

**TEMPERANCE AND ANHEUSER-BUSCH'S *TATLER*, 1919-1924****MARGOT OPDYCKE LAMME**

When Eberhard Anheuser took possession of The Bavarian Brewery in 1860, he became the fourth owner in the St. Louis company's eight-year history. His strategy was to target the smaller areas of the market left unoccupied by the city's major brewers.<sup>1</sup> Because he was already a partner in a soap manufacturing company, however, he hired his son-in-law, Adolphus Busch, in 1864 to supervise the brewery and its sales operations. At that point, the company's beer was a product 'so inferior that St. Louis rowdies were known to project mouthfuls of it back over the bar.'<sup>2</sup> When Adolphus Busch took Budweiser national in the early 1880s, the U.S. population was estimated at 40 million with an adult per capita beer consumption of 2.7 gallons; by the time of his death in 1913, the population had increased to 95 million with an adult per capita consumption of 29.5 gallons.<sup>3</sup>

Busch left the leadership of the company and its sales efforts to his son, August A. Busch, who was described in a contemporary article as someone who 'personally directs his company's advertising and promotion work; lays out campaigns; analyzes sales possibilities.'<sup>4</sup> It was August Busch who managed the company through World War I and, by 1917, the same year Congress passed a resolution to support national prohibition by proposing the ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment, Anheuser-Busch ranked 130 among the top 278 largest American businesses and the top brewer in the country with \$41.5 million in assets.<sup>5</sup> His success in navigating the company through prohibition, repealed in 1933, was marked by his sons' gift of the now iconic Clydesdales.<sup>6</sup>

Much of the company's early success was due to the rise in the 1870s of railroads, pasteurization, and refrigerated cars. This led to the national expansion of manufacturers' brands and the retention of advertising agencies to convey nationally distributed messages for industry, including the beer business, led in Milwaukee by the Pabst, Schlitz, and Blatz breweries, in Cincinnati by Moelin, and in St. Louis, by the Lemp and Anheuser-Busch breweries.<sup>7</sup> As these national brands took hold, so did new marketing techniques newly driven by the manufacturer, whose focus was on efficiency and volume.<sup>8</sup> The resulting efforts, grounded in the promotion of specific brands, laid the groundwork for what many considered then and now to be the age of modern advertising.<sup>9</sup>

**Controlling the flow**

The key to these new techniques were intermediary 'jobbers' who emerged among the eastern seaports in the United States in 1815 to manage the distribution network of the wholesaler, the importer, and the retailer but who, by the 1870s, were the wholesalers themselves, directly handling consumer goods and establishing their own distribution and promotional networks for the sales of goods purchased directly from the manufacturer.<sup>10</sup> Jobbers could be quite a powerful link in the distribution chain, providing retailers the management of overstocks for seasonal products and for when supply exceeded demand, and providing manufacturers high-volume retail outlets.<sup>11</sup> Jobbers also hired salesmen, or 'drummers,' who contacted the retail trade, based on their own marketing systems, and who proved to be an efficient channel to reach retailers with product introductions.<sup>12</sup> Drummers, according to historian Alfred Chandler,

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would travel by rail ‘to the towns and villages on the railroad and then by horse and buggy to the smallest and most distant of country stores.’<sup>13</sup> They took product orders, pitched for new accounts, and ‘provided a constant flow of information back to their headquarters’ about shifts in demand, trends, and the economic health of the market sectors and the merchants therein.<sup>14</sup> They also helped their customers, the retailers, to manage their inventory, their accounting practices, and their product displays.<sup>15</sup>

Although the jobber’s role in assuming the costs for product promotion relieved the manufacturers from doing so, it also precluded manufacturers from establishing their own expertise in offering their product to the marketplace.<sup>16</sup> In the case of companies that offered a product requiring special handling, expertise, and brand differentiation, manufacturers had to free themselves from their reliance on the jobbers’ promotional programs and, instead, develop their own.<sup>17</sup> To reach these middlemen, then, and to ensure that retail customers were well-stocked and accurately informed with the right product information as well as with the correct promotional positioning for those products, sales departments sought to provide not only advertising but also dealer services, specifically in regard to, according to an article in *Printers’ Ink*, ‘the sales policy and spirit of’ the business and ‘the human side of selling,’ the salesmen, their districts, market and consumer trends, as well as ongoing works in the public interest.<sup>18</sup>

Such was the case of Anheuser-Busch. The purpose of this study, then, is to examine how at the outset of prohibition one of America’s largest companies and its leading brewer used *Tatler*, its sales promotion magazine, to convey product information, sales strategies and messages, and innovative initiatives undertaken by the company’s intermediaries in the field, all while operating under a law that had banned its primary product category and national brand, Budweiser Lager Beer. Called, at first, the *Bevo Tatler*, and then, later, the *Anheuser-Busch Tatler*, the magazine debuted in February 1919 and appeared monthly through December 1924. Although it focused primarily on sales promotion in the first few years, the magazine’s sentiments shifted in 1922 in the wake of a national debate concerning the transportation and consumption of liquor aboard American and international shipping lines, and the *Tatler* increasingly became an outlet for anti-pro-

hibition messages. We know now that although American breweries lost the battle for prohibition, they won the war 13 years later. At Anheuser-Busch, however, victory came even earlier. By the end of 1922, the company found itself on firmer financial ground than it had been in years with a decline in losses from almost \$2.5 million in 1919 to less than \$250,000.<sup>19</sup>

In the absence of access to unpublished papers in the Anheuser-Busch corporate archives, the *Tatler* provides insight into what Anheuser-Busch wanted to convey about its products, the company, and, later, about prohibition, in the first six years following the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment.<sup>20</sup> The *Tatler* also lends some understanding into how Anheuser-Busch leveraged its vertically integrated operations and tapped the benefits of the brand it had cultivated in the previous 50 years to survive during that time.

### **Eighteenth Amendment**

Just as American business surged ahead into the twentieth century, armed with new ideas concerning marketing and manufacturing, so had the temperance movement gained momentum, driven in the last quarter of the nineteenth century by the Woman’s Christian Temperance Union and in the first decades of the twentieth century by the Anti-Saloon League of America. Their efforts culminated in the 18 December 1917, Congressional resolution to present the Eighteenth Amendment to the states for ratification, which would then prohibit the manufacture, transportation, and sale of liquor in the United States.

By that time, too, temperance forces had launched a number of legislative initiatives that leveraged wartime sentiment against the liquor interests.<sup>21</sup> The August 1917 Food and Fuel Control Act sought to eliminate foodstuffs for use by the distilleries. That December, in addition to the passage of the Amendment, a presidential decree limited the alcoholic content of malt beverages. In November 1918, the Wartime Prohibition Act prohibited the sale of liquor in the United States after 30 June 1919. And in December 1918, the Food Act prohibited the use of foodstuffs in malt beverages. January 1919 brought the ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment and, in May, the use of foodstuffs was reinstated for non-alcoholic malt drinks. Later, in

October of that year, the National Prohibition Act (Volstead Act) passed as well, creating the enforcement arm of the amendment. It was a lengthy and complicated document consisting of 67 sections designed to correspond to the three sections of the prohibition amendment, and it would wreak havoc on the policing of liquor traffic for the next thirteen years.<sup>22</sup>

