted number of retail outlets of sale, to the advantage of those controlling them. To the problems that a new producer would have in getting capital resources behind him to produce on a competitive scale, were now added almost insuperable difficulties of breaking into a congealing marketing structure. In addition, it seems clear that there was some favouritism in granting licenses to brewers' houses. It was natural that an instinctive sympathy should exist in cases where the important brewers applied for the licence - they moved in the same social world as the magistrates and added weight to the application. In some cases there was active collusion, often between servants of the brewery and the magistrates' clerks, which undoubtedly helped some brewers' houses to get licenses where publicans without influence found it difficult or impossible. To the extent that this existed, or was considered by independent publicans to exist, it helped the important brewers to consolidate their control over the trade.*30

In 1830 the support on which the development of this movement had rested, was withdrawn when the Whigs - not coincidentally - abolished the duty on beer and the old system of licensing for beer sales.

Restricted Competition

The foregoing passages must be related to the whole process of changing aspects of competition amongst the breweries, as changing conditions meant that regulation of *conditions* of competition became natural or inevitable amongst those few who now led the market.

There had always been a certain personal friendship or mutual regard (living a frail existence amongst the hazards of trade rivalries) between the great entrepreneurs of the industry, Thrale and Whitbread, Benjamin Truman and Felix Calvert, Sampson Hanbury, John Perkins and Robert Barclay. They met socially and to administer the charities at Brewers' Hall throughout the 18th. century, and generally moved in the same kind of social circle. And there had always been co-operation about small matters of trade. It was difficult to estimate production needs for the year exactly, so that in most years it is common to find the few hundred barrels bought by the Anchor Brewery from a rival if estimates had been low, or sold to various rivals if they had 'overbrewed' themselves. Similarly if a stock of yeast had gone wild the other porter brewers would sell enough stores to allow brewing to continue. A more important agreement existed at one time between Whitbread and Thrale, reported to Mrs. Thrale after her husband's death. It had lasted for three years before 1780 so that it was probably a government contract arising from the American War, and Murphy claimed that it was worth £23,000 a year for each them. (No details of it have survived at either brewery as far as is known).*31

When the few firms began to draw ahead of their rivals in production, so that they began to share between themselves an increasingly significant percentage of the total amount brewed, it became possible to discuss policies which would be favourable for the trade as a whole. Common action was most desirable against the government of the day, which was always interested in maximising revenue from the industry while keeping the retail prices as low as possible to prevent tumults amongst the populace. The old assize of ale meant that prices could not be moved upwards without public authority, so that negotiation became inevitable, and with it the preliminary need for discussions, a spokesman and a delegation from the trade to wait upon the ministers. In 1762 a deputation led by 'Sir Benjamin Truman, Mr. Whitbread and one or two other gentlemen of the brewery' obtained permission for an increase in price to 3½d. per quart pot after an increase in the duty in 1761. In 1782 - 3 a bad harvest coming on top of a previous rise in the duty on malt and hops caused similar pressure to bring the trade together against the government, who refused to allow any increase in prices.

In a letter to John Perkins of 29th. October from Norwich, Robert Barclay wrote:

"My dear Friend,

. I rec'd with much pleasure the account of the Congress of Brewers at Felix's & I own I applaud your resolutions to cry out helpmen and brethren, for truly the times require a combination of all the wisdom of the craft, & when I reflect how nobly H.T. &. Co are represented, I am perfectly easy to abide by the result of your debates. Your idea of brewing short I think most expedient to our Interest, but perhaps were we to stop directly for two months, I believe it would prove a more powerful argument to Ld. Shelburne, who would be clearly convinced that our union gives us a consequence he is little aware of …"*32.

Perhaps, in view of this, the extreme drop in production which occurred in 1783, spread over the year June 1782 - June 1783, did not come from purely commercial decisions. However, prices did not change as a result of their action.

This incentive for co-operation was all the stronger during wars from 1793 - 1815, when wildly fluctuating grain prices, and successive increases in the duties brought the brewers together to face the authorities. Public regulation on any industry will tend to have the same effect within the industry, especially where those regulations detail some methods of measurement as they did in brewing and malting, encouraging attempts to change regulations and alter allowances.

From the 1780s onwards the small group of porter brewers leading the industry began to meet on a more regular basis at Brewers' Hall, forming the Porter Brewers' Committee, which met when summoned by any of its dozen members. All paid dues according to the amount of their annual production (10s. per 1,000 barrels was often levied) in order to provide the services of a clerk and any expences connected with petitioning Parliament. Unfortunately, there is no Minute Book of the Committee existing with the records of the Brewers' Company, so information about its activities is scarce, save for the facts Charles Barclay told the Parliamentary Committees in the 19th. Century. Its birth and existence was part of the natural movement whereby Brewers' Hall began to assume an economic importance for the trade, after being for many years primarily an institution devoted to convivial, ceremonial and charitable pursuits.

The extremely high malt prices of 1801 led this group to take action, Robert Barclay, Goodwyn and Delafield formed a Committee to arrange the import of foreign barley, sent an agent, Claude Scott, to the continent, and canvassed all the brewers to take up the shares for the purchase price. Timothy Brown, partner with the younger Whitbread, arranged for the Bank of England to discount the bills drawn on Hamburg, and over 25,000 quarters were imported and dumped on the market to bring the price down. The loss of £2,500 occasioned by the sale was shared between the subscribers.*33

More generally, it was clear by the end of the century that each great brewer now had an individual influence upon the market. A price-war was therefore feasible, and, they claimed, dangerous in the long run alike upon trade and public, if carried to a bitter conclusion. If any one of five or six individuals, but notably Barclays after 1810, dropped their price, the prices of all would have to fall; similarly if they refused to raise their price the prices of none could be raised. Calvert asserted this to be so in 1818 - that if Barclays lowered, all must lower or face short-term ruin - even though it would be madness to drop the price unless the price of malt and hops allowed it. This is explicit recognition amongst the producers themselves of a market situation changed from that of pure competition, where a multitude of individuals manufacturers faced a price level which he could not influence as an individual; to one of 'oligopoly' with imperfect competition, where a few large concerns led the prices. From the first price movement since 1762, in 1799, all begin to move together in jumps of 5s. per barrel to the publican from the brewer, and ½ d. per pot on or off the retail price. Agreements were optional for anyone to adhere or refuse as they wished, but all moved together, as a lower price would have entailed brewing at a lower strength, if profit margins were to be adequate. The chance of confusion coming to all if a single brewer acted wildly over pricing, was a very early recognition of a 20th. Century truth, that situations where pure competition no longer exists cannot be judged under the old rules, where the invisible hand did all the adjusting necessary.

The invisible hand, after all, was not amputated, but guided only, in the matter of prices. The co-operation was at best a cat-and-mouse affair, with each remaining antagonistic to the other. No marketing quotas were set, or discussed, but each maintained a normal rivalry to extend sales at the fixed price. This was certainly the case with beer sales, but in the supply of yeast to distillers there may have been some effective restriction, though little is known. This situation meant also the continued existence of competition in quality up to the fixed price, which would keep profit margins in check by allowing the economic pressures of quality instead of price influence sales, though hindered in this by the integration which had developed. Charles Calvert made the same point to the 1818 Committee, that there would only be real combination if agreement was over price and quality. The Committee upheld their claims that marketing practices had not resulted in the evil effects of which they stood accused. Probably, profits were kept up slightly by this practice, though not in the direct monopoly sense. And any calculation of social evil and advantage is problematical: certainly the mechanisation of production which had enabled the few to expand until they dominated the market, itself produced more benefits than would have accrued under a less mature system of manufacture, and with this understood it becomes less easy to condemn the changed marketing system which resulted from this advance.