In their banning of alcoholic drinks, the prohibition laws did not discriminate among distilled liquors, beers, or wines, a circumstance against which all three chafed.<sup>23</sup> Over time, the brewers, the vintners, and the distillers would seek to align with the dries in attempts to undermine one another.<sup>24</sup> In 1915, however, the 'Co-operative Committee of the Licensed Trade Engaged in the Manufacture and Sale of Alcoholic Liquors' sought to bring together at the local levels 'the reputable men in retail business' so that, together, the brewers and distillers could fight saloon problems.<sup>25</sup> Yet some distillers claimed that because the brewers owned most of the saloons, they were the ones most responsible for corrupting America, and even among the brewers there was dissension between local entities and those that shipped across state lines.<sup>26</sup> Additionally, some brewers believed that beer was a better quality product - a healthful 'liquid bread' - and thus wanted to remain separate from the distillers, while others saw advantages to working with them.<sup>27</sup> Furthermore, many brewers considered their product to be a temperance beverage, as wine was, thereby associating intemperance with distilled liquor.<sup>28</sup> As one Anheuser-Busch ad declared in 1903, beer was a family-friendly temperance alternative to the 'declining popularity of the *decanter-on-the-sideboard*.'<sup>29</sup> With home consumption amounting to 'three-fifths' of the almost 84 million bottles of Budweiser consumed in 1902, the company implied in the ad that it was the distilleries, not the breweries, that should be the target of prohibitionists. Given these mixed sentiments, then, the brewers eventually assumed two-thirds of the cost for their anti-prohibition political activities, leaving one-third to the liquor manufacturers.<sup>30</sup> Yet despite millions of dollars poured into those efforts, the brewers, already hobbled by wartime restrictions, lost the battle against prohibition.<sup>31</sup>

The American brewing industry had been a powerful lobby since the founding of the United States Brewers' Association (U.S.B.A.) in 1862 to negotiate a fair federal tax system.<sup>32</sup> The U.S.B.A. reported that beer

production plummeted to 22.5 million barrels in 1919, down from 60.8 million barrels of beer in 1917.<sup>33</sup> At Anheuser-Busch, this trend meant laying off employees, providing early retirement to others, and cutting back on investments and donations as well as on advertising.<sup>34</sup> For example, the company leased its empty manufacturing and warehouse spaces and then sold steam and power to its tenants, which included box, sheet metal, printing, glass, and shoe companies.<sup>35</sup> Additionally, each week a special team met to review the company's real estate investments. In addition to selling surplus trucks and cars, as well as bonds, notes and stocks, Anheuser-Busch had sold half of its real estate holdings by 1924.<sup>36</sup>

The company's survival strategy of diversification and liquidation drove its name change at the end of 1919, from Anheuser-Busch Brewing Association to Anheuser-Busch, Inc. The idea of product diversification came from August Busch's philosophy that their business was to convert grain into other products.<sup>37</sup> Thus, he led the company into the livestock and poultry feed business as well as the glucose, corn sugar, corn oil, and gluten feed businesses. Later, Anheuser-Busch entered the baker's yeast business. Still more ideas came from examining the company's existing capabilities and finding ways to adapt them for other uses. For instance, the automobile department began making truck bodies and refinishing luxury passenger cars. It built refrigerated truck bodies and, coupled with the company's cold storage distribution branches originally used for beer, developed an ice cream business as well as a delivery business for perishable products. By 1926, ice cream sales exceeded one million gallons.<sup>38</sup> Carpenters who had built the cabinetry in saloons now built refrigerator cabinets.<sup>39</sup>

To varying degrees of success, Anheuser-Busch also invented, re-invented, and repositioned its products and its brand without turning its back on the success of the company's pre-prohibition products and those customers. Among these initiatives were the production of a number of soft drinks including root beer, ginger ale, coffee-, tea-, and chocolate-flavored drinks, and a grape drink sold in bottles as well as in a concentrate. In the first seven years of prohibition, Anheuser-Busch launched more than 26 products; of those, only a few, such as yeast, root beer, ginger ale, and syrup lasted beyond 1933.<sup>40</sup> By 1923, the company was breaking

even.<sup>41</sup> In contrast, its biggest competitor in St. Louis had sold its brewery buildings in 1920 to a shoe company for ten cents on the dollar.<sup>42</sup>

### *The Tatler*

The *Bevo Tatler* appeared in February 1919 at the outset of this scramble for survival, focusing almost exclusively on two of the company's earliest and, initially, most successful non-alcoholic product launches, Bevo, a cereal beverage, and a de-alcoholized Budweiser. The magazine's editors were listed as Oliver T. Remmers and George W. Eads, a newspaper reporter initially recruited by August Busch to counter Missouri legislation, although their bylines rarely appeared.<sup>43</sup> The inaugural issue featured an essay about London *Tatler* essayist Joseph Addison, for whom the magazine was named.<sup>44</sup> Its mission, the *Bevo Tatler* informed its readers, was to serve as a medium for the exchange of ideas,

to tell the story of Bevo, and, for the information of the Bevo salesmen and dealers, to try to interpret the spirit and ideals of the men, the organization and institution back of it. ... may we not hope that our advocacy of higher ideals in business will result in some small contribution to the cause of better citizenship and better government?<sup>45</sup>

Bevo, the cereal beverage, had debuted in 1916, three years before the Eighteenth Amendment was ratified.<sup>46</sup> Bottled in 10-ounce bottles, as opposed to the 12-ounce beer bottles, the company created a healthful association with its 'Malt-Nutrine,' a non-alcoholic 'liquid-food-tonic' product it had been selling since 1895 in a similar 10-ounce 'squat' design bottle. Both labels featured a stork as a symbol of nurturance, nourishment, and well being.<sup>47</sup> Within two years, Anheuser-Busch sold five million cases of Bevo. It was so successful so quickly that the company began selling it by the barrel.<sup>48</sup> After the company ceased beer production in late 1918 due to the wartime grain restrictions, it used its 36 beer distribution branches to fill Bevo orders. By 1919, Bevo was on the global market. By mid-1920, however, four years after Bevo's introduction but only six months into prohibition, Bevo sales began to decline; by 1923, sales were negligible.<sup>49</sup> One reason for this could be that the grain restrictions required a change in the Bevo manufacturing process, which changed its taste.<sup>50</sup> But those restrictions were lifted in early 1919 and the *Tatler* did

not report a change in Bevo until the spring of 1921, when sales already had started to fall.<sup>51</sup> Instead, a more likely reason for the decline could be that Bevo was competing with increasing amounts of home-brew and bootleg beer and liquor as well as with the new Budweiser.<sup>52</sup>

With the initial runaway success of Bevo, Anheuser-Busch began brewing a new Budweiser, a near beer, in September of 1919 and launched it that December. The manufacturing process was identical to that of real beer, except that it was de-alcoholized to the legal limit of ½% before bottling.<sup>53</sup> Indeed, two years later, continuing to echo the company's pre-prohibition assertions that beer was the beverage of 'true temperance,' the *Tatler* claimed Budweiser never had been 'intoxicating,' but a 'healthful and invigorating stimulant.'<sup>54</sup> The board of directors authorized \$35,000 for an advertising campaign to promote it, and sales took off in February 1920 with five million cases shipped in that first year.<sup>55</sup> But, as with Bevo, sales steadily declined after an initial rush.<sup>56</sup>

This first issue of the *Tatler*, then, included a message from the Bevo sales manager, who discussed the purity and healthfulness of Bevo and how its lack of added sugar, syrup, or sweetener meant that it would not bother digestion.<sup>57</sup> A two-page spread on the new Bevo Bottling and Shipping Plant described it as filling a production capacity of two million bottles every eight-hour day and emphasized the sanitary and healthful conditions of the plant, from the bottle cleaning system to the pasteurizing process to the on-site medical dispensary for employees.<sup>58</sup> This emphasis on cleanliness was particularly striking because it not only reinforced the quality of the Bevo production process, but it also served to counter the prohibitionists' claims about the filth, moral and otherwise, perpetuated by the saloons and, by association, the breweries. Additionally, it reinforced the company's support for food regulation. In the history of the Pure Food Movement, in which the 1906 Pure Food Act is just one albeit significant chapter, the concept of 'purity' concerned ingredients, manufacturing processes, and packaging. Historian Susan Strasser noted that federal food regulation was in the interests of 'branded-food manufacturers' because it not only relieved them of conforming to multiple sets of standards across states, but it also imposed a financial burden on small businesses competing in the same local and regional markets.<sup>59</sup>

Such emphases also served to reinforce to *Tatler* readers the huge operations that supported their efforts. They were reminded, for example, of the corresponding advertising promotions under way at the national and local levels, with placements in more than 1,700 magazines and weekly and daily newspapers. Further, readers were assured that the advertising was ‘scientifically handled through an efficient advertising agency that conducts its business on such a high plane as to thoroughly satisfy and win the confidence of publishers.’<sup>60</sup>

The next month’s issue profiled August A. Busch as ‘a man of vision’ who conceived the idea of Bevo, knowing that ‘the conditions of today may be changed by the public sentiment tomorrow.’<sup>61</sup> This kind of comment was the closest the *Tatler* came to criticizing prohibition in those first years. A reprint of a September 1916 letter from Navy Secretary Josephus Daniels in response to August Busch’s request to sell Bevo in ship commissaries not only demonstrated to the field agents the extensive range of the Bevo market, but implied a product endorsement from the Secretary of the Navy while alluding to Anheuser-Busch’s patriotism. Through Bevo, the company could provide ‘healthful and non-intoxicating beverages’ to the men in the military.<sup>62</sup>

A profile of Louis Pasteur served to emphasize the importance of pasteurization to Anheuser-Busch, another way to convey the company’s commitment to cleanliness and purity. Finally, this issue introduced the Bevo Mill to readers. The *Tatler* reported that the purpose of the Mill, opened in St. Louis in 1916, was to demonstrate to the city, if not the country, that beer, good food, good music, and family all could be combined in a wholesome atmosphere.<sup>63</sup> The article did not say it, but the implication was clear: the combination of alcohol and wholesomeness might have been contrary to temperance thought, but the Mill’s ability to fill its seating capacity of 285 people inside and another 400 outside in the summer garden was evidence of its success.

It was not until the April 1919 issue that the *Tatler* printed two Bevo ads as samples of that year’s campaign, the purpose of which was

to prove to the public, by the presentation of indisputable facts, that Bevo is first of all a quality product; that it is manufactured in the most perfect, the most sanitary, and the

best scientifically equipped beverage plant in the world, and that it has won its leadership solely on merit.<sup>64</sup>

Readers were then informed that copies of the ads were available for them to place in their local newspapers upon request. One ad emphasized the size and advanced technology of the new plant, which was built due to ‘popular demand’ for Bevo. The second ad emphasized Bevo as the leader in its product category based on the number of followers and imitators it had. Whereas both ads invited visitors to tour the plant, neither one featured the Anheuser-Busch brand and logo the way later Budweiser near-beer ads did. This was consistent with establishing Bevo as a distinct brand but it also reflected the company’s attempt to expand its appeal beyond its base of former beer-drinking customers to include non-drinkers, those who might have disapproved of beer - and a brand so closely associated with it - but who might have approved of a wholesome beverage whose source was downplayed.

The May issue featured another set of ads that positioned Bevo as a sportsman’s drink: ‘good to train and gain on.’<sup>65</sup> The June issue’s ad spread emphasized the healthfulness of Bevo: ‘Bevo is the highest refinement of the natural drink of primitive man - the accepted drink of modern America - a beverage with real food value.’<sup>66</sup> This issue also provided fourteen reasons for Bevo’s purity, including the high grade of cereals used, the \$1 million state-of-the-art manufacturing plant, the \$10 million bottling and shipping plant, the copper tanks that were ‘hand-scoured and sterilized by steam under 100 pounds of pressure,’ and the fact that the whole process is ‘untouched by human hands.’<sup>67</sup> In fact, all 14 points focused on cleanliness, pasteurization, filtering, or sterilization, significant selling points that ‘should be impressed by salesmen, distributors and dealers upon the public mind.’<sup>68</sup> A year later, it would be estimated that women purchased 87% of ‘raw and market foods.’<sup>69</sup> Thus, this appeal to purity and cleanliness also would have resonated with the female shopper concerned with the safety and quality of Bevo.

The July 1919 issue introduced to Anheuser-Busch salesmen the idea of advertising in movie theaters. The *Tatler* explained that film audiences could not overlook the ‘hand colored lantern slides’ as they might a newspaper ad, promising that the slides would ‘be certain to attract the attention of the movie fans, and the text will

convince them that they should drink Bevo.<sup>70</sup> The slides duplicated the content of black and white print ads, emphasizing leadership, success, popularity, health, and even inviting viewers to visit the Bevo plant in St. Louis. By using color, though, Anheuser-Busch reflected a contemporary finding that color not only attracted attention but also could help create an effective facsimile of a product, a virtual substitute for experiencing a sample of the product itself.<sup>71</sup>

This issue of the *Tatler* also revisited the company's advertising efforts on behalf of its readers. The story did not discuss ad size or placement frequency but volume, impressing upon readers the enormous support their efforts were receiving from the company. The *Tatler* informed them that Bevo was advertised in every town where Anheuser-Busch had agents buying in carload lots. On the national level, it was advertising in 1,700 magazines, newspapers, billboards, and street cars for an estimated total circulation of 50 million, with an average appearance in each newspaper of 15 times a year and in each magazine of 2.5 times. Thus, with an estimated total number of annual imprints of 750 million and an estimated U.S. population of 100 million, the *Tatler* told its readers, each person in the country conceivably could be exposed to a Bevo message seven times a year.<sup>72</sup> The story also made clear that Anheuser-Busch was mindful of the power and the limitations of its advertising efforts and of its dependence on the role of its distributors to reinforce the quality of its products:

The American public has been educated to believe in advertising and advertised goods. The people know that only reliable goods stand the test of advertising. ... no product that is not meritorious can long survive, no matter how liberally it is advertised. . . . the dealer cannot reap the full benefit of our advertising investment unless he is alert and takes advantage of every opportunity to increase his sales.<sup>73</sup>

The October 1919 *Tatler* included a list of the magazines in which the company placed ads for Bevo and Malt-Nutrine, conveying, again, the enormity of the advertising support Anheuser-Busch provided its distributors and dealers. Bevo ads were placed in 36 magazines for a combined circulation of more than 15.8 million, and Malt-Nutrine ads were placed in 22 magazines for a combined circulation of more than 11.3 million.