The brewers were more secure in their claims through the failure of the one important effort to break into the market at a lower price. The Golden Lane Brewery sent out its first full deliveries, 125,000 barrels, in 1807 at ½d. per pot under the Brewers' Hall price, but it had ceased to compete on the first scale by 1811 and declined until bankruptcy in 1827. A slight cause for this could be laid to heavy legal expenses and excise difficulties (brought on through the efforts of the other brewers) but in the main its failure came for the reasons claimed by the others - that its revenues from the lower price did not allow the proprietors to maintain the quality standards of the rest. They were then forced to drop their specific gravities and demand for Golden Lane beer melted away towards the stronger beers of the other brewers. The argument was given added point, as Charles Barclay saw, by the fact that the Golden

Lane Brewery followed every price movement of the others.*34

It seems clear, too, that the great brewers had most of the free trade of London in their hands. The smaller brewers, ringing the centre of the city where all the large breweries had their sites, had been forced to tie up their trade more completely than anyone else, to save their markets which, under free competition, were being threatened by the better products of the greater. This was true of brewers from Reading to Bromley, who had more capital tied up per barrel produced and a higher percentage of tied trade to free trade than Barclays or the others of the first rank. As could be expected from this situation, the first demands for raising prices always came from these smaller concerns, who petitioned the price-leaders to 'allow an advance' when all the brewers met in the corn market - an assertion which is given weight by the absorption or collapse of many smaller firms during these years.*35.

Such was the degree of co-operation which, with the integration forward into retail sale, made the industrial and marketing structure of the London brewing industry - controlled by the few amongst which Barclays Perkins stood as the greatest of the great - one of the most precociously sophisticated in England. Within this context, must be seen the great expansion of the firm which came after 1807.

Equipment

As the scale of production became greater, so it became more important to have exact means of measurement for materials. Mistakes in cost rates and pricing were being translated over ever increasing quantities, and hence becoming more and more serious. The need for calculation in this way, was the greater when prices were fixed and all variations had to come in the quality of the product, and it was just in the measurement of strength that there had hitherto been no accuracy. The invention of the saccharometer by John Richardson, published in 1784 though claimed previously by Baverstock, brought for the first time calculations of specific gravity to the consideration of the brewer. Until then, the strength of beer could be judged only roughly from the 'length' of brew from a quarter of malt - estimating the quality and strength of the grain by rule of thumb. Now, the exact weight of fermentable matter contained in any parcel of malt could be easily discovered, and hence beer could be made to any specific gravity desired, by using the appropriate quantities of graded malts. This was of the greatest value in enabling a regular strength of brew to be maintained, but conversely, it meant also that exact predictions could be made about what changes in strength would be entailed in a given change in costs - and vice versa.*36.

There is no mention in the records of the year in which the saccharometer was introduced into the Anchor Brewery, but it was probably within a few years of 1780, for the advantages of the instrument were manifest, and Richardson published tables of the comparative strengths of malts and beers based on specific gravity counts, which opened up a new world for measurement in the industry - and for the Excise Commissioners measuring the industry. This change in surveying the brewery did not come about, however, until duty was again laid on beer by Gladstone.

Further mechanisation had taken place before the expansion after 1807. Steam-power was applied to the mashing process in 1802, when machines valued at £700 were installed, and malt elevators fitted:

"Large rakes with chains moved by an invisible
power, stir to the very bottom the immense mass
of malt in boilers twelve feet deep, elevators which
no-body touches carry up to the summit of the
building 2,500 bushels of malt a day, thence
distributed to the different places where the process
is carried on ..."*37

A new plant was erected at Storey's Lane worth £16,000 in 1815, and the whole valuation of plant rose to £78,500 in 1821 - Park Street, £54,000, New Buildings and purchases an extra, £10,000, and the Storey's Lane plant £14,500. Further increases occurred in 1826 on the New Park Estates (£3,800).

Any growth in production meant directly an increase in deliveries, and greater numbers of drays and horses to make them. The production figures imply therefore, the rise in the Farrier's valuations which go up from £2,800 in 1805, to £3,500 by 1809, and to £6,750 in 1818, when the great number of 150 horses were owned by the brewery. The number of butts rose similarly from 13,000 in 1800 to over 17,000 in 1815.

Expansion in Trade

From 1801 Whitbread finally lost the lead in production to Barclays, Hanbury and Reid. After contesting with Reid for a few years Barclays jumped ahead after 1808 in what was undoubtedly the greatest, and most rapid expansion in the history of the brewery. Annual production rose from well under 200,000 - in most years about a mean of 150,000 barrels - to 337,000 in 1815 and built up to another peak of 380,000 barrels in 1826. The rise was too rapid and too long sustained to be explained as anything but a deep-seated change in the efficiency of the firm or the product, for it went clearly contrary to other individual cases, and, indeed, to the collective trend of the other major breweries. The others were themselves wondering what could explain their rivals unprecedented success, and feared that a new process was in use, of which they remained quite ignorant, even employing a chemist to find out if new substances were giving a special distinction to the porter of the Anchor Brewery.*38

No explicit reasons are given in the records of the firm, or elsewhere, for this great success, and any *quantitative* analysis of the factors involved is impossible. The Rests would suggest a misleading picture (from the movements of the debts in trade) if there was not the direct evidence of production figures and the indirect evidence of stocks of beer and plant valuations to prove the extent of the rise. The Committee of 1818 are trying to prove that Barclays have less capital tied up in securing retail trade, on which interest would have to be paid, hence were unencumbered by as heavy a capital investment as the others, and could so afford to brew a better product. Charles Barclay turns down the suggestions (though opposing the direct purchase of leases as a burden on the brewers) and with Fredrick Perkins, said merely that large-scale production allowed them to brew cheaper. This is, of course, generally true, especially in the brewing industry, and plant, once erected, is most economically used when running to capacity, as production increases without concomitant increases in overhead costs. But it does not explain the process of expansion, nor was the answer intended to delve very deeply into the secrets of success.

We may speculate in retrospect more boldly than Charles Barclay and Fredrick Perkins wished to do in public, upon the innovations which aided success, even if we cannot be as definite about their respective contributions, as the partners could have been.

In mechanisation there does not appear to have been much difference between the greatest breweries, except that 'refrigeration' from 1817 may have given Barclays an extended brewing season and quickened the process of brewing, and a 'yeast manufactury' increased ancillary profits. But the main reasons evidently do not lie here.

The Country Trade provides a more important answer; how important only the missing Country Trade ledgers or correspondence would tell. But debts outstanding for the country trade do rise very greatly until 1810, and although they begin to fall in subsequent years, they remain many times higher than those of other firms. When one turns to the valuations of beer stocks in the Rests, the point is amply confirmed, and its significance deepened; for while most of the other brewers remained faithful to their traditional brew - the porter which had always been the sheet-anchor of their fortunes - Barclays were moving more and more into other kinds of beer. While porter itself, still more than half the sales, was undergoing a transformation, stout and bottling beer, which were not the staple trade of the London pub-

Year	Porter	Stout	Bottling	Ale	% Porter	% Rest
	Figures in £ ...					
1795	£80,000	£12,000	-	-	87	13
	Subsequent figures in barrels ...					
1805	76,396	10,361	10,177	245	78	22
1815	69,317	28,937	17,055	513	60	40
1825	98,187	17,913	-	809	83.8	16.2

lic houses increased greatly, and the Stoney Lane plant which appears in the 1815 Rest valuations for the first time, worth £16,000, is almost certainly an ale brewery, for ale stocks begin in the same year. Porter had traditionally kept for almost a year to mature before being sent out to the publicans, but from 1800 the public taste had been moving towards a milder beer, and by 1818 Barclays were sending out most of their 'porter' just as it was brewed, with only a small amount maturing for delivery as the old 'entire' beer. This had important financial consequences for the brewer - who had every reason to entice the public taste towards mild beer - but there does seem to have been this spontaneous movement in taste (always one of the most difficult historical circumstances to explain) from which Barclays profited more than any rival. It was 'product leadership' of the greatest importance for the fortunes of the firm, for the innovations led the crest of this wave of public taste away from porter in the old sense, while the other brewers followed it. Whitbread, for instance, did not begin to brew ale until 1834.