As an aid in promoting sales, think what this tremendous volume of advertising means to distributors and dealers everywhere. It is one of the reasons why Bevo is known to every consumer of soft drinks as the most delicious, nutritious and satisfying cereal beverage.<sup>74</sup>

The December 1919 issue introduced two new products: 'Malt Sugar Syrup,' a product endorsed by the Department of Agriculture as containing ingredients that serve as a pure and healthful sugar substitute, and the new near-beer Budweiser as 'The Re-Creation of Anheuser-Busch's Famous Budweiser' that conformed to 'every provision of the Volstead law, which became effective October 28, 1919.'<sup>75</sup> The slogan for Budweiser between 1899 and 1905 was 'King of Bottled Beers'; from 1906 to 1950, with the exception of prohibition, the slogan was 'King of All Bottled Beers'; in the years leading up to prohibition, however, it was 'Budweiser Means Moderation.'<sup>76</sup> During prohibition, the new Budweiser, the *Tatler* explained, was manufactured just like the original, '... fully and maturely lagered, put up in sterilized, hermetically sealed, 12-ounce brown bottles, and pasteurized to insure its permanent purity and quality.'<sup>77</sup> Readers were advised, however, that the key to promoting the new Budweiser was not to offer it as an alternative to beer, but to offer it as a quality product in its own right, a strategy pursued by some competing soft drink manufacturers as well.<sup>78</sup> The challenge was to promote a new version of its flagship brand, one that Anheuser-Busch had developed into a national brand as early as the 1880s, when Adolphus Busch traveled, entertained 'lavishly,' took orders for Budweiser, and then left his agents to fulfill them.<sup>79</sup>

The first year of the *Tatler's* publication, then, set the pattern for its brief run: to introduce national advertising efforts undertaken by Anheuser-Busch, to share effective promotional ideas, and to communicate product and promotional messages directly with its field representatives. Other promotional tactics and themes emerged across the next four years that reflected the company's combined efforts to invent, sell, and promote a series of initiatives designed to help it stay afloat.

### **Tactics**

The *Tatler* soon returned to the use of lantern slides as movie theater advertisements that distributors and deal-

ers could localize to reach ‘an average of 35 percent of the population in your town every week.’<sup>80</sup> Two sets of slide images designed two years apart promoted the new Budweiser near beer although none referred to it as such. The first set, promoted in 1920, were available for purchase (a ‘trifling’ cost) by the company’s sales agents, and emphasized the brand identity and messages concerning flavor, quality, satisfaction, familiarity, and price. Each slide featured the ‘Budweiser’ name at least twice, counting the bottle label, the ‘Anheuser-Busch’ name at least twice, and the ‘A & Eagle’ trademark logo one time each, and two of the ads promoted the consumption of Budweiser at home.<sup>81</sup> The second set, promoted in 1922, were offered to agents at no cost but did not feature the brand prominence as strongly as in 1920. This set of slides appealed more to the pleasure of consuming the product by emphasizing taste, thirst, and flavor.<sup>82</sup> Taken in sum, the slides created an association with the brand image of the former real beer version with phrases such as ‘the famous friend of old,’ ‘brings back ‘the friendly glass,’ ‘memories add charm to its wonderful taste,’ and ‘same name - same taste - same flavor.’ Additionally, five of the eight slides encouraged the consumer to buy a case for the home: ‘No household commissary complete without it.’ Another confronted the question of price, informing the consumer that ‘those who want quality will pay the price.’ Still another called attention to the ‘purity, food-value and satisfaction in every bottle.’ As an example of how the company reinforced its brand in contrast to its Bevo and Malt-Nutrine ads, seven of these eight slides featured prominent images of bottles of Budweiser, the word ‘Budweiser,’ the words ‘Anheuser-Busch,’ and the ‘A & Eagle’ trademark logo. One slide replaced the Anheuser-Busch name with an image of an appetizing tray of meats, reminiscent of the free lunches often served by saloons before prohibition.<sup>83</sup>

As before, the slide images reflected some of the content and images found in the print ads, two sets of which were featured in *Tatler* during the summer of 1922. The first set, which appeared in the June issue, consisted of eight ads from a new-Budweiser campaign. As with the slide images, these focused on quality, taste (‘just as good as ever’), ‘tonic food value,’ and previous product experience - of the consumer (‘same old flavor’) and of the company (‘mellowed by many years of knowing how’).<sup>84</sup> Seven of the eight ads featured an image of a bottle of Budweiser on the left and the words

‘Budweiser’ and ‘Everywhere.’ All of the ads featured prominently the ‘A & Eagle’ logo as well as the Anheuser-Busch name. One ad returned to the idea that intoxication was never the reason to enjoy a Budweiser: ‘Body and flavor, not alcoholic content, made Budweiser the favorite. And body and flavor are the same today.’ Another touted Budweiser’s tonic food value, replacing the image of the Budweiser bottle with a larger logo and promoting other Anheuser-Busch products: ‘Made famous by the manufacturers of Bevo, A.B. Ginger Ale, A.B. Root Beer, A.B. Draught, A.B. Barley Malt Syrup, Malt-Nutrine and other products.’<sup>85</sup>

The second set of samples appeared in the August 1922 issue and promoted the company’s A-B Ginger Ale, which, like Bevo and Malt-Nutrine before it, was packaged in the 10-ounce squat bottle. Although the *Tatler* reported that these samples were intended only to show ‘the general character of the advertising,’ they reflected the familiar themes of quality and taste (‘mellow, yet full of pep and ginger’) and included the same emphasis on brand image as in the Budweiser ads.<sup>86</sup> Unlike Bevo or Malt-Nutrine, which had their own brand names, this product was called ‘Anheuser-Busch Ginger Ale.’

In addition to previewing its national ads, the *Tatler* also promoted ad ideas developed and placed independently by field agents. For example, the December 1920 issue reprinted the ads of the New State Ice Company of Oklahoma City, which promoted ‘Bud’ as a soda fountain drink (‘cooling, refreshing, satisfying and healthful’), as a children’s drink (‘... there’s nothing like ‘BUD’ as a health and brawn builder. Wise mothers keep a case in the house all the time’), and as a refreshment for workers or old timers (‘It isn’t quite the same - it can’t be - but it looks, foams, smells, sparkles and tastes like it’).<sup>87</sup> These ads were folksier than Anheuser-Busch’s ads and they took on the ‘near beer’ issue more directly (‘its goodness makes you forget the ‘kick’’).<sup>88</sup> Nevertheless, the *Tatler* encouraged its readers to develop their own ads, to ask the Anheuser-Busch Advertising Department for help in creating local ads, or to request copies of these ads for use in their own markets.

Promotional ideas also were featured in the *Tatler*, which often passed along best-practices efforts from the field. A March 1920 story described the new-Budweiser

dedication at the Bevo plant in St. Louis. The *Tatler* reported that 10,000 people attended, including St. Louis distributors and dealers and ‘city officials, judges, clergymen and other prominent citizens.’<sup>89</sup> Guests included many men, some women, and a few children. Together they drank more than 35,000 glasses of the new Budweiser either in formal taste tests or over a lunch of sausages, roasted pigs, baked hams, bread, and condiments, again, the kinds of items served by saloons as free lunch fare before prohibition.<sup>90</sup> Here, the company not only intended to share the events of the day, but to demonstrate to the distributors and dealers the popularity of the new Budweiser: if public officials and clergy could enjoy it, much less children, then their customers would, too.

Another promotional idea, this time from Spokane, involved distributing tickets that promised the recipients a free glass of ‘ICE COLD Anheuser-Busch Draught’ at the Peacock Buffet.<sup>91</sup> Still another could be found in a photograph of a shop sign featuring new Budweiser, but recalling saloon fare ads of 50 years earlier:

TRY OUR BUDWEISER LUNCH 25¢

Choice of Swiss cheese, Ham or ‘Our Sausage’

Sandwich with real rye bread and bottle of old, good Budweiser-Top off with our clear ‘Havanas’ 3 for 25¢<sup>92</sup>

At a time when the use of trucks was being embraced for the fast and direct shipping and delivery opportunities they presented, the December 1920 issue reported how some distributors and dealers placed signs on their trucks and in their windows to great success, and the May 1922 *Tatler* reported how some salesmen used their spare tire covers for advertising.<sup>93</sup>

Ideas also included point-of-purchase opportunities. A letter from an Arkansas grocer urged customers to try the new Budweiser by splitting one with a friend.<sup>94</sup> Other ideas included producing grocery bag inserts that promoted the company’s Grape Bouquet drink on one side and provided recipes on the other, pairing new Anheuser-Busch beverage products with Malt-Nutrine in store displays, especially in drug stores, and instructing sales clerks to mention Budweiser to their customers, just as they would a staple article.<sup>95</sup>

As a precursor to the kind of corporate sponsorship that would eventually pair the Busch name with St. Louis

baseball and Budweiser with the Superbowl, the *Tatler* urged its readers to integrate Anheuser-Busch products into local events, such as county and state fairs and baseball games: ‘Get busy with the management of every baseball club in your territory and see that both Budweiser and Bevo are sold to the fans at every game.’<sup>96</sup> Another and more unusual tactic was the arrival of Tom the bull in the fall of 1923. Billed as the world’s largest ox, Tom and his handler, Big Bill, were available for regional events, such as state and county fairs.<sup>97</sup>

Church support was encouraged, too. Suggestions included placing ads in church directories and providing Bevo for churches to sell at their socials, allowing them to return any unsold bottles.<sup>98</sup> The *Tatler* also lauded the achievements of agents such as Charles Ilfield of Albuquerque, who made sure that one ice-cold bottle of Budweiser accompanied each of 200 place settings at a local banquet.<sup>99</sup>

In accordance with national advertising trends reflected in *Printers’ Ink* at the time, the *Tatler* often featured success stories about in-store and window displays.<sup>100</sup> One example concerned the Colorado distributor whose salesmen traveled with cases of iced-down bottles of Bevo for their customers to try. Once a customer decided to buy, the salesman set up a display of Bevo cases at the front of the store with a sign that invited customers to buy by the case.<sup>101</sup> Another *Tatler* item featured a photograph of a Bevo window display in a Kansas City F.W. Woolworth’s and a description of the promotion.<sup>102</sup> Frederick Ellis stood in an extravagantly decorated store window for an entire day, using hand-held signs to get the attention of passers-by. Once he did, he would hold up a sign that read, ‘Gee! I’m glad I’m Thirsty’ and then drink a bottle of Bevo with gusto. By day’s end, he had consumed 21 bottles. In the early days of the *Tatler*, when Bevo sales were at their peak, mentions of such store promotions were not uncommon. This particular one stood out because of the elaborate design and participation of the agent and because the *Tatler* reported that Ellis’ efforts generated a 300% increase in Bevo sales.<sup>103</sup>

## Themes

*Patriotism* - In tandem with sales tips and promotional strategies the *Tatler* also focused on some themes in

conveying messages about Anheuser-Busch and its products. As Anheuser-Busch had grown and in the years leading up to the war, it commissioned prints depicting scenes from American history, such as 'Custer's Last Fight' and a series 'depicting the romantic growth and expansion of the United States.'<sup>104</sup> The onset of World War I in Europe and the attack on the Lusitania in 1915, however, fueled anti-German sentiment as the dries stepped up their attacks against the brewers. Anheuser-Busch responded by creating associations between its temperance drinks and American heroes such as George Washington, Ben Franklin, and Abraham Lincoln, the latter of whom was used by 'wets' and 'drys' to support their respective viewpoints.<sup>105</sup> Additionally, despite Budweiser's national success in the previous 30 to 40 years with a label that retained a strong German identity, Anheuser-Busch produced a new label in 1918 that employed distinctly American symbols. English words replaced any remaining German, the American eagle replaced the German royal double eagle, and shafts of grains replaced crowns.<sup>106</sup> The company also loaned its diesel engine facility to the U.S. Navy to build submarines, purchased at least \$1,000,000 in Liberty Loans, and leased a portion of its plant space to the War Department to store munitions.<sup>107</sup>

Yet Americanism was a vibrant theme employed well after the war because it could, according to *Printers' Ink*, 'by its very unusualness attract an overmeasure of attention, at the same time performing patriotic service to the country.'<sup>108</sup> In that tradition, then, Anheuser-Busch launched a series of poster sets in the summer of 1920 that dramatized the American presidency, exploration, and invention. Coinciding with the political conventions being held that summer, the first set depicted incidents in the boyhood or early adulthood of Presidents Grant, Cleveland, Garfield, and Lincoln.<sup>109</sup> The July issue promoted a 'Discoverer' poster series featuring Lewis and Clark, John Fremont, and Pierre Laclede, as well as an image of 'discovering the Mississippi,' while the August issue featured a 'Transportation' series with images of a wagon train, dogsled, steamboat, and train.<sup>110</sup>

*Family, purity* - Along with ideas about Americanism were messages about purity and nutrition that often combined with family. The March 1920 issue of the *Tatler* stressed the importance of sterilizing drinking

glasses: 'Let your customers know that you serve your drinks and eatables in sterilized glasses and dishes, and watch your sales go up.'<sup>111</sup> Emphasize that Budweiser is a healthful alternative to impure water, a later issue advised, 'Protect Your Health! Drink 'Budweiser' While the Water is Bad! Pure and Healthful.'<sup>112</sup> Ideas on leveraging purity to appeal to women as the family grocery shoppers included some from a Macon, Georgia, distributor who suggested capitalizing on the sale of Bevo in military canteens and aboard ship: if the military approved it, women could depend on its 'purity and wholesomeness,' too.<sup>113</sup> He also recommended reminding women how well Bevo went with meals: 'Bevo will solve many lunch troubles in hot or cold weather. ... Bevo is nourishing ... pasteurized ... non-alcoholic ... contains no drugs!'<sup>114</sup> The *Tatler* reminded readers not only to remember Bevo as a children's drink but also, in keeping with its advertising message strategy, to give the Anheuser-Busch trademark 'the widest possible circulation and keep it everlastingly before the public.'<sup>115</sup>

New products also were linked to family messages. The *Tatler* announced a twelve-bottle carton of Budweiser designed to fit in small apartments where 'thousands live' and which 'takes little room, the package is neat, and it is always handy when a bottle or two is needed for the ice box.'<sup>116</sup> The *Tatler* encouraged readers to

push the sale of Budweiser and Ginger Ale in handy-package cartons through grocers and druggists and other dealers making direct deliveries to the home. ... It is surprising how well our distributors hold up their distribution when they cultivate the family trade through these methods.<sup>117</sup>

*Psychology of sales* - Such efforts, the *Tatler* noted, were grounded in psychology. An advertising textbook of the time defined psychology as 'the science of consciousness and behavior' while the 'psychological moment,' the point of sale, occurred when the idea predominated the customer's thoughts.<sup>118</sup> The focus, therefore, must be on the customer's attention to the idea, making timing critical to closing the sale.<sup>119</sup> The *Tatler* urged its salesmen to leverage the 'psychological moment' by 'doing the right thing at the right time.'<sup>120</sup> Pairing Budweiser with drug-store lunches, for example, brought 'the beverage to the attention of the consumer at the psychological moment.'<sup>121</sup> Additionally, the *Tatler* noted that

advertising experts tell us that the psychological influence of advertising makes many sales. ... continually remind them [the public] that you have Budweiser and Bevo for sale. The effect is to create a psychological condition of mind that will eventually compel the observer to buy. When a consumer once buys Budweiser and Bevo, why, you've got him, that's all.<sup>122</sup>