Although most of the stout and almost all the bottled beer would be sold in the Country Trade (which would also include sales within the London area outside the public houses, save for the bottling beer which is listed separately in the Rests) as they began to gain popularity with the *publicans* and public, it meant the firm was tapping a second market within the London trade, which lies concealed in the aggregate figures for sales to London publicans. And this market for different beers in the public houses was not being exploited by the others until Barclays had doubled their trade.

The table shows how important these other beers were in these years, although the only comparative figures are for stocks and not sales. These should still reflect the proportions of sales without great distortion. Under the ale figures is included 'Ale for India' which is entered first in 1799. Bottling stocks decline rapidly after 1820, as do the debts outstanding for 'Bottling and Exports' in the Rests.

The new products are the clearest to find, but other innovations worked to the advantage of the brewery in indirect ways more difficult to evaluate. Economies had come in the 18th. Century mainly from the increase in the scale of production through planning the brewery efficiently and mechanisation. In the first part of the 19th. Century they came in other ways. The lower the costs of brewing the more money could be spent on malt and hops per barrel to get out a stronger beer at the fixed price. One of the factors behind costs was the payment of interest on capital (which bore a steady 5%). In this sense the Committee were correct to inquire into the amount of capital put into controlling the retail trade -

and in fact Barclays did have less tied up in leases and loans in relation to turn-over than the others - but this capital charge was largely self-sustaining through the payment of interest to the brewery on the loans, and rent for the leases. Its marginal effect upon the cost of beer to the publican was negligible, More important was the amount of working capital tied up in the stocks of raw materials and beer, on which interest was paid. Any quickening in the rate of turn-over of stocks of beer would thus have the effect of reducing the amount of capital 'sustaining' the stocks and lessen the interest charges accordingly The point is a material one, remembering the movement away from maturing porter for almost a year before delivery, and the value of the stocks involved. With regard to the mild beer, which was sent out when brewed, the saving was large, and ways had been found to mature the 'entire' beer in four weeks by the use of stale beer, in place of the 9 - 12 months necessary before. These stocks had been worth over £200,000 on each year after 1805 and over £300,000 in 1819, so that the savings on the interest charges were considerable. Barclays are leading the field in this movement, which coincided with the swing in tastes towards the mild beers, - milder beers which could afford to be stronger beers because they were more economical in resources. This may reconcile the paradoxical claims that the brewers were 'inducing' an 'autonomous' change in public tastes. One particular device may have helped Barclays produce a beer which was distinct, and a 'different' product in a sense that had not been true before in relation to the porter of other breweries. The innovation of 'differentiation of product' is of the highest importance in business history, being connected with the beginnings of advertising and a whole new world of *making* a market instead of merely supplying a market. For the first time, it appears, the brewer at Barclays put a handful of dry hops into each barrel, when the beer was racked, - 'dry-hopping' as it is now known. This could be an innovation in the same way that porter was a technical invention in 1722, attracting custom in the same way from other products without its distinction.

A further economising innovation in manufacture deserves to be mentioned with the others. The pressure of higher grain prices made every brewer use his malt to the best advantage, and gave an incentive for changing the proportions of brown and pale malts used for porter. Pale was known to be stronger, and more economical despite its higher price, than brown, so that increasingly a higher proportion of pale would be used to give the strength from the minimum amount of malt, while more highly dried malt provided the traditional colour and flavour. In 1819 the great brewers were cleared of charges of using special colouring and flavouring substances, in vogue among the smaller firms and the publicans, for further economising on brown malt. When sugar or molasses were allowed these were sometimes used, but the solution generally adopted came in 1821, when the Anchor Brewery first used 'patent' or roasted malt, just to give taste and colour, while all the strength came from the pale malt. This process never became universal for the entire output of the brewery, and Hertfordshire brown malt continued to be used, even if less extensively.*39.

It is impossible to say just which of the foregoing new devices, new methods and new products 'primed the pump' for the expansion, and which sustained it. Being expressed in quality and not pin price, they do not admit of analysis where the records of input and output of all factors are missing. But if the economist must remain disappointed in this (as so often) the historian can still see in their collective influence the innovating force behind the changes.

<u>Grains and Yeast</u>*40

Using such a great quantity of malt annually (a production of 200,000 barrels needed over 200,000 quarters input of malt) meant that great quantities of the spent grains were available for sale by the brewery. With the sale of yeast, this was an ancillary trade profitable to the firm and intimately linked with other industries supplying the needs of London. The spent grains were used almost entirely for feeding milch cows and cattle within, or near, London, and it was above all, upon the regular supply of brewers' grains that most of London's milk supplies depended. The seasonal rhythm was exactly suited to the needs of the cattle raisers and cow-keepers, for the greatest flow of grains came in the winter, when feed was at its shortest. This was true also for the distillers who either kept pigs and cattle at their distilleries, or similarly sold their waste-products off the premises to farmers elsewhere. Middlemen took off the grains from the brewery for distribution to the many small cow-keepers, and the receipts were set against the expenses of brewing for the year, as were the sales of yeast. Prices for grains rose from 1s. 6d. per quarter until 1799, 2s. in 1800 to 3s. by 1827, so that, with the large quantities involved, receipts were usually above £10,000. After 1827 the Rests do give running accounts for the expenses of brewing over the complete year, so for the first time quantities of raw materials used are given. For these years receipts from grains were:-

Year	Qtrs of malt and grains, annually	Annual production, barrels	Grains pr Qtr.	Receipts from grains. Nett.
1827	96,794	341,5000	3s	£14,519
1828	89,406	306,000	3s	£13,410
1829	79,977	275,500	3s	£9,523
1830	231,500	231,500	2s.6d	£9,304

The brewers were equally important as distributors of yeast as they were suppliers of feeding stuffs for cattle. Surplus yeast grown in the fermenting tanks during the process of brewing would be collected and 'fed', even before the yeast manufactury was built to do the operation more conveniently, in 1816. The distillers of London, and some from Scotland, as well as the countless small bakeries in the London area, depended on these regular supplies from the breweries to carry on their trades. As the distilleries were large concerns, and few in number, they were sold yeast directly from the breweries, but a class of intermediaries - the 'yeast-men' - had the trade to the bakeries in their hands. From the books it is clear that these yeastmen bought a few shillings cheaper than the distillers, who were charged 20s. per 'store' in accordance with an arrangement between the brewers which also limited the quantities to be sold. Receipts for yeast rose from £4,500 (at 12s. per store) in 1799 to over £7,000 after 1827, with the dealers paying 17s. and 18s. and the distillers 20s. And in the expenses of brewing accounts after 1827, though unmentioned before, come receipts from the sale of 'grounds' for over £2,000 each year in which accounts are given.

This was efficient management for the firm, who were profiting from the sale of waste products, incidental to the main purposes of production, and also an efficient 'economy' between industries, for the breweries were part of the integrated system of trades which supplied city populations with food and drink.