These ideas also extended to more concrete concerns, such as pricing. The *Tatler* explained, for example, that because Anheuser-Busch paid the government tax on Bevo up front, retailers should not raise the price by telling customers it was due to the tax increase.<sup>123</sup> It also reminded readers that price was not the issue in sales: 'A wishy-washy attitude toward your price is overwhelming evidence to the other fellow that your price IS too high.'<sup>124</sup> Within the year, however, concerns about Bevo sales were evident and in May 1921, the *Bevo Tatler* became the *Anheuser-Busch Tatler*, a move that served to de-emphasize Bevo and reflected the company's growing non-alcoholic product line. Sales of new Budweiser also had begun to lag; however, readers were reminded not to neglect Bevo, but to promote it along with Budweiser, emphasizing the quality of both, because, it noted, the two beverages did not compete with another: 'if there is any prejudice against cereal beverages [Bevo] manufactured in conformance to the present laws it is purely psychological.'<sup>125</sup>

Later that year, 'the psychological jag' was described as a common scam in which beer was touted as having illegally high alcohol content to lure customers into paying more for it. It often turned out, the *Tatler* reported, based on Anheuser-Busch's own tests of some of those samples, that the beer was, actually, within or below legal limits (½%). Thus, it explained, that although there were those who swore they could taste higher alcohol content, 'the effect is purely psychological.' The *Tatler* concluded, 'this psychological phase of the unusual situation that exists throughout the country has a disastrous effect upon the business of some our distributors.' The situation also, however, served as a 'record of interesting phenomena growing out of the attempt of government to legislate goodness and virtue into the human race.'<sup>126</sup>

*Prohibition* - The backdrop, of course, for all these tactics and themes within the *Tatler*-and for the publication of the *Tatler* itself-was the Eighteenth Amendment and

the Volstead Act. Early on, the pages of the *Tatler* conveyed legal compliance and legitimacy concerning Anheuser-Busch's prohibition-era products, product development, and distribution. In the February 1920 issue, one month into prohibition, the *Tatler* reaffirmed Anheuser-Busch's adherence to the law, reminding readers of the sales opportunities in the cereal beverage market created by the demise of some competitors who were 'swept away by the enactment of new laws' and reiterating the company's commitment to advertising:

This is an age in which national advertising, intelligently and skillfully directed, is necessary to make a permanent success of any product. ... We shall continue in the future, as we have in the past, to back up our distributors and dealers, with advertising that covers the entire North American continent.<sup>127</sup>

Adherence to the law and commitment to advertising, however, did not necessarily translate into passive compliance. In 1921, for example, the *Tatler* reprinted an editorial from the 14 May issue of *New York Morning Telegraph* in which Anheuser-Busch was lauded for its stance against allowing drug stores to distribute a legal 4½% beer 'to the profit of crooked doctors.' The company's position, according to the *Telegraph*, highlighted the need to revisit the Volstead Act 'from the front,' rather than resort to 'subterfuge.'<sup>128</sup> Later, the *Tatler*, prompted by an inquiry from a new salesman, laid out the impact of prohibition and the strategies that had been employed thus far to survive it, starting with the declaration that 'war regulations and prohibitory legislation practically destroyed the entire business of Anheuser-Busch.' The infrastructure that took 65 years to build was, it said, 'swept away in a year.' But with 'brain power,' millions spent in retooling, and the retention of as many employees as possible, the company - 'its business obliterated by the war and hostile legislation - is operating, not at full capacity to be sure, while thousands of great industries that made millions upon millions during the war and out of the war are closed.' The challenge was not only to create, 'to perfect,' a product that conformed to the law, but also to 'create a market for it.'<sup>129</sup>

The next month, the *Tatler* highlighted those failures wrought by prohibition. The magazine reminded readers that it avoided 'political propaganda' even as the company 'always has been, and always will be, opposed to

prohibition.’ Nevertheless, because its distributors ranged from ‘bone dry’ to ‘dripping wet,’ the *Tatler* presented ‘for the record’ a number of promises that the passage of national prohibition had failed to keep, including complete temperance, elimination of crime, universal prosperity, tax reductions, and better government. It was certain that Anheuser-Busch intended to comply with the law - ‘we believe in law and order and decency - the fair and impartial enforcement of the law’ - but the flagrant violations of the law by ‘crooked officials and crooked politicians’ created ‘unlawful competition’ against which law-abiding companies struggled.<sup>130</sup> The following March, the *Tatler* reported on bootleggers, ‘more than 2,000 of them industriously and intelligently plying their trade under the very noses of the men who are responsible for the prohibition laws and their enforcement.’<sup>131</sup>

The turning point came in June 1922, however, when August Busch sailed to Europe on the *George Washington*, a passenger ship operated by the United States Shipping Board, and learned that passengers were all but guaranteed that ‘the bars for intoxicating liquors will be thrown wide open’ after the ship passed the three-mile limit. In a letter to President Warren G. Harding criticizing the practice, Busch was reported to have concluded that such operations meant the United States ‘is comparably the biggest bootlegger in the world.’<sup>132</sup> News of the letter sparked a flurry of front-page stories and garnered Anheuser-Busch some unlikely bedfellows, such as prohibitionist legislators, who argued that the shipping rules violated the Volstead Act, and Dr. Wilbur E. Crafts, superintendent of the International Reform Bureau, which had been instrumental in drafting the prohibition amendment.<sup>133</sup> The Shipping Board, headed by Albert D. Lasker, stood its ground and vowed to continue the practice of serving wine and beer outside the three-mile limit unless overturned by the Supreme Court.<sup>134</sup>

Congressional attempts to impose fines on any ship of any country that departed from or arrived at an American port were unsuccessful, and the U.S. Treasury continued to support the Shipping Board.<sup>135</sup> In October, however, the Harding Administration issued a legal opinion that effectively applied the Volstead Act to American vessels and that promised to impose sanctions on any other ship entering an American port with liquor on board as cargo or even in a locked bar.<sup>136</sup> Challenged

by the Cunard and Anchor shipping lines, the case went to the Supreme Court, which ruled in favor of the Shipping Board with the exception that any transport of liquor in American waters was illegal.<sup>137</sup>

Soon, the tide turned in the pages of the *Tatler* as well. Even as it continued to support its distributors and salesmen in introducing products, product information, and outlining sales promotion strategies, it incorporated darker, more caustic comment on the state of prohibition. In excerpting comments from a speech by Louis K. Liggett, president of the United Drug Company, for example, the *Tatler* quoted Liggett as saying, ‘One of the biggest jokes in the country is the prohibition enforcement office. There are bootleggers in every corner, and attempt at their apprehension is amusing.’<sup>138</sup> Items that connected prohibition and bootlegging with rises in crime, divorce, stomach ailments, even venereal disease, appeared in the *Tatler* over the next two years, as did stories on the deaths of sheriffs, wives involved in ‘booze making,’ and overall failures of enforcement laws.<sup>139</sup>

December 1924 marked the last issue of the *Tatler*, which itself ended with a bitter Christmas message, one that wished readers joy and happiness while reminding them that Anheuser-Busch had been in the business of ‘creating happiness’ until reformers replaced that joy with ‘hatreds’ that ‘bred crime and disease’ and so bled the world of ‘good comradeship’ that there was ‘certainly not enough to go around among all God’s children.’<sup>140</sup>