Partners and Profits: 1800 - 1830

From the records which have survived it is difficult to extract accounts of profits. The tables showing increments to capital stock and the known receipts from trade of the partners, give a rough idea only of what the profits must have been, although by no means the accurate calculation which contemporaries would have been able to make. The roughness of the method is shown when there are 'taxable profit' figures existing between the years 1804 - 1813, against which the others may be compared, and even these estimates must become less valid still after 1814 when the private ledgers lapse. The annual transfers of capital from the joint partnership account (which is maintained at £200,000) to the partners' surplus capital account show how large profits became when production and sales had increased. From fluctuating about £50,000 from the turn of the century, much less in the bad years and more in the good, they rise sharply after 1810 to £145,000 in 1814 (including the payments to partners) and the Rests show at what a high level they were maintained. Besides the temporary investments of surplus cash, which increase at this time of prosperity, in 1818 the brewery made a permanent investment in Southwark Bridge, being rebuilt and improved, of £9,000 worth of shares - £4,250 in 1816 when the work began, and another £4,750 before the 1818 Rest.

From 1788 onwards each quarter share of the partnership earnt a regular, agreed sum annually. For the year 1788 this was £2,500; from 1789 to 1805 £3,000, and then £4,000 for 1806, 1807, 1808; £5,000 for 1809 and £6,000 after 1810. In addition there were allowances. John Perkins had always £200 each year for entertaining customers, and after 1800 all the partners agreed on certain increases from £200 to £700 to compensate themselves for the war-time income-tax - an unwelcome innovation to the old taxes.

While these large profits were highly lucrative to the partners, they remained also valuable to the firm. through the written agreements to keep most of the annual surplus in the partners' surplus capital account - a mere book-keeping transfer - which did not move it away from the business. This rapidly augmenting account is remarkable for showing both the high amount of annual profit and the high proportion of it which was ploughed back - so that the firm was virtually self-financing after 1810.

The Income Tax brought home to everybody's purse how the national economy was being mobilised for war, but the detachments of militia raised by every large concern in London for its own defence, showed more directly the unprecedented emergencies the times. In one of the few letters existing about the firm, John Perkins agreed to muster a company, as did the other brewers:

"My Lord,
Agreeable to your Lordship's desire we have the honour to acquaint you, we have maturely considered the conversation you had with our Mr. Barclay, and find we have it in our power to muster a company of fifty men for the internal defence of the brewhouse.

"We have already of our own thirty stand of arms and accoutrements, we shall therefore want twenty stand of arms and accoutrements, and ammunition for fifty men, we shall wait your directions in this business and are with the utmost respect,

Your Lordship's
Obedient humble Servant
JOHN PERKINS (Signed)
"Barclay, Perkins and Co.'s Brewhouse,
Park Gate, Southwark. 7 July, 1803."
John Perkins to Lord Pelham.*41

The thirty stand of muskets, to which he refers, may well have been a legacy from the old days of the Gordon Riots, when he had saved the brewery from almost certain destruction. When Mrs. Thrale returned to London after hearing the news, she wrote in her diary, '... we now have got arms and mean to defend ourselves by Force, if further violence is intended ...'.

At this time, the family partnerships begin to pass to the second generation, and family ownership becomes all the more complete as ploughed back profits dominate the capital accounts. David Barclay gave way in 1801 to Richard Gurney and his son Hudson. In 1807 Robert Barclay nominated his son Charles to half his own share, and in 1809 both John Perkins and Silvanus Bevan did the same for their sons, Henry. After John Perkins' death in 1812 his quarter-share was divided between Henry and Fredrick.

The change in generations can be seen also through the Minutes of the Meeting of the Brewers' Company, for in response to its increased importance in playing an economic rôle, it became a matter of course for the important brewers to take their places in the hierarchy, whereas their fathers had less time for its activities. Henry Perkins' apprenticeship is recorded there to William Tunnard in 1792 - Tunnard being always friendly with the firm, brewing for their stocks and lending £4,000 to the brewery in the bad year of 1794. Henry Perkins entered the Company in 1799, when his apprenticeship was over, and Frederick in 1803, after being apprenticed to his father, Charles Barclay, the second generation of the other active family in the business, entered the Brewers' Company in 1804. He was joint steward with Fredrick Perkins on Lord Mayor's day 1807 - a companionship in public he repeated before various Parliamentary Committees. Charles Barclay was the first of the Quaker families who renewed Thrale's old example of standing for Parliament. He was elected as Tory M.P. for Southwark in 1815, but purchased Dundalk when he failed to get re-elected in 1818.

The last of the old generation, Robert Barclay, was made Master of the Brewers' Company in 1813, but as an old man he remained in the country while somebody officiated for him at the meetings. The sons rose to this honour within a few years, Henry Perkins being master in 1819, Charles Barclay in 1826 and Fredrick Perkins in 1827. By 1830 the sons of the second generation are themselves being sworn in and taking the livery of the Company.

It was still the complete family firm in all its aspects. In the most important matters, capital was held within the immediate family of partners, and the direction of the firm remained completely in their hands. Beyond this, the Quaker bankers, who were still within the kinship group, stood ready to lend money in a difficult year, and there were increasing numbers of small investments in the hands of publicans, as the brewery became a savings bank for the humble.

In small ways, too, the family circle entered closely into the life of the firm. The 'Private Trade' had an account of its own - mostly for bottled beer being supplied to relations and friends when in London, or at their country homes. Mrs. Thrale's continuing letters to Perkins mention many times the bottled porter that he sent her, even when she was as far away as Manchester. Fodder for the horses came from the estates of the partners, and where Quakers were in trades whose products or services were utilised by the brewery, it is usual to see their names scattered through the books, whether Taylors for malt or Lloyds, Gurneys and Ransom for iron.

Conclusion

These were the conditions of organisation and prosperity of the Anchor Brewery in 1830, when licensing and duty were both abolished, to greatly increase production after the declining fortunes of the previous three years.

Following 1830 came a century of change; the abrupt transition to free trade under the Whigs; renewed beer taxation under Gladstone; a renewed and completed race for tying the trade, changing products and the complete transformation of the form of ownership. Through all these changes runs the living thread of family continuity, as it had done for so long before.

Ending a history thus in 1830, when its subject has continued to the present, means that it is perforce left incomplete, and the perspective which a completed narrative would present may now appear foreshortened. But the gap of a century and more has, if nothing else, the saving merit of providing an interval which enables the previous span of development to be seen with detachment; in a certain sense insulating the history from the entanglements of the present, where the brambles of latterday opinions and tensions catch at the sleeve of the historian. This may prove a partial compensation for incompleteness.

Notes to the Text

Notes following numbered asterisks.
Page number and note number are given.

11,*1. This document was lost in 1951, and has not yet been recovered. The extracts were made by Mr. B.W. Cockes.

12,*2. Parliamentary Papers,1830,X, p.21. Evidence to Report on retail sale of beer. Charles Barclay. Ch. lI, ch.23, s.22.

*3. Boswell, *Life of Johnson*, l791, (OUP Edn., 1946) Vol ii, 69.

13,*4. *Ibid*. Vol i, 328.

14,*5. *Instructions for officers in the London brewery*, 1724, p.4

*6. Parl. Papers,1808, IV, Evidence on … Distillation from sugar, p.129. and Parl. Papers, 1806, II, Evidence to Committee ... on Malt, p.39.

*7. Trade Ledgers in Whitbreads Brewery, Chiswell Street.

17,*8. Minute Books, Brewers' Company Records, Guildhall, London.

18,*9. I have not, as yet, thoroughly searched the Thrale papers on deposit in the John Rylands Library, Manchester. This may reveal more exact information about profits and borrowing.