By that time, however, Anheuser-Busch had regained its footing. Losses had decreased from almost \$2.5 million in 1919 to less than a quarter of a million dollars by the end of 1922, although employment experienced a similar drop from an estimated 6,500-8,000 in 1920 to 2,000 by 1925.<sup>141</sup> By 1923, the company reported that it had broken even, although, by 1924, it had sold one-half of its holdings.<sup>142</sup> The company continued to produce Bevo and new Budweiser until 1929 and 1933, respectively, but sales of both were negligible by 1923. The fates of other Anheuser-Busch products developed during prohibition varied. A-B Ginger-Ale ceased production in 1928, but A-B Extra Dry Ginger Ale survived until 1942, as did the company’s root beer; production ceased on Grape Bouquet in 1928 but it continued with Malt Syrup until 1954 and with baker’s yeast, launched

in 1926, until 1990.<sup>143</sup> Nevertheless, in the last issue of the *Tatler*, the company made it clear that it believed it had accomplished its educational mission through the publication, which served as: ‘... a textbook on the products of Anheuser-Busch, their processes of manufacture, the sales policies, principles and ethics of the Corporation, and the spokesman for our distributors and dealers.’<sup>144</sup>

## Conclusion

Although it is difficult to determine the precise impact the *Tatler* may have had on the company’s bottom line, given the rapidly shifting product lines, the asset liquidations, and the employee layoffs occurring during the same period, the *Tatler* revealed a wealth of information concerning Anheuser-Busch’s intentional positioning of itself and its products in response to the prohibition laws. As a sales promotion magazine, the *Tatler* was designed for public consumption. In fact, at its final issue, its circulation was 12,500, up from 5,000 at its launch. As such, the *Tatler* proved to provide a public record of a company in crisis. It served as the primary channel for Anheuser-Busch to convey the key messages to be delivered and reinforced by its jobbers and drummers, and through them to the retailers, while developing and establishing new product lines, new markets, new business strategies, and redefining its customer base. In doing so, the *Tatler* provided a window into how the otherwise closely held company transitioned from the vertically integrated manufacturer of a leading national brand, Budweiser Lager Beer, to the diversified manufacturer of Bevo, new Budweiser, and other legal foodstuffs and consumer products, documenting along the way the company’s shift from resentful compliance to outright condemnation of the prohibition laws. Thus, this study of the *Tatler* as a sales promotions tool launched by the leading American brewer during prohibition is also a profile of that company as it struggled to stay afloat once its flagship product was declared illegal.

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3. Anon. (1935) ‘King of Bottled Beer,’ *Fortune*. July, p.42; Kingsdale, J.M. (1973) ‘The Poor Man’s Club: Social Functions of the Working Class Saloon,’ *American Quarterly*. 25, p. 473.
4. Anon (1926) ‘Kolossal,’ *Time*. 6 December, p.36.
5. Chandler Jr., A.D. (1977) *The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp.503-512 [Appendix A]. For Chandler’s explanation and elaboration of the chart, see pp.348-363. Schlitz was the only other brewer included on the list, at number 228 with \$25 million.
6. Beset by chronic and painful health problems, August Busch committed suicide in 1934. See Hernon, P. and Ganey, T. (1991) *Under the Influence: The Unauthorized Story of the Anheuser-Busch Dynasty*. New York: Simon & Schuster, pp.159-163.
7. Chandler, A.D. (1977) op. cit. pp.299-301.
8. Laird, P.W. (1998) *Advertising Progress: American Business and the Rise of Consumer Marketing*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, p.209. Laird points to this dynamic as one reason advertising began being outsourced. Managers recognized, she said, ‘different market conditions that called for new marketing practices.’
9. *ibid*, p.31.
10. Chandler, A.D. (1977) op. cit. pp.25, 215-216. In particular, according to Chandler, jobbers outnumbered importers in ‘dry goods, groceries, china, glass, and earthenware’ but numbered ‘about the same’ in ‘drugs and wines, and spirits’ whereas importers outnumbered jobbers in ‘hardware, fancy dry goods, and clothing trades.’ p.26.
11. Cobb Jr., A. (1920) ‘When is Jobber Distribution Advisable?: The Sliding Scale of Prices vs. the Flat Jobber Discount,’ *Printers’ Ink*, 9 July, p.34.
12. Laird, P.W. (1998) op. cit. p.34.
13. Chandler, A.D. (1977) op. cit. p.219.
14. *ibid*. p.229.
15. *ibid*. p.219.
16. Laird, P.W. (1998) op. cit. p.34.
17. *ibid*. p.197. This approach also had the advantage of avoiding problems that could arise with salespeople who could not necessarily be trusted to deliver the goods and the messages as the manufacturer intended.
18. Barstow, R. (1920) ‘What Are the Duties of a Sales Promotion Department?’ *Printers’ Ink*. 15 July, p.157.
19. Plavchan, R.J. (1976) op. cit. p.196; Anon. (1935) op. cit. p.102; Anon (1926) op. cit. p.35.
20. The author wishes to thank Tracy Lauer, Anheuser-Busch corporate archivist, for her assistance during a visit to

the Anheuser-Busch corporate archives in 2012, as well as to Ms. Lauer, William J. Vollmar, Ph.D., Mary Louise Brown, and Lynn Fendler, who provided assistance during an earlier trip to the archives in 2001.

21. See, for example, Lamm, M.O. (2004) 'Tapping into War: Leveraging World War I in the Drive for a Dry Nation,' *American Journalism, Special Issue: Persuasive Communication*. 21, no.4, pp.63-91.

22. In truth, Wayne B. Wheeler, the Anti-Saloon League of America's national counsel and Washington lobbyist, was the primary force behind the Act, drafting it for House Judiciary Committee Chair Andrew J. Volstead. See Steuart, J. (1928) *Wayne Wheeler, Dry Boss*. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. Reprint (1970) Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, pp.99, 150; Kerr, K.A. (1985) *Organized for Prohibition: A New History of the Anti-Saloon League*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, p.222. See *National Prohibition Act, Statutes at Large* 85, 305 (1919). Title I of the Act and its seven sections addressed the continuation of the Wartime Prohibition Act, effective until terminated by the President of the United States. Title II and its thirty-nine sections addressed the legal rules surrounding the manufacture, transportation, or sale of alcohol. Title III and its 21 sections addressed industrial alcohol.

23. Steuart, J. (1928) op. cit. p.153. As it turned out, Wilson vetoed the National Prohibition Act when it arrived on his desk but Congress overrode him, and the Act was challenged in court on questions of constitutionality, but remained in force. Some of those problems included (1) ownership of property connected to the manufacture, transport, storage, or sale of alcohol did not preclude the legal possession and consumption of liquor in a private residence, as long as only residents and guests consumed it; (2) the definitions of 'liquor' differed between Titles I and II of the Act, although both defined an alcoholic beverage as containing ½% alcohol by volume; and (3) the U.S. Department of Internal Revenue was charged both with overseeing the legal manufacturing of alcohol (e.g., medicinal or sacramental use) and for reporting abuses to the U.S. District Attorney. See *National Prohibition Act, Statutes at Large* pp.85, 305, 307-308, 314, 317 (1919). The U.S.B.A. suspected that the true purpose of such a rigid standard of alcohol content was 'to destroy the large and growing business of the brewers in non-intoxicating beers.' With the Food Control Act restrictions lifted after the war, brewers could resume using the foodstuffs they needed to produce near-beer (which was manufactured almost exactly like real beer, except it was de-alcoholized before bottling) and cereal beverages, which were grain-based, non-fermented, non-alcoholic beverages. To illustrate how

unrealistic the U.S.B.A. believed the alcohol standard to be, it compiled charts showing the alcoholic content of various products not considered to be intoxicating beverages, such as Hire's Homemade Root Beer, which came the closest to the Volstead standard at 0.53% content after 36 hours and 0.89% after 96 hours; flavor extracts, ranging from 10.82% in Golden Rule's Blackberry Flavoring to 93.09% in Williams & Carlton Jamaica Ginger extract; patent medicines, ranging from 5% in Lepso to 46% in Dr. Grady's Pure Malt Rye; and cider, which averaged 6.28% in 15 samples purchased from farmers. See Anon. (1920) *The 1919 Year Book of the United States Brewers' Association*. New York: The United States Brewers' Association, 23, pp.171-4.