20,*10. Previous references to Mrs. Thrale and Perkins are taken from *Thraliana* (ed. Balderston, 1942) Vol ii, pp.461-2, 479. i, pp.437 et seq., 332. Subsequent references may be found in Boswell, *passim*, Clifford, *Hester Lynch Piozzi*,(1941) pp.95-6, 166, 167, 172, 178, Hayward, *Autobiography of Mrs. Piozzi*, (1861) Vol i, p.37, ii, p.25, and *Thraliana* for January, 1780.

25,*11. Clifford, op. cit., p.203. Mrs. Thrale - Perkins, 1st.July. 1781, *Letter Book*, Brewery Records. *Thraliana*. for July, 1781, Hayward, op. cit. for April, 1781.

*12. *Thraliana*, i, 498. Hayward, loc. cit.

26,*13. All documents quoted or referred to about the firm are to be found in the Deed Book, and Document Book.

28,*14. Biographical details of the Perkins Family are in a MSS at the brewery, S. Barber, *History of the Perkins Family*. I have not checked on the authenticity of his claims, more particularly that Perkins came from Durham.
Genealogical tables of the Barclay Family are given with text in Barclay and Fox, *History of Barclays*.

*15. Mrs. Thrale - Perkins, *Letter Book*, 21, July, 1781

29,*16. Details of investments are given in the Private Ledgers, and Rest Books. See Table of Capital Investments in Appendix.

*17. Cash Books, 1781.

30,*18. Parl. Papers , , , Evidence to Bullion Report., p. .

*19. Cash Books, 1781 - *passim*. Private Ledgers, Accounts of S. Bevan.

33,*20. Private Ledgers, Stock Bought.

34,*21. For evidence on the malt factors see their evidence before various Parliamentary Committees. Parl. Papers, 1806, II, Evidence to Malt Report. 1819, V, Evidence to Report on Public Breweries. 1831, VII, Evidence before C. on brewing from Molasses. Documents relating to John Taylor have been loaned to me by C. Tuke Taylor, of H.A. & D. Taylors, Sawbridgeworth.

35,*22. Prices and stocks in June of each year are given in the Rests, and from these the Table given in the appendix has been compiled.

*23. Hop Book and Barber, *op. cit*.

37,*24. Boulton and Watt Papers, Birmingham. Details of the engine ordered by breweries have been given to me by Prof. M. Levy, of the Institut d'Etudes Politiques, Paris.

42,*25. See an article by Prof. T.S. Ashton in Journal of Economic History, Supplement for 1949, Tasks of Economic History.

*26 Table given in Morewood, *History of Intoxicating Liquors*, (1838). Also for decline after 1800, Parl. Papers, 1810-11, V, Revenues of Ireland, Beer Imports.

43,*27. From Brewery Statistics Book, at the Brewery. Also total figures of strong beer taxed in the London area from MSS in the brewery.

*28. Parl. Papers, 1818, III, Report on Public Breweries. 1819, V, Evidence to Report. 1817, , Evidence to Reports on the Police of the

Metropolis. 1830, X, Evidence to the Report on the Retail Sale of Beer. Mainly the evidence of Charles Barclay, John Martineau, Frederick Perkins, T.F. Buxton, Charles Calvert for the brewers, and others against them.

*29. Parl. Papers, 1830, Evidence ... on retail sale of beer. Charles Barclay's statement.

46,*30. See evidence about the Tower Division Magistrates given in evidence to the Police Report 1817.

47,*31. Thraliana, i, 939, note 2.

47,*32. Letter in records at the brewery.

48,*33. References to the Brewers Meetings will be found under the same headings as for tying the trade, Note 28. Grain imports mentioned by T. Brown, Parl. Papers, 1801, II, App. VIII, to 7th. Report on High Prices of Provisions, p.45. and in a paper held at Truman, Hanbury & Buxton, Spitalfields.

49,*34. Same references as for tying trade, Note 28. Also *Golden Lane Brewery*, Guildhall, Pam. 3802.

*35, There were 98 Common Brewers licensed in 1822 (and 37 brewing, victuallers left only) (Morewood, *op. cit.*) and 84 Common brewers in 1830 (McCulloch, *Dictionary of Trade and Commerce*, (1832) Article on Brewers.

*36. Richardson, *Statistical Estimates of the Materials of Brewing, showing the use of the Saccharometer*, (1784) Enlarged 3rd. Edn.at York, 1805.

*37. Simond, *Journal of a Tour and Residence in Great Britain*, (1817) p.182.

50,*38. Parl. Papers, 1819, V, Evidence of J. Hume and A. Aitken, chemists.

52,*39. Parl. Papers, 1831, VII, Evidence on ... Molasses, p.40, J. Martineau. Parl. Papers, 1835, XXXI, 15th. Report of Excise Commissioners, 1834. App. 59, p.46. J. Fison.

*40. See P. Mathias, *A connection between the brewing and distilling industries and agriculture*. Economic History Review, 1952.

54,*41. Letter in MSS Collection, *Beer and Brewers*, Bullock and Broadley, held at Whitbreads Brewery, Chiswell Street.

Appendix of Tables.

(N.B. Incomplete)

Annual Production of Strong Beer, in years known, until 1830 of Anchor Brewery, Whitbread and Trumans
With total London production.

Sources: Records at the Brewery. Printed Lists. 1759, 1787 published. A small % error exists where two reports of production are recorded, but this never becomes significant. Years ending midsummer on given years. Figures in barrels.

Year	Anchor Brewery	Whitbread	Truman	Total London
1748	35,579	-	39,378	915,365
1749	40,668	-	49,980	993,705
~~1750~~	46,097	-	45,980	979,542
1758	32,622	64,588	55,506	1,057,515
~~1760~~	32,740	63,408	60,140	1,114,334
1776	75,354	102,505	83,008	1,288,799
1777	85,287	110,440	80,936	1,366,973
1778	86,965	96,988	81,512	1,314,453
1779	73,400	98,291	76,372	1,309,964
1780	65,462	97,396	80,730	1,319,655
1781	80,053	115,033	80,774	1,412,264
1782	85,695	122,180	92,385	1,462,450
1783	65,437	91,752	69,515	1,146,354
1784	103,691	130,013	120,764	1,323,356
1785	100,678	143,014	111,154	1,306,447
1786	101,627	143,058	94,832	1,197,968
1787	105,554	150,280	95,302	1,250,815
1788	112,603	156,184	82,302	-
1789	123,938	171,000	93,860	-
1790	126,725	175,000	93.716	-
1791	121,232	176,000	89,716	-
1792	119,482	178,000	97,518	-
1793	130,134	184,000	96,310	-
1794	132,511	189,000	93,594	-
1795	122,318	159,000	99,057	-
1796	137,812	202,000	109,178	-
1797	141,594	192,700	117,179	-
1798	131,519	184,5000	109,727	-
1799	136,298	203,200	116,773	-
1800	105,905	137,000	101,562	-

Year	Anchor Brewery	Whitbread	Truman	Total London
1801	139,883	157,950	125,161	-
1802	137,463	135,104	131,916	-
1803	150,582	131,801	130,723	-
1804	129,788	102,687	110,295	-
1805	152,505	103,623	126,414	-
1806	102,529	103,297	125,820	-
1807	166,601	104,251	135,972	-
1808	184,196	112,472	117,574	-
1809	205,326	100,275	130,846	-
1810	235,053	110,939	144,990	-
1811	264,166	122,316	142,179	-
1812	270,259	122,446	150,162	-
1813	257,265	135,892	140,114	-
1814	262,468	141,103	145,141	-
1815	337,621	161,672	172,177	1,768,472
1816	330,200	168,855	185,041	1,725,377
1817	281,484	151,888	168,757	1,532,352
1818	340,560	151,107	185,412	-
1819	320,090	181,344	210,967	-
1820	275,183	180,560	190,122	-
1821	326,398	184,505	201,299	-
1822	310,277	190,971	207,931	-
1823	351,474	213,841	219,127	-
1824	356,281	206,802	215,317	-
1825	357,445	303,844	223,755	-
1826	380,180	202,070	211,521	-
1827	341,330	191,328	203,532	-
1828	305,938	180,843	205,655	1,588,199
1829	275,641	163,271	186,502	-
1830	231,341	131,300	150,383	1,441,557

Malt Wetted 1835 - 1850

By Barclay Perkins, Whitbreads, and Trumans.