24. Sinclair, A. (1964) *Era of Excess: A Social History of the Prohibition Movement*. New York: Harper & Row, p.112.

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26. Sinclair, A. (1964) op. cit. p.112.

27. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on the Judiciary, *Brewing and Liquor Interests and German and Bolshevik Propaganda: Report and Hearings of the Subcommittee on the Judiciary*, 66th Cong., 1st sess., 19 November 1918, 65. Historian K. Austin Kerr pointed out that the A.S.L.A.'s depiction of the liquor traffic as a unified whole was misleading because distillers, brewers, and wineries did not comprise a cohesive movement; there was no 'centralized liquor business force.' See Kerr, K.A. (1985) op. cit. pp.24 & 27.

28. Sinclair, A. (1964) op. cit. p.111.

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32. Senate Subcommittee, *German and Bolshevik Propaganda*, 19 November 1918, p.82.

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80. *Bevo Tatler*, December 1920, p.5.
81. *ibid.* December 1920, p.5.
82. *Anheuser-Busch Tatler*, February 1922, p.16.
83. *Bevo Tatler*, December 1920, p.5; *Anheuser-Busch Tatler*, February 1922, p.16.
84. *Anheuser-Busch Tatler*, June 1922, pp.10-11.
85. *ibid.*
86. *ibid.* August 1922, pp.10-11.
87. *ibid.* December 1920, pp.10-11.
88. *ibid.*
89. *ibid.* March 1920, p.4.
90. *ibid.* March 1920, pp.4, 8, & 10-11.
91. *ibid.* October 1921, p.12.
92. *Bevo Tatler*, April 1920, p.6.
93. *Anheuser-Busch Tatler*, May 1922, p.13. On the use of trucks, see Anon. [1986] (1938) p.301.
94. *Bevo Tatler*, April 1920, p.9.
95. *Anheuser-Busch Tatler*, April 1923, pp.6 & 8; July 1923, p.4.
96. *Bevo Tatler*, August 1920, p.19; April 1920, p.7.
97. *Anheuser-Busch Tatler*, October 1923, pp.6 & 19.
98. *Bevo Tatler*, August 1919, 8; September 1919, p.9.
99. *Anheuser-Busch Tatler*, March 1922, p.16.
100. See, for example, Anon. (1922a) 'Chevrolet Plan Lends Flavor of Realism to Dealer's Windows,' *Printers' Ink Monthly*. December, pp.94-97; Cameron, J.F. (1922) 'Is Dignity More Valuable Than Window Displays?' *Printers' Ink Monthly*. January, pp.56-57; Anon. (1924) 'Getting Down to Hardpan on Window Display Problems: Window Display Convention Emphasized Necessity of Co-operation between Buyers and Sellers of Display Material to Make Windows More Resultful,' *Printers' Ink*, 9 October, pp.97-100.

101. *Bevo Tatler*, April 1919, p.2.
102. *ibid.* p.18.
103. The *Tatler* did not report the duration of the sales boost or the base sales volume before the increase.
104. Plavchan, R.J. (1976) *op. cit.* p.96.
105. Holland, G. (1929) *op. cit.* p.177; Sinclair, A. (1964) *op. cit.* p.116.
106. Change in Budweiser label, *Images from the Archives*, p.112. Anheuser-Busch.
107. Plavchan, R.J. (1976) *op. cit.* pp.133 & 142.
108. Anon. (1920) 'Advertising with Americanism as a By-Product,' *Printers' Ink*. 8 April, p.160.
109. *Bevo Tatler*, June 1920, pp.10-11.
110. *ibid.* July 1920, pp.10-11; August 1920, pp.10-11.
111. *ibid.* March 1920, p.12.
112. *ibid.* February 1921, p.15.
113. *ibid.* May 1919, p.8.
114. *ibid.* p.8.
115. *Anheuser-Busch Tatler*, May 1922, pp.14-15.
116. *ibid.* November 1922, 11.
117. *ibid.*
118. Kitson, H.D. (1920) *Manual for the Study of The Psychology of Advertising and Selling*. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, pp.16 & 106.
119. *ibid.* p.106. Laird credited *Printers' Ink* with launching the role of psychology in advertising in 1895; soon it was considered an important scientific tool that should outweigh intuition on the part of the ad creators. See Laird, P.W. (1998) *op. cit.* p.289.
120. *Bevo Tatler*, February 1921, p.15.
121. *Anheuser-Busch Tatler*, January, 1924, p.4.
122. *Bevo Tatler*, December 1920, p.2.
123. *ibid.* April 1919, p.5.
124. *ibid.* May 1919, p.5.
125. *ibid.* April 1920, p.3; May 1920, p.3, 12; January 1921, p.17.
126. *Anheuser-Busch Tatler*, July 1921, pp.7 & 31. The article referred to higher alcohol content as being 4½%.
127. *Bevo Tatler*, February 1920, p.9.
128. *Anheuser-Busch Tatler*, June 1921, p.3.
129. *ibid.* September, 1921, pp.10-12 & 22.
130. *ibid.* October 1921, pp.2 & 18-19.
131. *ibid.* March 1922, p.18.
132. Anon. (1922b) 'Head of Brewery Calls Government Chief Bootlegger,' *Christian Science Monitor*. 14 June, p.1. Contemporary newspaper articles here were retrieved from ProQuest Historical Newspapers database.
133. Anon. (1922c) 'Our Ships in Port Can't Have Liquor,' *New York Times*. 15 June, p.1; Anon. (1922d) 'Crafts Praises Busch Action,' *The Atlanta Constitution*., 18 June, p.1.
134. Anon. (1922e) 'Lasker Stands By Selling of Liquors On Our Ships At Sea,' *New York Times*. 15 June, p.1.
135. Anon. (1922f) 'Would Bar Any Ship That Sells Liquor,' *New York Times*. 16 June, p.1; Anon. (1922g) 'Subsidy Bill Is In; No Liquor Clauses,' *New York Times*, 17 June, p.1; Anon. (1922h) 'Liquor Sales Legal on Board's Vessels,' *The Washington Post*. 17 June, p.1.
136. Anon. (1922i) 'Harding Prohibits Liquor on Our Ships And On Foreign Craft in American Ports; Backs Sweeping Ruling by Daugherty,' *New York Times*. 7 October, p.1.
137. Anon. (1922j) 'American Ships Win First Step in Fight To Lift Liquor Ban,' *New York Times*. 13 October, p.1; Anon. (1922k) 'To Carry Fight to Supreme Court,' *The Atlanta Constitution*. 25 October, p.1; *Anheuser-Busch Tatler*, August, 1923, pp.16-17.
138. *Anheuser-Busch Tatler*, March, 1923, p.12.
139. *ibid.* April, 1923, 18; June, 1923, p.19; December, 1923, p.17, back cover; May, 1924, p.13; August, 1924, pp.9 & 14; November, 1924, pp.12, 17 & 19; December 1924, pp.11, 13 & 18-19.
140. *ibid.* December 1924, back cover.
141. Plavchan, R.J. (1976) *op. cit.* p.196; Anon. (1935) *op. cit.* p.102, Anon (1926) *op. cit.* p.35.
142. Plavchan, R.J. (1976) *op. cit.* pp.200 & 199.
143. 'Anheuser-Busch Fact Sheet,' p.11; Plavchan, R.J. (1976) *op. cit.* pp.183-86.
144. *Anheuser-Busch Tatler*, December 1924, p.3.