Source: Brewers' Hall Lists.

After the repeal of the Beer Duty in 1830 there were no public sources for ascertaining the production of individual breweries. Malt, being still taxed, is available as a production index.

Figures in Quarters

Year	Barclays	Whitbread	Truman
1835	106,098	55,209	78,087
1840	115,561	53,622	98,210
1845	117,415	51,442	105,630
1850	113,420	51,400	106,462

Barrelage: Barclays, 1835 - 1890

Source: Hop Book and Brewery Statistics

Figures in Barrels

Year	Barrelage	Year	Barrelage
1835	382,083	1865	415,142
1840	400,838	1870	410,710
1845	396,784	1875	441,277
1850	397,360	1880	384,257
1855	357,836	1885	500,576
1860	421,286	1890	522,717

Figures in the Hop Book are consistently higher than those in the Brewery Statistics Book (which continue only to 1854), varying up to 5% increase. Those printed here are taken entirely from the Hop Book. No reason is given for the discrepancy.

Hops used 1781 - 1835, 1840 - 1875

With Annual average prices.

N.B. This table does not show yearly purchases, nor actual buying prices.

Year	**Bags**	**Average Price**
1781	1,153	£2 10s. 9¼
1782	857	£2 18s. 2¾
1783	1,374	£4 9s. 4½
1784	1,315	£4 10s. 0
1785	1,355	£4 6s. 0
1786	1,458	£4 0s. 10
1787	1,492	£8 9s. 3
1788	1,636	£5 16s. 8
1789	1,530	£6 10s. 9
1790	1,492	£4 13s. 2
1791	1,473	£4 14s. 1
1792	1,501	£4 1s. 0
1793	1,610	£5 18s. 2½
1794	1,364	£5 5s. 10
1795	1,730	£3 19s. 5½
1796	1,780	£4 5s. 8½
1797	1,560	£4 11s. 8
1798	1,481	£9 2s. 0
1799	929	£13 3s. 5½
1800	1,174	£14 14s. 8½
1801	1,424	£5 2s. 8¼
1802	1,340	£6 3s. 6½
1803	1,190	£5 7s. 1½
1804	1,520	£5 1s. 10
1805	1,761	£4 18s. 0
1806	1,605	£5 5s. 5½
1807	1,990	£4 9s. 8
1808	2,452	£3 19s. 6
1809	2,850	£3 14s. 10
1810	3,166	£5 1s. 11½
1811	3,037	£4 17s. 2½
1812	2,956	£4 4s. 8
1813	3,204	£7 8s. 5
1814	4,375	£7 7s. 0
1815	3,645	£6 18s. 9
1816	3,120	£13 16s. 9½
1817	3,788	£19 14s. 10¾
1818	3,889	£6 16s. 9¼
1819	2,881	£4 2s. 10
1820	3,469	£3 3s. 9
1821	3,409	£3 17s. 4
1821	4,207	£3 19s. 1
1823	3,967	£4 15s. 5¼
1824	4,213	£6 14s. 5½
1825	4,345	None bought
1826	4,202	£4 6s. 0
1827	3,872	£4 9s. 2
1828	3,595	£5 8s. 8½
1829	3,341	£6 5s. 4
1830	4,397	£6 5s. 4
1831	4,914	£14 17s. 9
1832	4,192	£5 8s. 7
1833	4,632	£6 5s. 5
1834	5,068	£6 4s. 4
1835	4,681	£5 3s. 8
1840	5,061	£3 16s. 9
1845	5,584½	£9 13s. 6½
1850	5,503	£10 7s. 6½
1855	4,758	£17 18s. 0
1860	6,015	£5 13s. 7
1875	8,811	£11 18s. 5

Insurance Valuations of the Anchor Brewery

Midsummer, 1801

Utensils, Stock, etc.		£
In the Stourhouses, Palmira. Vats.		10,000
Steam Engine, Carpenter's, Coopers and Wheelers' Shops & in the Yard		3,000
Running Stourhouse, Brewhouse, Millhouse, Amber-side Store Cellars, Mailt Lofts, Coal Cellares & Malt Lofts and Warehouse No.13 in 3 offices 16,000 in each		48,000
In No.5 and 6 Lofts over		6,000
In new No.9		20,000
In the Stables		2,000
In No.7 & 8		10,000
In little No.10	6,000	
Great do.	21,000	
No.11	9,000	
No.12	15,000	51,000
In Cowells		4,800
In Warehouse, Bank End.		500
Oak staves at Knight's		2,500
		£157,800

Houses & Buildings	
Warehouse, Bank End	500
Malt Lofts, Maid Lane	1,500
Do.	3,000
No.10, Great and Small	2,000
Storehouse in Burial Ground	700
Stourhouses in Palmira	2,000
Stables	1,500
Nos.5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and new No.9	5,000
No.11 now called No.12	2,000
No.15	800
Fining House and Stable	400
Dwelling House and Accountng House	3,200
Steam Engine House	500
Brewhouse, Amberside Hop Warehouse and running Stourhouse	5,500
Tap House, 10 Tenements and 66 Public Houses	30,300
	£58,900
	£216,700

Malt Prices, of stock held at the Anchor Brewery

Annual date that of the Rest, at the beginning of June or Midsummer. Prices, in Shillings per Quarter.

Note
1. Prices of Ship Pale in parentheses for 1808, ‘09, ‘10, ‘13, ‘15 and 1820 are for second quality malt. Also two qualities for 1818.
2. Prices in parentheses refer to ‘old malt’.
3. For 1818 it is noted in the Rests ‘Present Price: Herts P. 93s. Herts Amber 93s. Ship Pale 92s. Ship Pale 94s.’

	PALE				AMBER				BROWN			
Year	**West C.**	**Hunts**	**Hert**	**Ship**	**West**	**Hunt**	**Hert**	**Ship**	**West**	**Hunt**	**Hert**	**Ship**
1748	-	22	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	18	20	-
1749	-	26	-	-	-	-	-	-	22	26	24	-
1750	24	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	22	26	24	-
1752	23	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	22	-	21	-
1753	24	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	22	-	24	-
1754	25	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	23	-	25	-
1755	22	-	24	-	-	-	-	-	20	-	22	-
1756	24	-	-	-	22	-	-	-	20	-	22	-
1757	24	-	26	-	22	-	-	-	20	-	22	-
1758	24	-	26	-	22	-	-	-	20	-	22	-
1759	24	-	26	-	22	-	-	-	20	-	22	-
1767		Burlington P. 38		-	35	-	-	-	-	-	35	-
1780	-	-	-	27	25½	-	29½	27	-	-	26	-
1781	-	-	-	30½	28½	-	-	29½	-	-	30	-
1782	-	-	-	32	28½	-	-	32	26	-	30½	-
1783	-	-	48	46	-	-	48	46	-	-	45	-
1784	-	-	-	40	34	-	-	40	-	-	39	-
1785	-	-	-	32	30	-	-	32	-	-	32	-
1786	-	-	-	35	30½	-	-	35½	-	-	35	-
1787	-	-	-	33	31	-	-	33½	-	-	33	-
1788	-	-	-	33½	29½	-	-	33½	-	-	33½	-
1789	-	-	-	32½	30½	-	-	30½	-	-	32	-
1790	-	-	-	36	33	-	-	36½	-	-	35½	-
1791												
1792	-	-	-	37	-	-	-	-	-	-	38½	-
1793												
1794	-	-	-	44		Foreign A. 39		44	-	-	43	-
1795	-	-	53½	49		Hert 54 Foreign A. 44		48½	-	-	47½	-

		PALE				AMBER				BROWN		
Year	**West C.**	**Hunts**	**Hert**	**Ship**	**West**	**Hunt**	**Hert**	**Ship**	**West**	**Hunt**	**Hert**	**Ship**
1796	-	-	49	41	-	-	-	41	-	-	43	-
1797	-	-	40	36	-	-	-	33	-	-	43	-
1798	-	-	47	43	-	-	-	42	-	-	38	-
1799	-	-	47	46	-	-	-	-	-	-	47	-
1800	-	-	91	87	-	-	-	-	-	-	66	-
1801	-	-	72	72	-	-	-	72	-	-	62	-
		Foreign P. 55				Foreign A. 55						
1802	-	-	60	57	-	-	-	56	-	-	52	-
1803	-	-	52	48	-	-	-	48	-	-	44	-
1804	-	-	67	63	-	-	-	62	-	-	57	-
1805	-	-	82	78	-	-	-	-	-	-	70	-
1806	-	-	-	76	-	-	76	-	-	-	69	-
1807	-	-	81	76	-	-	-	76	-	-	70	-
1808	-	-	85	81 (73)*[1]	-	-	85	-	-	-	74	-
1809	-	-	89	85 (79)	-	-	89	-	-	-	76	-
1810	-	-	90	87 (82)	-	-	91	-	-	-	76	-
1811	-	-	79	76	-	-	79	-	-	-	66½	-
1812	-	-	103	98	-	-	103	-	-	-	83	-
1813	-	-	103	100 (90)	-	-	105	-	-	-	90	-
1814	-	-	-	76	-	-	83	-	-	-	72	-
1815	-	-	77	72 (63)	-	-	79	-	-	-	68	-
1816	-	-	73	66	-	-	75	-	-	-	63	-
1817	-	-	88	80 (88)*[2]	-	-	88	-	-	-	70 (75)*[2]	-
1818*[3]	-	-	88	86 (88)	-	-	88	-	-	-	73	-
1819	-	-	-	66	-	-	68	-	-	-	56	-
										Foreign B. 56		
1820	-	-	74	74 (69)	-	-	74	-	-	-	59	Roasted
1821	-	-	63	61	-	-	65	-	-	-	53	70
1822	-	-	54	52	-	-	54	-	-	-	43	43
1823	-	-	63	61	-	-	65	-	-	-	54	70
1824	-	-	65	64	-	-	67	-	-	-	55	67
1825	-	-	75	75	-	-	-	-	-	-	65	75
1826	-	-	65	65	-	-	-	-	-	-	55	65
1827	-	-	66	66	-	-	-	-	-	-	56	68
1828	-	-	61	61	-	-	-	-	-	-	51	65
1829	-	-	62	62	-	-	-	-	-	-	52	68
1830	-	-	63	62	-	-	-	-	-	-	52	61

Beer Prices and Duty Rates: 1713 - 1830

This table should be seen in relation to malt prices, of which the summer stock valuations are given in another series.

Source: Prices - Brewery Statistics Book, Anchor Brewery.
Duty - *The Beer Duty*, H.G. Aldous.
Note: Duty rates do not include changing allowances free of duty given to Common Brewers, nor duty rates on small, table or Intermediate beers.

N.B. Months of the year stated refer only to movements in prices, not movements in duty.

Year	**PRICES OF PORTER**		**DUTY RATES**		
	Strong, per brl to publican	**Retail per Quart**	**Strong per brl**	**Malt per bushel**	**Hops per lb**
1711			5s.	6¾d.	1d.
1713	22s.	2¾d.	"	"	"
1722		3d.	"	"	"
1760	"	"	8s.	9¼d.	"
1761	30s.	3½d.	"	"	"
1778	"	"	"	"	"+5%
1779	"	"	"	9½d.	"+5%
1780	"	"	"	1s. 4¼d.	"+10%
1783	"	"	"	"	"+15%
1786	"	"	"	"	1s. 6d.
1791	"	"	"	1s. 7¼d.	"
1792	"	"	"	1s. 4¼d.	"
1799	35s.	4d.	"	"	"
Jan. 1801	40s.	4½d.	"	"	2½d.
Jan. 1802	35s.	4d.	10s.	2s. 5d.	"
Apr. 1802	40s.	4½d.	"	"	"
Jul. 1803	45s.	5d.	"	"	"
1804	55s.	6d.	"	4s. 5¾d.	"
1805	45s.	5d.	"	"	"
1806	"	"	"	"	2d.
Nov. 1812	50s.	5½d.	"	"	"
Jan. 1813	55s.	6d.	"	"	"
Dec. 1813	50s.	5½d.	"	"	"
Feb. 1815	45s.	5d.	"	"	"
Jul. 1816	40s.	4½d.	10s.	2s. 5d.	2d.
Oct. 1816	45s.	5d.	"	"	"
Jan. 1917	50s.	5½d.	"	"	"
Dec. 1817	55s.	6d.	"	"	"
Sep. 1819	50s.	5½d.	"	3s. 7¼d.	"
Oct. 1820	45s.	5d.	"	"	"
May 1822	40s.	4½d.	"	2s. 7d.	"
1823	"	"	"	"	"
1830			Nil.	"	"

Barclay Perkins: Profits 1782 - 1799

No simple profit accounts exist in the records of the firm. Some estimate of profits can be made by trying to add the annual increments to capital and withdrawls during the year - where both of these accounts are from inside the firm without a 'leak'. The following table is a rough calculation of these series.

The private ledgers do not make clear what cash the partners drew annually until 1788, and it is probable that withdrawals before then were not of money produced by the business, but money put into the accounts from elsewhere (in Robert Barclay's case). These withdrawls have therefore only been included when they begin for all partners, on a regular basis, in 1788.

Source: Rests and Private Ledgers.
Figures: £'000.

Note: 1. Heavy payments to Executors of Thrale for purchase.
2. J. Perkins receives £200p.a. for entertaining customers.

Years. Midsr. - Midsr.	**Increments in Capital**	**Partners receipts**	**Total**
1780 - 1781	6.8		
1781 - 1782	-74*[1]		
1782 - 1783	17.5		
1783 - 1784	-4.5		
1784 - 1785	5.8		
1785 - 1786	14		
1786 - 1787	7.8		
1787 - 1788	6	10 + .2*[2]	16.2
1788 - 1789	7.4	12 + .2	19.2
1789 - 1790	-1	12 + .2	11.2
1790 - 1791	13	12 + .2	25.2
1791 - 1792	0	12 + .2	12.2
1792 - 1793	6	12 + .2	18.2
1793 - 1794	-2.5	12 + .2	9.7
1794 - 1795	1.5	12 + .2	13.7
1795 - 1796	5	11 + .2	16.2
1796 - 1797	20	13 + .2	33.2
1797 - 1798	23	12 + .2	25.2
1798 - 1799	4	12 + .2	16.2

Barclay Perkins: Profits 1800 - 1814

This is not the explicit profit accounts, of which none exist. Certain calculations are possible to determine the yearly produce of trade by adding the increments to ‘Nett Capital Stock’ transfered to Partners Surplus Capital account or remaining in the nett. capital stock, and the receipts of the partners from the four shares of the partnership. From 1804 - 1813 Income Tax account give a check on nett. profits taxed.

Source: Rests and Private Ledgers.
Figures: £’000.

Profits taxed will differ from (i) + (ii) because of different datings of the accounting years, and through possible omission of interest payments on which tax may have been levied.

Note: 1. Small incrememnts to the main receipts come from allowances, evidently to off-set taxation.

	(i)	(ii)			(i) + (ii)
Year	**Increments to Capital**	**Receipts of Partners**	**Profits Taxed. Yr. ending 4th April**	**Rate %**	
1800	4	12 + .4*[1]			16.4
1801	6	12 + .4			18.4
1802	68	12 + .4			80.4
1803	48	12 + .4			60.4
1804	40	12 + 1.3	58	5%	53.3
1805	54	12 + 2.2	60	6¼%	68.2
1806	40	16 + 2.2	64	10%	58.2
1807	28	16 + 2.2	55.8	10%	46.2
1808	30	16 + 2.2	59.5	10%	48.2
1809	56	20 + 2.2	58.4	10%	78.2
1810	30	24 + 2.2	69.2	10%	56.2
1811	56	24 + 1.6	66.2	10%	81.2
1812	64	24 + 1.6	77.9	10%	89.6
1813	52	24 + 1.6	83.5	10%	77.6
1814	120	24 + 1.6	-	-	145.6

Capital Invested Annually, 1784 - 1830

Note: The following long table is not yet complete. It lists only the four main categories of investors, the Partners, Quaker Bankers, others on the Partners' Account (known Quaker friends and relatives) and the rest of P.A. not known to be relatives or Quakers. It omits, in addition, many small accounts, and accounts held by publicans which grow to a considerable sum after 1800. These accounts are given in aggregate in the table printed in the text, and will be inserted in the following table as soon as possible.

It will be convenient to pull out the folded lists of names on the last folio of each section of the table.

Capital Invested in Barclay Perkins, Anchor Brewery, Southwark. 1784 -1830

(N.B. Additional to partnership capital)

Figures in £: of balances held in the firm at the time of the annual Rest valuations and stock-taking in early June.

I. By partners

Name	1784	1785	1786	1787	1788	1789	1790	1791	1792	1793	1794	1795	1796	1797	1798	1799
Robert Barclay	-	2,000	2,080	1,500	725	5,000	3,700	2,500	2,500	3,725	3,000	3,000	2,000	10,000	12,500	21,840
Charles Barclay, Partner from 1807 (son of Robert Barclay)								-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
David Barclay From 1787 Rest			-	-	-	6,329	3,980	3,562	3,500	2,526	5,399	2,400	3,000	2,000	4,000	11,000
John Perkins	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,400	3,000	3,000	3,100	4,000	2,000	10,400
Henry Perkins, Partner from 1809. Son of John Perkins						-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Silvanus Bevan	-	5,011	5,000	5,000	5,000	25,000	9,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	250	4,012	7,500	12,480
Henry Bevan, Partner from 1809. Son of Silvanus Bevan						-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Richard Gurney, Partner from 1802				-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Hudson Gurney, Partner from 1802				-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

II. By Quaker bankers

Barclay, Bevan & Company	5,033	-	-	3,000	-	-	-							3,704		
Barclay and Tritton	-	-	-	-	-	-	4,003	17,000	5,000	5,000	3,012	3,000	10,762		4,000	10,000
Gurney and Bland	-	17,641	28,965	19,220	19,860	10,250	10,250	10,500	10,000	10,000	10,250	10,000	10,250	7,175	7,000	7,000
Robert Bartlett & John Gurney	-	-	5,000	20,000	20,000	10,000	50,277	20,000	5,000	9,650	10,000	10,000	15,000	13,725	10,000	5,000
J. Gurney, Gurney & Webb	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-	-	-	11,000
Taylor & Lloyds	-	-	-	10,194	10,250	10,250	10,250	10,250	10,000	5,182	-	5,195	-	-	-	-
Ketts & Back	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

I. By partners

Name	1800	1801	1802	1803	1804	1805	1806	1807	1808	1809	1810	1811	1812	1813	1814	1815	1816	1817
R.B.	19,000	19,500	18,000	25,000	31,500	35,000	34,500	42,000	46,500	51,000	65,000	70,000	79,000	83,000	77,000	78,000	85,000	84,000
C.B.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-									
D.B.	12,000	13,000				1,000				-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
J.P.	11,000	10,000	11,620	27,200	35,500	38,500	37,500	45,000	49,500	54,000	68,000	78,000	91,000					
H.P.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	84,000	95,500	104,500	114,500	104,500
S.B.	14,000	15,000	16,000	25,000	28,000	34,000	33,500	41,000	45,500	50,000	64,000	72,000	81,000	87,000	85,000	92,000	98,000	91,500
H.B.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-									
R.G.	-	-	10,000	30,000	36,000	46,000	49,500	53,500	58,000	62,500	76,500	89,000	67,750*1	54,500	30,000	30,000	40,000	40,000
H.G.			4,000										22,750	40,000	53,000	78,000	90,000	94,000
Gurney, R.J.J. & H.			-	10,000	10,000	10,000	15,000	15,000	10,000	10,000	20,000	20,000	10,000	10,000	-	-	-	-

Note: 1. Ex R.G.

II. By Quaker bankers

B, B & Co	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
B & T	-	13,000			10,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	10,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
G & B	7,000	7,000	7,000		3,022	3,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
R.B. & J.G.	-	10,000	12,000	5,000	10,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
J.G., G & W	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	5,031	-	3,000	3,000	3,000	3,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
T & L	-	3,150	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
K & B	-	-	-	-	-	-	10,000	20,000	20,000	10,000	10,000	20,000	-	5,000	-	-	-	-

Bibliography

Manuscript Records at the Brewery

Annual Rest Books	1748 - 1750
	172 - 1759
	1764 (incomplete)
	1767
	1780 - to date.
Cash Books	1776 - 1781
	1781 - 1788
	1788 - 1795
	1795 - 1802
	1802 - 1809
Private Ledgers	1781 - 1798
	1798 - 1814
Collecting Clerks receipt books	1768 - 1773
	1792 - 1798
	1836 - 1839
	1812 - 1815
Hop Book	1786 - 1893
Brewing Books	1798 - 1799
	1799 - 1801
Deeds Ledger	post 1781
Documents Book	1831 -1850
	1864
Summary of Rests	1801 - 1875
Brewery Statistics	1748 - 1750
	1758 - 1760
	1776 - 1854
Letter Book: Mrs Thrale - John Perkins	1773 -
Letter: Halsey - Thrale	Undated
Letter of Attorney: Executors of H. Thrale - Barclay Perkins	1782
Bill of Auction Sale	1797
History of Perkins Family (S. Barber)	
Ledger ‘A’: D. & J. Barclay	1784 - 1797

Only those sources have been listed which are of direct and important relevance to the text. Other references are given, as they occur, in the notes to the text.

<u>Manscript Sources</u>

Records at the Brewery, Park Street. Listed in the appendix. These have been studied in conjunction with records at Whitbread and Co., Chiswell Street, Truman, Hanbury & Buxton, Spitalfields and Charringtons, Mile End, - all of London.
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1818, Report on the Public Breweries
1819, Evidence to Report on the Public Breweries.
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